Space-Cabin Atmospheres: Part II - Fire and Blast Hazards. A Literature Review by Roth, Emanuel M.
CASE FILE 
~~. --~ CO py 
NASA SP-48 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19640010830 2020-03-11T13:23:31+00:00Z
NASA SP-48 
SPACE-CABIN ATMOSPHERES 
-.-~ .---- - --
Part II-Fire and Blast 
Hazards 
A li terature review by 
Emanuel M. Roth, M.D. 
Prepared under contract for NASA by 
Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education 
and Research, Albuquerque, New Mexico 
Scientific and Technical Information Division 1964 
NA TI ONAL A ERONAUTI CS A N D SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
Washington, D. C. 
FOR SALE BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS. U .S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON. D .C . 20402 - PRICE $1.00 
Foreword 
THIS REPORT IS PART II OF A STUDY ON Space-Cabin Atmospheres, conducted 
under sponsorship of the Directorate, Space Medicine, Office of Manned Space 
Flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Future parts of this 
report will be: Part III, "Physiological Factors of Inert Gases," and Part IV, 
"One- versus Multiple-Gas Systems." Part I, "Oxygen Toxicity," was origi-
nally published as NASA TN D-2008, dated August 1963, and will be repub-
lished as NASA SP-47. 
This document provides a readily available summary of the open literature 
in the field. It is intended primarily for biomedical scientists and design 
engineers. 
The manuscript was reviewed and evaluated by leaders in the scientific 
community as well as by the NASA staff. As is generally true among scien-
tists, there was varied opinion about the author's interpretation of the data 
compiled. There was nonetheless complete satisfaction with, the level and 
scope of scholarly research that went into the preparation of the document. 
Thus, for scientist and engineer alike it is anticipated that this study will 
become a basic building block upon which research and development within 
the space community may proceed. 
GEORGE M. KNAUF, M.D. 
Acting Director, Space Medicine 
Office oj Manned Space Flight 
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In trod uction 
THE RAPID EVOLUTION OF AIRCRAFT and, lately, space vehicles has brought 
with it the ever-increasing difficulty of designing for prevention of fires and 
explosions. The present-day sealed cabin with its limited work space, unusual 
atmospheric constituents, and lack of flexibility in emergency situations has 
brought new and ill-defined hazards into the picture. 
In the past, numerous data have been compiled on the fire and explosion 
characteristics of all things combustible. Unfortunately, much of the material 
is not pertinent to the actual operational problems in space. The confusion 
and controversy arising from attempts to evaluate the space-cabin fire prob-
lem appear to stem from past failure to compile the scattered data and to 
expose it to critical review and selection. In the compilation that follows, an 
attempt has been made to review the best available data that was deemed 
actually pertinent to the present problem. The effects of unusual atmospheres 
have been emphasized, but, as will soon be evident, other physical parameters 
also playa major role in determining the nature of the problem. 
Chapter 1 contains a discussion of pertinent definitions and theory. This 
is detailed only to the point of anticipating some of the problems of interpreta-
tion that may arise in other chapters of the report. Included in this chapter 
is speculation on the impact of unusual environmental conditions such as aero-
dynamic heating, reduced gravitational acceleration, and low ambient pres-
sures. Chapter 2 covers flammable fabrics and carbonaceous solids; Chapter 3, 
specific fire hazards involving flammable liquids, vapors, and gases; and Chap-
ter 4, electrical fires. Chapter 5 covers the fire, blast, and flash hazards from 
meteoroid penetration; and Chapter 6, the problems of fire prevention and 
extinguishment in space cabins. Chapter 7 reviews the factors of fire and 
blast hazards in selection of a space-cabin atmosphere. 
IX 
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CHAPTER 1 
Definition and Theory 
IN DEFI ING THE WORD" FIRE," we are starting 
our discussion in a hazardous but necessary 
way. A fire is usually thought of as a rapid 
decomposition of matter by oxidation such that 
heat is dissipated and gases emitted. The 
process is usually defined to include a visible 
flame. The definition of flame is more diffi-
cult. Flames (or deflagration processes) are 
the products of strongly exothermic free-radical 
reactions between gases and vapors resulting 
in hot combustion products and accompanied 
by light emission.88 • 133 
The terms "detonation" and "explosion" 
are widely misused. Both have been used to 
describe violent reactions such as those accom-
panied by loud noise or even a shock wave, Or 
those causing severe damage. For the pur-
poses of this report, an explosion will be defined 
as a condition of chemical reaction in which self-
acceleration of rate leads to rapid pressure 
rise. Two kinds of explosion are commonly 
distinguished. One is called a branched chain 
explosion, of which the hydrogen-oxygen re-
action discussed on pages 18 and 19 is an ex-
ample. The other is a thermal explosion. 
In this the material reacts exothermally to 
produce heat at a faster rate than heat is los t 
by conduction, convection, and radiation . 
Because of the generally exponential depend-
ence of rate of reaction on temperature, in 
such a situation the rate of chemical reaction 
increases rapidly. The result is a disruptive 
pressure rise. 
A detonation is specifically an exothermic 
reaction which takes place in a high-pressure 
hydrodynamic wave moving at supersonic 
velocity with respect to the unreacted material,69 
Flames (or deflagration processes), on the other 
hand, travel at subsonic velocity with respect 
to the unreacted material. Further, except 
for transients during the building or decay 
periods, the velocity of propagation is a constant 
and is more closely defined by the fluid thermo-
dynamic variables than by the chemical vari-
ables in the system. 
ow that we have generally defined our 
terms, let us proceed to an analysis of those 
physicochemical factors which define the actual 
fire or detonation hazard in any system. 
During the past few years there has been 
considerable progress in development of flame 
theory. Most of the theoretical approaches 
to gas-phase theory have been generated by 
Hirschfelder and his coworkers in the United 
States,56. 108 Spalding in England/OIl. 210 and 
Lovachev in the U.S.S.R.137· 138 A critical 
review of the theory of defiagration in homo-
geneous gas mixtures prior to 1952 may be found 
in an excellent paper by Evans.73 MaJor con-
tributions to the development of the theory 
of condensed-phase defiagration have been 
made in the past several years . The most 
pertinent appear to be the studies of Spalding 208 
on burning of solid and liquid propellants, 
Wise and Agoston 241 and Williams 240 on the 
burning of liquid droplets, Nachbar and Wil-
liams 163 on the analysis of linear pyrolysis, and 
Andersen et 0.1.4 on combustion of composite 
solid propellants . The theories of condensed-
phase detonations owe much of their current 
sophistication to the pioneering efforts of Wood 
and Kirkwood 124 . 245 and Eyring and his co-
workers.74 A recent contribution to the theory 
of gas-phase detonation has been the work of 
D . R . White.236 A comprehensive review of 
detonation theory has been presented by 
E vans.69 Finally, initiation phenomena (igni-
tion) have received modern theoretical treat-
ment by Bowden and his coworkers.20 • 21 
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In the past, most theories of flame propaga-
tion, flammability limits, quenching diameters, 
and detonation parameters were greatly over-
simplified. Specific flame systems are often 
dependent on a single limiting physicochemical 
parameter. Because of this fact, attempts to 
formulate flame theory on the basis of heat 
transfer alone, diffusion of active species alone, 
or chemical kinetics alone had some success. 
It was obvious, however, that a unified approach 
required that all parameters be taken into 
account. Background factors such as chemical 
rate constants, diffusion rates, and radiation 
constants became part of the increasing com-
plexity of mathematical solutions to the prob-
lem. In spite of the sophistication of recent 
treatments, an overall analysis of the param-
eters in anyone flame system has yet to be 
attained. 
One can hardly expect analysis of a problem 
such as "fire hazard" to be amenable to any-
thing but an order-of-magnitude approach. 
Attempts have been made to define fire hazards 
on a basis other than pure intuition. An ex-
cellent review of this approach has been pre-
sented by Van Dolah et al., 220 of the Bureau of 
Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior. Much 
of the material presented in this chapter is taken 
from this review; figures 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are 
Van Dolah's adaptation of figures from Lewis 
and von Elbe. 133 The physicochemical vari-
abIes will be stressed because they are so critical 
in defining a hazardous condition. Apparent in 
this discussion will be the "threshold factors" 
which play such a major role in free-radical 
reactions of all types. The theoretical role of 
oxygen and inert gases as they affect each phase 
of the combustion process are also discussed. It 
will be apparent that a statement defining the 
hazardous nature of any gaseous environment 
must include a very rigid definition of the entire 
system. Much of the confusion which appears 
to exist today arises from the basic neglect of 
these system variables. Recent interviews 
with "fire experts" suggest that many opinions 
regarding the problem of fire hazards in space 
have been given by individuals quite unfamiliar 
with the basic physics and chemistry of com-
bustion. Their sweeping statements regarding 
"the hazard" have only served to confuse the 
issue. Therefore, an attempt is made to cover 
each phase of the combustion picture: ignition, 
flame propagation, detonation, and flame ex-
tinguishment. The environmental variables 
presented by the total space-cabin conditions 
which modify these phases are then discussed. 
These discussions and their bibliographic nota-
tions are not meant to be comprehensive. They 
will point out only the major factors pertinent 
to the problem at hand. 
IGNITION 
Ignition, or the initiation of a combustion 
process, must be defined in an operational way. 
One judges whether ignition has occurred only 
by setting the physical criteria of whether a 
deflagration or detonation process has indeed 
occurred. Grossly, the presence of a visible 
high-temperature flame may satisfy the judg-
ment. Under confinement, flames may produce 
rises in pressure. Thus, changes in tempera-
ture, radiation, and pressure are usually the 
cri teria used to i udge ignition. 
The initiating source is obviously critical in 
defining ignition. In general, sources may be 
categorized as follows: 
(a) E lectrical-electrostatic or induction 
(break) sparks 
(b) Hot surfaces-frictional or impact sparks; 
heated walls, surfaces, or wires; heating by 
high shear rates; and plastic deformation of 
sharp points 
(c) Heated gases-hot gas jets (pilot flame); 
adiabatic compression; shock waves and metal-
lic vapor from meteoroid penetrations 
(d) Hypergolic ignition 
In space cabins the first three types of ignition 
are the most probable. As we shall see, any 
combustible mixture will respond to the effects 
of ambient pressure and mixture ratios quite 
differently under different ignition conditions. 
In general, one must think in terms of locali-
zation of the source of energy in space and time. 
At one end of the spectrum are electrostatic 
sparks which may discharge across a gap of less 
than 1 mm in less than a microsecond . The 
high local temperature of such a source triggers 
the chemical reaction in a microscopic flame 
kernel and makes the energy of the source the 
key factor in initiation. Ignition depends only 
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on whether the kernel is large enough to de-
velop a self-propagating flame. Quenching the 
kernel below the temperature required for self-
propagation will effectively arrest the flame. 
Miners' safety lamps and quenching flanges on 
explosion-proof motors make use of this flame-
arrestor principle. At the other end of the 
time-space spectrum is the heating of a gaseous 
mixture within a closed container. Here much 
energy is supplied in toto but only the specific 
temperature of the system determines ignition. 
The spontaneous ignition temperature may be 
defined as that temperature at which the rate 
of exothermic chemical heating of the system 
exceeds the rate of heat loss from the system. 
Another parameter to be considered is the 
phenomenon of ignition delay. A finite time 
of exposure to any heat source is required for 
initiating ignition. For example, a methane-
air mixture with a spontaneous ignition tem-
perature of 1,000° F may be safely exposed to 
an impinging jet of gases at 2,000° F if the 
contact time between source and combustible 
material is short enough. Each ignition source 
is reviewed in greater detail in the following 
paragraphs to illustrate how time, space, and 
components of the combustible system control 
ignition. 
Electrical Sparks 
The structure and dynamics of sparks have 
been studied thoroughly by many groups 
from different points of view. Internal-com-
bustion engineers, fire-safety engineers, and 
explosive experts, to name a few, have wrestled 
with this problem. After World War II, 
Lewis, von Elbe, and their coworkers in troduced 
a new approach to the problem. IS . 16. 132,133 
These workers shifted from the focus on capaci-
tance and inductance in spark circuits to the 
spark energy available at the point source. 
Some of the physicochemical factors controlling 
the effectiveness of any spark energy in initiat-
ing combustion will now be reviewed. Only 
general concepts will be discussed except where 
potential space-cabin considerations are in-
volved. This material has been taken from the 
review by Van Dolah et al. 220 of the Lewis and 
von Elbe studies. It shows how difficult it is 
to actually define a spark-induced fire hazard 
in quantitative terms, especially in as complex a 
system as a space cabin. Figure 1 illustrates 
the dependence of critical spark energy on the 
electrode separation or length of spark gap. 
Shorter gap lengths require greater critical 
energies for ignition because the propagating 
flame kernel has to reach a critical size to initiate 
combustion, and the electrodes themselves 
may act as quenching agen ts. There is, as 
expected, an optimum gap length for minimum-
energy ignition. 
Figure 2 indicates how this minimum ignition 
energy, in turn, depends on the fuel-air ratio 
for any given combustible mixture. As the 
mixture approaches limits of flammability, the 
energy required for ignition approaches infinity. 
Figure 3 shows how the molecular weight of 
a homologous series of hydrocarbons deter-
mines the minimum spark energy required for 
ignition of any given stoichiometric ratio of 
fuel to air. In general, the greater the molecu-
lar weight, the more the minimum ignition 
energy shifts to the higher stoichiometric frac-
tion of hydrocarbon. It is believed that in 
this type of ignition the relative diffusivity of 
fuels in air controls the initial aerodynamic 
factors in propagation of the flame kernel and 
that this factor is more important than the 
actual chemical reactivity of the materials. 
The factors presented in figure 4 are most 
pertinent to the space-cabin problem. These 
graphs show how the oxygen content of the 
system affects the minimum spark energy for 
the ignition of propane. It is evident that at 
any given percentage of oxygen in an oxygen-
Partial quenching 
by electrodes 
"/ Optimum gap length 
"--- -- ------- - - --:--"""--...-:::-. 
Gap length 
Minimum 
ignition energy 
FIGURE I.-Minimum iAnition enerAies at various 
lenAths of spark Aap. (AFTER VAN DOLAH ET AL.220) 
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nitrogen mixture, halving the total pressure will 
increase the minimum energy by a factor of 
about 5. It is also evident that increasing the 
percentage of oxygen at any total pressure will 
not only decrease the minimum spark energy, 
but also extend the limits of flammability to a 
much wider range. For example, in going from 
21 percent oxygen to 100 percent oxygen, the 
minimum required spark energy decreases by 3 
orders of magnitude. The total range of flam-
mability increases from about 2-10 percent 
propane in a mixture with air to 2-55 percent 
propane in a mixture with 100 percent oxygen. 
These curves are referred to again in the discus-
sion of the selection of space-cabin atmospheres 
(Chapter 6). 
The generation of an electrostatic spark with-
in a space-cabin system is always a danger. An 
E 
1,000 ,-------,--1----...,--, I 
l OOt-
I t--
I -----: Limits of ~ 
,..--- flammability I 
I I 
I , 
I I_ 
I I 
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I I I I -
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" / 
....... / 
-
I' .2~------------~----------~ o .1 .2 
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FIGURE 2.-Ignitibility curve f o r butane-air mix-
tures at 1 atmosphere and 78° F. (AFTER VAN 
DOLAH ET AL. 220) 
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FIGURE 3.-Effects of molecular weight of fuel on 
stoichiometric ratio for easiest ignitibility at 
p ressure of 1 atmosphere. (AFTER VAN DOLAH ET 
AL. 220) 
average-sized man with a capacitance of 300 
fJ.fJ.f, charged to 10,000 volts, could conceiv-
ably initiate a discharge of energy (CV2/2) 
equal to 15 millijoules. How dangerous is this 
spark discharge? Figure 5 is a compilation of 
all the measurements made by the Lewis and 
von Elbe group on hydrocarbon mixtures that 
contained from 21 percent to 100 percent oxy-
gen at initial pressures from 0.1 to 2.0 atmos-
pheres. It would appear from this compilation 
that almost any of the flammable mixtures 
studied can be spark-ignited by commonly 
occurring elect:r.ostatic discharges. 
The "excess enthalpy theory" of spark igni-
tion of von Elbe and his coworkers has recently 
been opened to question by several groups. 245. 256 
However, the general concepts outlined above 
are still valid. 
The general problem of protection against 
electrostatic spark discharges is not limited to 
the problem of dissipation of energy but in-
eludes as well the control of generation and 
accumulation processes. The problem as en-
countered in hospital operating rooms has been 
studied by Guest et al,94 and will not be reviewed 
here except to mention the use of electrically 
conducting materials in the breathing appara-
tus, sheets, uniforms, shoes, and floors. Addi-
tional dissipation is attained by maintaining 
the atmospheric humidity at a high level. The 
general problem of protection against electro-
static hazards has been adequately studied by 
the American Petroleum Institute. 173 
A recent study by Litchfield 135 at the Bureau 
of Mines suggests that the characteristics of 
electrostatic spark ignition are encountered in 
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other ignition processes, especially break sparks, 
heated fine wires, and converging shock waves. 
This should be kept in mind during considera-
tion of other ignition sources. 
When an electrical switch is opened or when 
a current-carrying wire is broken mechanically, 
an arc may jump between the separating con-
ductors. Ignition of the insulation or combus-
tible gas mixtures may then occur. Since most 
of the energy is converted into heat while the 
conductors are close together, the parameters 
for ignition resemble those for short-gap electro-
static sparks. Because of the quenching effects 
of short spark gaps (see the curve of fig. 1), it 
appears that the spark energy for ignition by 
break sparks would be higher than the cor-
responding minimum energies described in 
10 ~ 
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figures 2 to 5. In general, the millijoule range 
rather than fractional millijoule range is re-
quired for ignition. Most data 93 are given 
as maximum safe current in wires. The vari-
able heat sinks provided by the wire and in-
ductance factors in the system prevent as 
rigorous a treatment of break sparks as that 
available for electrostatic sparks. 
Hot Surfaces 
Small wires, especially if the heating current 
occurs as a brief pulse, can be treated as local 
sources of energy release similar to electric 
sparks. The results of Jones 121 cover the short-
duration hot-wire effects on condensed-phase 
igmtlOns. In practical fire-hazard problems, 
fine-wire heating usually occurs not in micro-
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seconds, but in multisecond puls"es. The igni-
tion system is therefore similar to one involving 
larger hot surfaces. 
In general, the temperature required to ignite 
a large volume of combustible gases decreases 
with increase in wire diameter, as illustrated by 
the typical curve in figure 6. Gravitational 
factors begin to play a role in this ignition 
picture. Large heated wires set up convection 
currents which limit the contact time between 
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tion energy and optimum electrode separation 
(quenching distance) for hydrocarbon mixtures 
containing 21 to 100 percent oxygen at initial 
pressures from 0 .1 to 2.0 atmospheres. (AFTER 
VAN DOLAH ET AL.220) 
the heated surface and the small adjacent 
volume of combustible gas. Increasing the 
diameter of the wire prolongs the contact time 
and thus decreases the surface temperature 
required for ignition. Reduction of the gravi-
tational field decreases convective cooling and 
simulates an increase in diameter. More will 
be said of this in the discussion of space en-
vironment effects. Surrounding the gas mix-
ture with a hot surface also simulates the factors 
invoked for increase in wire diameter.2';O 
An interesting offshoot of hot-surface ignition 
is the case of the ignition of combustible mix-
tures by incandescent carbon wear particles. 
The carbon brushes of electrical motors are the 
most usual sources of these hot particles, though 
other mechanical friction systems involving 
carbon structures can be at fault. 
It has been demonstrated that flash tempera-
tures of high spots or asperities on surfaces in 
sliding contact- can be 900° to 1,800° F (500° to 
1,000° C) above the bulk temperatures of the 
sliding materials. 22 Wear particles from asper-
ities may achieve incandescent temperatures 
and, in an oxygen-containing atmosphere, can 
burn. IS In particular, the wear of carbon is 
accelerated by operation at high altitude 153 and 
by an electric potential across the sliding inter-
face. All these conditions may be experienced 
in the operation of an electrically driven vane-
type fuel pump such as is used in flight vehicles. 
Buckley et aPO studied these pumps in propane-
air mixtures. Even when the electrical parts of 
the pumps were adequately insulated, friction 
from carbon vanes sliding against metal disks 
could initiate combustion in propane-air mix-
tures. Altitudes of 38,000 feet (150 mm Hg) 
accelerated the wear of vanes and increased the 
carbon particle sizes . However, electric poten-
tial and current as low as 106 volts and 3 am-
peres at 400° F across the vane-dish interface 
were required for incandescence of particles and 
for ignition of the propane-air mixtures. Elec-
tric potentials alone without wear produced no 
igmtlOn. These potentials are much lower than 
the 10,000-volt potentials seen in similar opera-
tional static conditions. The high electrical re-
sistance of anodized aluminum surfaces and of 
lubricant films in machines will allow static 
buildup, especially when the rotating shafts are 
_J 
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Region of ignition 
Diameter 
FIGURE 6.-Effect of wire diameter on ignition 
temperature of a flammable mixture. ( AFTER 
VAN DOLAH ET AL.220) 
floating free in their bearings. Zero gravity 
would augment this condition. It thus appears 
that under appropriate conditions, even well-
lubricated and shielded rotating systems can 
create unexpected ignition hazards. 
The problem of surface hot spots produced 
by high shear rates in metal and by plastic 
deformation of sharp points has not been 
studied adequately.63 . 
The hot-surface ignition temperature is re-
duced by modifying the oxidizing components 
of the atmosphere. At any fixed total pressure, 
increasing the percentage of oxygen, chlorine, 
fluorine, and so forth, in the mixture will 
usually reduce the hot-surface ignition temper-
ature. 
In general, the ignition temperatures of most 
flammable mixtures tend to decrease with in-
crease in total pressure of the system. Some 
high-energy fuels show a reverse trend in the 
response to ambient pressure. Ooncrete ex-
amples of this oxygen and pressure effect are 
presented in other sections of this report. 
Hot Gases in Absence of Surfaces 
Pilot Flames and Hot Gas Jets. While these 
are not the most probable sources of space-
cabin fires, they are possible hazards. The 
penetration of a meteorite into a cabin es-
pecially in an oxygen a tmosphere, will b~ ac-
companied by a jet of vaporized metal as well 
as by a compression wave. This is discussed 
in Ohapter 5. 
Wolfhard and Burgess 244 have shown that 
pilot flames, if sufficiently small, may be treated 
724-454 0--64-2 
as point sources in the manner of electrostatic 
sparks. In general, however, pilot flames act 
like extended sources and the critical factor is 
the temperature of their combustion products. 
The ignition problem really converts itself to 
one of flame propagation. 
Ignition by streams of hot gases is a subject 
well developed in connection with the hazards 
of flammable atmospheres in coal mines and in 
the design of jet engines where control of flames 
is determined by recirculation of combustion 
products.154.223 The interplay of chemical ki-
netics and contact times is too complex for 
adequate discussion in this report. For most 
gas mixtures, the short contact times in jets 
require that the ignition temperature be much 
higher than for the corresponding mixture in 
the hot-surface ignition situation. 
Adwbatic Compression. The classical igni-
tion problem of diesel engines finds its counter-
part in space-cabin situations. The water 
hammer effect, the operation of certain gear 
pumps, and the rapid operation of valves can 
lead to ignition by adiabatic compression. 
The classic example is the explosion of oil or 
carbonaceous washers in the reducing valves of 
oxygen cylinders which are "cracked" too 
rapidly. As long as the rate of heat loss is 
low enough to allow ignition temperatures to be 
maintained through periods exceeding the ig-
nition delay, a successful ignition is possible. 
This problem is quite serious in the extracabin 
control of monopropellants. Slow valving and 
careful "oxygen discipline" 10. 63.203 should elimi-
nate the adiabatic compression problem within 
cabin equipment. 208 The possibility of igni-
tion of external lubricants in gear trains and 
other moving parts needs to be considered, 
especially in high-oxygen environments. 
Shock-Wave Compression. Adiabatic com-
pression at a rate approximating that of the mo-
lecular velocity at a specified temperature and 
pressure is referred to as shock-wave compres-
sion. It may be assumed that when a shock 
wave is caused to converge, a local critical 
source of energy is formed. In the ignition 
process, this energy must be dissipated in a 
small volume of the combustible mixture. 
This condition reverts back to the electro-
static spark problem. 76 The problem of plane 
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shock waves reduces itself to the case of adia-
batic compressionY Table 1 indicates the 
temperature ranges to be expected from dif-
ferent compression rat ios. 
From the temperatures in table 1 and the 
specific gaseous ignition temperatures discussed 
in subsequent sections, it is apparent that pres-
sure ratios of less than 10 will not ignite 
many fuel-air mixtures. Fuel-oxygen mixtures, 
however, will be ignited by relatively weak 
shocks.62.200 
Hypergolic Ignition 
The term "hypergolic ignition" is reserved for 
spontaneous ignition upon mixing of a bipro-
pellant mixture at ambient temperature. 
Though control jets in spacecraft may employ 
hypergolic mixtures, it is doubtful that any will 
be found inside a cabin. However, one can 
imagine a situation in future missions where 
self-maneuvering units employing hypergolic 
propellants may be filled and serviced inside 
space cabins. The surrounding atmosphere 
and physical parameters may well determine the 
actual hazard involved. There is a major 
extracabin hazard with hypergolic chemicals. 
Ignition by accidental mixing adjacent to 
cabins (meteorite penetration of storage tanks) 
may, of course, effect damage to the cabin. 
Unfortunately, each hypergolic mixture has 
its own hazard parameters and most work Las 
been done in the specific condition of small-scale 
rocket engines. It will suffice to mention here 
two studies on the accidental mixing of hyper-
golic materials at launch sites. A Rocketdyne 
program at Edwards Air Force Base is evaluat-
ing the blast potential,182 and the Bureau of 
Mines is studying the role of inerting agents 
required to prevent ignition in both the liquid 
and gaseous phases. 220 
Most of the initiation phenomena described 
above were for gas-phase reactions. In recent 
years a considerable body of theory on the 
ignition of solid surfaces has been developed. 
Since most of these studies are related to ex-
plosives and propellants wh'ich can sustain 
flames in the absence of an oxidant atmosphere, 
only a brief review of the basic principles in-
volved will be presented . The earlier work in 
TABLE l.-Compressed-Gas Temperatures at 
Various Compression Ratios [AFTER VAN 
DOLAH ET AL. 220] 
Compression ratio 
2 _________________ ____ _ 
5 _____________________ _ 
10 ____________________ _ 
50 ____________________ _ 
100 ___________________ _ 
1,000 ___ _______________ _ 
2,000 __________________ _ 
Temp. of compressed gas, 
oR 
Shock 
wave 
604 
866 
1, 270 
4, 070 
6,950 
34,400 
52,000 
Adiabatic 
compression 
594 
766 
927 
1,430 
1,710 
3,075 
3,715 
the field of ignition of explosives has been 
covered by Bowden and his coworkers.19 . 20. 21 
Recent studies have led to two schools of 
thought. One holds that ignition (initiation 
of deflagration wave) occurs only when thermal 
ignition of the solid occurs at the surface. The 
studies of Hicks and his coworkers 80. 107 and of 
Altman and Grant 3 have tended to support 
this point of view. Contrary opinion, how-
ever, suggests that ignition occurs when gases 
are formed from the solid surface and ignite 
to establish a flame.12I • 140. 180 
It may well be that specific combinations of 
solid-phase and gas-phase reactions are initiat-
ing factors for each solid in que'ltion. Evans 68 
will shortly publish a report reviewing the 
controversy. Application of mechanisms of 
propellant ignition to the ignition of carbona-
ceous and other solids of all types remains 
unclear at this point. Were gas-phase initia-
tion to be the general rule, one would expect 
the inert gases in the atmosphere to play a 
significant role in the phenomena. 
FLAME PROPAGATION 
Once a flammable mixture is ignited, the 
resultant flame will either propagate through 
the mixture or be extinguished. The speed of 
flame propagation is greatly influenced by 
oxygen, inert-gas, and ambient-pressure pa-
rameters, as well as by the ignition source and 
physical environment. Much of the concrete I 
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data to be presented in other sections will cover 
these parameters. In order to idealize the 
propagation picture, the two major systems 
which determine the propagation of flames in 
a combustible-oxidant mixture are discussed 
next: premixed or homogeneous systems, and 
unmixed or heterogeneous systems. The com-
bustion of solids is a subcategory of the latter 
system. 
Homogeneous Systems 
A flammable homogeneous system is one 
whose composition lies between the composi-
tionallimits of flammability of the combustible 
vapor at a specified temperature and pressure. 
For example, the butane-air system of figure 2 
has a lower (lean) limit of flammability at a 
fuel-air ratio of 0.04 and an upper (rich) limit 
at about 0.18. Figure 3 shows how the limits 
of flammability of a homologous series of hydro-
carbons in air will vary. When the temperature 
of a mixture is increased, the flammable range 
widens. An electric spark or any local heat 
source may produce a local flame in a mixture 
outside of the flammability limits, but the flame 
will not propagate through the mixture. By 
maintaining the source in the nonflammable 
mixture, one can gradually oxidize all of the 
fuel component without a flame process. 
Condensation of fuel components may well 
change the flammability of a mixture. As the 
temperature of a flammable mixture is decreased, 
the range of flammability narrows. As the tem-
perature is lowered the percentage of fuel in the 
mixture decreases if the vapor pressure of the 
fuel is at the saturation point for that tempera-
ture. Further decreases in temperature will 
decrease the concentration of fuel in the vapor 
phase until the lower (lean) limit of flammabil-
ity is reached. Figure 7 indicates that the inter-
section of the lower-limit curve and the vapor-
pressure curve occurs in a temperature region 
known as the flash point of the combustible 
liquid. 
The effect of ambient pressure on a combus-
tible mixture is somewhat more complicated. A 
decrease in ambient pressure produces little 
effect on the limits of flammability until the low 
pressure limit is reached. This limit is critically 
determined by the nature of oxidant and com-
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FIGURE 7.-Effects of temperature on limits of 
flammability of a combustible vapor in air. 
(AFTER VAN DOLAH ET AL.220) 
bustible and the size, geometry, and attitude of 
the confining vessel. Failure of propagation of 
flame through a pipe is a good test of the low-
pressure effect. Figure 8 shows, in an idealized 
way, how the quenching effect of a cylindrical 
pipe wall can become critical as the low-pressure 
limit is reached. 
As has been mentioned, the lower the 
pressure, the greater the energy requirement for 
ignition. Flames have been shown to propa-
gate through tubes at ambient pressures as low 
as 0.01 psia, but the energy requirements for 
ignition and the tube diameters must be quite 
14.7 
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large. The homogeneous system is fine for 
discussion of principles. Most fire hazards, 
however, involve heterogeneous systems. 
Heterogeneous Systems 
A single-state system may be heterogeneous 
by virtue of concentration gradients and is 
invariably formed when a combustible vapor is 
leaked into an oxidant such as air. 
A multistate heterogeneous system is formed 
when a liquid or solid fuel is injected into an 
oxidant medium. The sudden disruption of a 
hydraulic line would represent a practical case 
of this type which is discussed in Ohapter 3. 
A rigid analysis of flame propagation in single-
state and multistate systems is quite beyond the 
needs of the present discussion. Only a qualita-
tive representation of the two conditions will be 
given. 
When a vapor is injected into an oxidant, 
concentration gradients are set up which span 
the spectrum of mixtures above, below, and 
within the flammable-concentration limits. 
The flammable zone may ignite and propagate 
a flame until either mixing or depletion of fuel 
reduces the concentration below the lower 
(lean) limits. 
When a liquid or a flammable solid is injected 
into an oxidant medium, a vapor-mist-oxidant 
system can be formed if temperatures are below 
the flash point ("Mist" area of fig. 7). 
Flammable sprays can be produced over a wide 
range of temperatures, both above and below 
the flash point. The introduction of an ignition 
source into an ignitible spray or mist will tend 
to vaporize the fuel droplets or solid fuel 
particles locally and, thus, form flammable 
mixtures similar to the single-state type. 
These behave like the vapor injected into 
oxidant. In the case of complex mixtures of 
liquid or solid fuels, fractionation may occur 
prior to burning. The fuels may carbonize, 
pyrolyze, and yield combustible gases and 
vapors quite unlike the original liquid or solid 
fuel. In such a system the geometry of the 
container, type of ignition source, and physical 
state of the spray or mist are critical in descrip-
tion of flame propagation. 
It is obvious that ignition in heterogeneous 
liquid-gaseous systems is much more difficult 
to study than ignition in homogeneous gaseous 
systems. A variety of experimental methods 
and techniques have been employed in the study 
of spontaneous ignition of liquid fuels. There 
are the OFR octane-number-,ating engine, well-
instrumented engines with single-cylinder 
motors in which single combustion cycles can 
be isolated, and special devices such as the rapid-
compression machines and constant-volume 
bombs which restrict themselves to the develop-
ment of a fraction of a combustion cycle. 
There are also various combustion containers 
under both static and flow conditions in which 
the variables affecting ignition may be isolated 
more individually and in which the chemistry 
of the ignition and combustion processes may 
be studied more closely. All these methods 
provide valuable information which can be 
used in the interpretations of ignition behavior. 
It is noteworthy that the same particular 
phenomena associated with ignition and com-
bustion are often apparent in one form or 
another in the results obtained with the various 
methods. It appears worthwhile to review 
some' of the variables involved in the deter-
mination of ignition phenomena in condensed-
phase hydrocarbon systems. 
There are at least two generalized mechanisms 
for the oxidative react:ons that lead to ignition 
of hydrocarbons. In the low-temperature 
mechanism, which predominates up to tempera-
tures of 350 0 to 400 0 0, the reactions proceed 
through free-radical chain-branching processes 
involving the formation and decomposition of 
peroxides and hydro peroxides. The high-tem-
perature mechanism, which predominates above 
350 0 to 400 0 0, depends at least partially on 
pyrolysis prior to and during oxidation. 
Early studies of spontaneous-ignition tem-
peratures of fuels were reported by Townend 
and his coworkers. 147 , 217 More recent data by 
Johnson et al. /20 of the Naval Research Labo-
ratory, point up many of the hazards in inter-
preting ignition points of fuels and the effects 
of oxygen and inert gases on the phenomenon. 
The apparatus used in the latter studies con-
sisted of a stainless-steel block containing an 
ignition chamber of about 21 ml capacity with 
an opening at the top and two gas outlets near 
the bottom. The chamber had a small de-
I 
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pression in the bottom designed to hold !l. 
shallow stainless-steel crucible which could be 
replaced easily and which served as a recep-
tacle for the fuel. The block was heated in 
an electric furnace to a high temperature and 
one drop of fuel was added to the crucible. 
The reaction which followed was then observed 
and recorded. Since it was easier to change 
the temperature than the oxygen concentra-
tion, the procedure was repeated at progres-
sively lower temperatures until the ignition 
pattern for a given oxygen level was estab-
lished. The oxygen-nitrogen concentration was 
then changed and the process repeated until a 
delineation of the ignition zones could be ob-
tained. The recorded temperatures were those 
of the block, although for many studies a 
thermocouple was suspended in the chamber 
itself to record gas-temperature changes. 
Figure 9 shows the ignition curve of n-octane 
in oxygen with nitrogen as diluent. The area 
of positive ignition (visible and/or audible com-
bustion) lies above and to the right of the 
ignition curve. In the area labeled "Cool 
flames" a definite but much weaker type of 
reaction or ignition occurs which can be seen 
only in the dark or observed by means of 
thermocouple response. To the left is the area 
of nonignition in which oxidative reactions still 
proceed but too slowly to culminate in ignition . 
Johnson et al. interpret this model curve as 
follows: 
The self-ignition point (SIP), is the lowest tempera-
ture at which a drop of fuel will ignite when pure 
oxygen is being supplied. It is a readily reproducible 
value characteristic of the fuel in a given ignition cham-
ber. For many substances this temperature remains 
nearly constant for oxygen concentrations down to 50 
percent and below. The ignition curve reverses itself 
at lower oxygen levels to give an inflection point at M. 
As yet no good explanation can be given for this par-
ticular feature of the ignition curve, but since it appears 
in a variety of fuels and pure hydrocarbons it is very 
likely a reflection of a fundamental part of the ignition 
process. There does appear to be a relationship be-
tween the height of B and ease of ignition. . .. As 
the temperature is raised past B, reactivity again in-
creases to a maximum value at N. This region repre-
sents the greatest reactivity of the fuel to oxidation by 
the low temperature mechanism. As the teJTIperatur~ 
is increased further, this apparent reactivity decreases 
probably due to the increased thermal instability of 
certain heat-sensitive intermediates. Accordingly, more 
oxygen is required to furnish the necessary supply of 
these intermediates so that positive ignition may occur. 
At higher temperatures, OP, the high temperature 
mechanism becomes effective so that again less oxygen 
is required for positive ignition. 
It is evident that the amount of oxygen required for 
the formation of cool flames is very small in that cool 
flames are observed even when pure nitrogen is fed 
into the chamber. Under these conditions the only 
oxygen available is that which enters the chamber from 
the air above by back diffusion or convection. 
Similar curves were obtained from many 
different hydrocarbons and specific differences 
were interpreted in the light of molecular struc-
tures . The ignition lags for each system were 
also studied to get a firmer basis for the molecu-
lar mechanisms involved. The ignition lag, or 
time delay, is the time elapsing between addi-
tion of sample and ignition. Figure 10 is a 
portion of the curve of figure 9 showing these 
lags as a family of curves. 
The exponential increase in lag with decreas-
ing temperature seen in figure 10 is typical of 
the results obtained for all fuels and hydro-
carbons studied at all oxygen concentrations. 
It is of interest that there is a smooth continuity 
to the ignition lags as they change with tem-
perature, regardless of the type of ignition 
occurring. Furthermore, it is evident in figure 
10 that although the ignition lags are very 
dependent on temperature, they are scarcely 
affected by changes in oxygen concentration. 
Also as has been observed by other investi-gato~'s under special conditions, a cool flame (or 
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some related phenomenon) immediately pre-
cedes positive ignition. Although this two-
stage process may occur generally, the cool 
flame usually was not observed because of the 
shortness of the time interval and the masking 
effect of the much more violent positive ignition. 
All the above phenomena were interpreted 
along the following lines: 
Peroxides and hydroperoxides are among the first 
oxidation products formed. These then decompose or 
react to initiate branched-chain reactions. Neither 
cool flame nor positive ignition can occur if the rate of 
quenching of these chains is greater than their rate of 
initiation and propagation. In view of the relatively 
long time lags before ignition, when contrasted to the 
short duration of the ignition itself, it appears that there 
is a gradual increase in concentration of intermediate 
oxidation products up to a critical value. When this is 
reached, then either cool flame and/or positive ignition 
ensues immed.iately. 
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Under a given set of conditions the net in-
crease in rate of formation of these intermediates 
must be greater for easily ignitible substances 
than for less easily ignitible ones, or else the 
critical concentration is much lower. 
The ignition curves show that positive ignition can 
occur under conditions of higher temperature and lower 
oxygen partial pressure for a more difficultly ignitible 
. . . substance than for a more easily ignitible . . . 
substance. This would imply that although the neces-
sary intermediates are formed with more difficulty for 
the former type, nevertheless they must be more stable 
thermally. If peroxides are involved in these inter-
mediates this is in keeping with their known thermal 
stability properties-namely, that primary peroxides are 
very unstable, whereas secondary and tertiary peroxides 
are increasingly more stable. . . . 
In the low temperature mechanism zone the pre-
ignition oxidative reactions for a given substance are 
independent of the type of ignition that follows. 
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whether positive or cool flame. These preignition 
reactions are constantly yielding intermediates, which 
for want of a better name, will be labeled X . These 
compounds, X, are continually being lost by chemical 
reaction, degradation, and physical removal. The 
formation of X requires relatively little oxygen, but 
the rate is very dependent on temperature. If the 
temperature is high enough, then the rate of formation 
of X will be greater than the loss of X, and eventually a 
critical concentration is reached and ignition occurs. 
This explains why a minimum temperature is necessary 
for ignition of a particular substance in a given ap-
paratus; tl:e almost perpendicular boundary between 
nonignition and both types of ignition; and the very 
rapid continuous decrease in ignition lags with increas-
ing temperature regardless of the type of ignition. 
A second concept is that there are certain heat 
sensitive reactants, Y, part of which are dependent on 
the cool flame reaction, that are necessary interme-
diates for the reactions which result in positive ignition. 
In addition, these must attain a critical concentration 
before positive ignition can occur. This implies that 
the first reactions in ignition are the cool flame ones 
which, if they yield Y above the critical concentration, 
immediately will become positive ignition; otherwise, 
if the rate of destruction of Y is greater than its gener-
ation, the ignition remains a cool flame. These ignition 
reactions are generally very fast compared to the pre-
ignition reactions, but the border line case exists where 
under certain conditions the cool flame can be observed 
immediately preceding positive ignition. Two-stage 
combustion may well be another manifestation of this 
same phenomenon. The sharpness of the boundaries 
between positive ignitions and cool flames in the ignition 
curves shows that attainment of the critical concentra-
tion of Y at a particular temperature is very dependent 
on the availability of oxygen. This is quite in contrast 
to the formation of intermediates, X. However, the 
formation of Y is also somewhat dependent on tempera-
ture since less oxygen is required at the point of greatest 
reactivity (N in fig. 9). The rise in the positive ignition 
curve at temperatures above N in fig. 9 implies that 
the reactants, Y, may well be peroxidic in nature ... 
their temperature instability coefficient being greater 
than the coefficient of formation so that the composite 
gives the inflection at N. 
It is of interest that these generalizations have 
some support from observation of temperature 
changes of the gases in chambers following 
addition of a drop of fuel. Under conditions of 
longer ignition lags, the gas temperature 
dropped several degrees because of tbe cooling 
effect of evaporation. The temperature then 
rose slowly to slightly above block temperature 
owing to the small amount of heat liberated by 
the preignition reactions (the formation of com-
Pool diameter 
FIGUR E 11.-BurninA rate of a liquid fuel from a 
pool . (AFTER VAN DOLAH ET AL.220) 
pounds X mentioned previously). At the 
moment of ignition, either positive or cool flame, 
there was a very sudden temperature rise or 
"kick" due to the large amount of heat liberated 
(the time at which X reached the wtical con-
centration) . 
These complex phenomena are probably im-
portant in explaining the anomalous effects of 
oxygen environments in the ignition of hydro-
carbon systems to be discussed in Chapter 3, 
under "Liquids and Vapors." Prediction of the 
degree of fire hazard in accidental situations of 
this type in space cabins is quite beyond the 
present state of the art. The best one can do is 
get an intuitive feel for the degree of hazard, and 
try to choose the least hazardous liquid hydro-
carbon systems. 
Diffusion flames are special cases of flame 
propagation in heterogeneous systems. They 
are flames whose rates are controlled by dif-
fusive mixing processes. In engine applications, 
diffusion flames are controlled by the rate at 
which fuel and oxidant are brought together. ss 
In a consideration of hazardous conditions, the 
burning of a pool of flammable liquid is the 
typical example of a diffusion flame process. 
Spillage of flammable materials on launch pads 
or within space cabins presents such a hazard. 
When burning occurs above a pool, the rate of 
burning can be increased by heating the liquid 
or increasing the concentration of oxidant above 
the pool. The pool diameter in any fixed con-
taining environment also determines the rate. 
For example, figure 11 demonstrates that linear 
liquid burning rate or pool regression rate is a 
complex function of diameter of the pool. At 
small pool diameters the burning rate is high 
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because of the addition of heat to the pool by 
the containing medium. The rate usually 
reaches a minimum value and then increases .to a 
constant velocity. Zabetakis and Burgess 249 
have studied these pool phenomena and find 
t):lat this constant velocity (in inches per minute) 
is 0.03 times the net heat of combustion divided 
by the sensible heat of vaporization. Container 
geometry determines the approach to this burn-
ing rate at infinite pool size. 
DETONATION 
The detonation process has already been 
defined at the beginning of this chapter. The 
theory of detonation has been reviewed quite 
thoroughly in recent years (refs. 52,69,92,117, 
133, 136, 148, 215, and 220). The physics of 
detonations will not be discussed here except 
for a brief review of the factors in a space cabin 
which may seriously alter the detonation 
process. 
In discussing detonation both gaseous and 
condensed systems must be considered. In 
gaseous systems, initiation of detonations re-
quires amounts of energy several orders of 
magnitude greater than those required to initi-
ate deflagrations. For electrical initiation 
there are required at least 10's to 100's of joules. 
In some systems, however, lower levels of 
energy are sufficient. Evans and Ablow 70 re-
port that in a mixture of 67 percent hydrogen 
and 33 percent oxygen a detonation wave was 
initiated with an electric spark of 540 mil-
lijoules' energy, the wave being formed 1 to 2 
feet from the spark in 2- to 4-inch-diameter 
tubes. Under the proper conditions, detona-
tion of several tenths of a gram of primer 
explosive is enough to initiate a major detona-
tion process in a large system. A typical 
accidental detonation in gaseous systems occurs 
in pipes or tubing where a deflagration initiated 
by a low-energy source increases the energy 
in the system sufficiently to propagate a detona-
tion. In such a system, the following sequence 
of events may occur: (a) The pressure waves 
from the deflagration continuously catch up 
with previous wave fronts, until a shock wave 
occurs; (b) the shock wave increases in strength 
until it is capable of initiating, after an induction 
period, a detonation reaction; and (c) the 
reactions behind the shock-wave front become 
continuous and a detonation wave is propagated. 
In condensed liquid or solid systems the same 
initiation processes are potentiaHy available. 
Electric sparks, explosive primers, or transitions 
from deflagration to detonation are possible 
initiating events . The initiation of detonation 
by intense shock waves of any origin is a 
constant problem complicating the handling of 
many monopropellant systems such as solid-fuel 
rockets. Evans,68 for example, reports that a 
rapid deflagration or explosion of certain liquid 
mono propellants can be accomplished by a 
succession of sparks of millijoule energy. 
Presumably vapor is being formed during the 
first sparks, and this is ignited by a later spark. 
The detonation processes themselves fall into 
two classes: high-velocity (high-order or hydro-
dynamic) detonations and low-velocity detona-
tions. In most condensed liquid or solid sys-
tems high-velocity detonations usually involve 
pressures of about 105 atmospheres, require high 
shock pressures for initiation, and, as will be 
discussed subsequently, have smaller critical 
diameters for propagation. In some systems, a 
shock magnitude of only 103 atmospheres is 
required to initiate these high-order detona-
tions . This has been demonstrated with granu-
lar ammonium perchlorate 72 and granular 
PET 72. 195 in an uncompressed state. The 
low-velocity detonations, on the other hand, are 
initiated by weaker shocks, and they have lower 
pressures and larger critical diameters than the 
typical hydrodynamic detonation. These low-
velocity detonations resemble deflagrations such 
as are seen with black powder. In liquids, the 
process appears to be quasi-steady-state with a 
net velocity approximately equal to that of 
sound. The details of these low-veloci ty deto-
nations are still under study.95 . 196.216 
As in the case of defiagrations, there are 
critical environmental limits for detonations. 
The concentration limits are usually narrower 
than the corresponding flammability limits. A 
typical example is the hydrogen-oxygen system 
where the lower limit for flammability is 4 
percent, and for detonation, 16 percent. 
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In the case of flames, environmental limits 
are conveniently determined as quenching dis-
tances. With lesser distances (tube diameters 
.or plate separation) , the flame is quenched by 
extraction of heat. Contrariwise, below the 
critical diameter for detonation, the rate of 
energy loss through expansion of the product 
gases is too great for the wave to continue to 
propagate. Critical diameters are one indica-
tion of the relative sensitivity to detonation, 
and have been employed for this purpose. 
Since the rate of energy release is important, 
less energetic or slower reacting systems will 
have larger critical diameters. Typically, crit-
ical diameters may vary from 0.02 inch or less 
for nitrogen tetroxide-hydrocarbon systems to 
over 1 inch for insensitive mixtures. An in-
crease in lateral confinement produced by heavy-
walled tubing will naturally reduce the absolute 
value of this critical diameter. Low-velocity 
reactions, being apparently less energetic, appear 
to have larger critical diameters. A recent 
paper by Evans 69 discusses the relation between 
failure diameter and shock sensitivity for high-
order detonations of homogeneous condensed 
materials, and the relation of both to chemical 
kinetics of thermal decomposition. 
Subcritical-diameter tubing is commonly em-
ployed for detonation traps, devices that prevent 
a detonation initiated in one part of a system 
from propagating to another. One use of such 
a device is to isolate a monopropellant tank on 
a test stand from an experimental motor. For 
systems exhibiting the low-velocity reaction, 
traps consisting of 270 0 or 360 0 loops of larger 
tubing may be adequate. The suggestion has 
been made that such traps operate by the initia-
tion of a low-velocity reaction at the point of 
intersection. This reaction breaks the liquid 
column but is in itself incapable of propagation, 
since the tubing diameter is below the critical 
diam.eter for propagation of the low-velocity 
reaction. 
It is important to remember that an oxygen-
enriched atmosphere reduces the time scale of 
combustion phenomena, so that fire hazards 
become explosion hazards, and deflagrations 
become detonations. It is fortunate that the 
number of accidental situations capable of 
forming detonations in space cabins are quite 
few. The presence of propellant refilling sta-
tions for "self-maneuvering" personal propul-
sion systems would probably create the greatest 
hazard. Hydrogen or other combustibles re-
quired for the function of fuel cells or fuel-cell 
oxygen detectors and hydrogen from over-
charged batteries are other possible sources of 
difficulty. A major detonation danger, of 
course, involves the shock sensitivity of oxygen 
(liquid or gaseous) in contact with organic 
materials, or compounds like hydrazine in con-
tact with rusty surfaces. 1o• 97 Proper discipline 
should avoid intracabin hazards from these 
sources. 10. 62. 63. 17. 
The reviews of Van Dolah 220 and of the 
Office of the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering 97 cover adequately the quantita-
tive detonation hazards of most rocket fuels in 
use and projected for future missions. Because 
this subj ect area is primarily of concern in 
extracabin design, it will not be pursued 
further in this report. The role of inert gases 
in detonation processes is discussed in the last 
section of this chapter and the physical charac-
teristics of typical fuels and oxidizers are 
presented in Chapter 7. 
FLAME EXTINGUISHMENT 
The problem of flame extinguishment in 
sealed cabin systems is mostly related to the 
toxicological dangers involved. The entire 
problem of flame extinguishing agents has been 
reviewed adequately by Friedman and Levy,Sl 
The mechanism of extinguishment is depend-
ent on the oxidant system since the many 
chemical extinguishing agents (alkyl halides) 
interfere with the free-radical flame reactions. 
Container geometry, heats of reaction, and 
many other factors determine the optimum 
approach to extinguishment. 
Physical methods of flame control consist of 
(a) isolation of combustible from oxidant 
(blanketing or diluting), (b) removal of heat 
(cooling), (c) disturbance of flame zone, and 
(d) blockage of radiation. Specific problems 
created by each of these physical approaches 
and by the many chemical methods in space 
cabins are reviewed in Chapter 7. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN SPACE-CABIN 
FIRE HAZARDS 
In this section, factors in space cabins which 
contribute immediately to the fire hazard are 
briefly reviewed in light of the theory discussed 
above. The problem of meteoroid penetra-
tion is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Temperature 
Local hot spots resulting from electrical 
equipment, frictional sites, and adiabatic com-
pression procedures !ill increase the fire hazard. 
Autoignition tendencies, reaction rates, limits 
of flammability, flame speeds, and extinguish-
ment problems are all affected by hot spots 
within the cabin. 
Pressure 
Since pressure affects reaction rates, the 
limits of flammability, flame speeds, and auto-
ignition tendency are affected by cabin pres-
sures. An increase in ambient pressure usually 
widens the flammable range and decreases the 
temperature required for autoignition in most 
systems except in the case of some of the high-
energy fuels. 220 In the latter instance, the 
vapor pressure of the liquid appears critical. 
Since vapor pressure is dependent on tempera-
ture, a decrease in ambient pressure results in 
a decrease in flash point even though limits of 
flammability are not affected by this small 
pressure change. Accordingly, mixtures with 
flash points above room . temperature at 1 
atmosphere may form flammable mixtures when 
pressures are reduced. This factor will be 
invoked in the discussion of plate ignition 
temperatures in Chapter 3. The tendency of 
electrical contacts to arc is increased by low 
extracabin pressures. Rapid deterioration of 
plastic insulation may occur from the excess 
heat evolved and cause malfunctions. l68 Re-
duced pressure within the cabin itself can 
increase arcing of electrical contacts. More will 
be said about pressure effects on burning solids 
in Chapters 2 and 4. 
Velocity 
The velocity of gases in the area of a possible 
ignition site affects the mixing, ignition, and 
extinguishment parameters of the flame process. 
In general, more energy is required to ignite 
flowing mixtures than static ones; and con-
versely, moving heat sources require higher 
temperatures than static ones to ignite static 
gas mixtures. The air-conditioning system, 
therefore, plays a role in the fire hazard. 
Gravita tional Fields 
The role of gravitational fields is indeed a 
complicated one in the total fire hazard. There 
appear to be four phases to the problem: (1) 
the preparation of combustible mixtures where 
liquid and gaseous combustibles are involved, 
(2) the ignition process, (3) flame propagation, 
and (4) flame extinguishment. 
The effect of gravity on the preparation of 
flammable mixtures depends on the properties 
of the flammable material and the nature of the 
spill or leak. In the absence of both gravity 
and forced convection, the spread of flammable 
vapor or gas would be entirely by diffusion. A 
spill on a surface in the presence of gravity 
would result in gravity's "holding" the liquid 
pool to the surface. Vapors move away from 
the surface and mix with the ambient gas: · A 
vapor heavier than the ambient gas would tend 
to cling to the surface and probably be spread 
less under full gravity than under reduced 
gravity conditions. 136 This spreading factor 
can be calculated for any system of liquid and 
ambient gas. 
There would appear to be one other mixing 
problem. If a spill or leak imparts even a 
small momentum to the fluid, the motion of the 
fluid through the atmosphere of a space cabin 
under zero gravity conditions would be such 
that a more random distribution of flammable 
sources would be expected. The actual motion 
of such fluid particles may even set up a forced 
convection by entrainment in zero gravity 
states and promote the mixing and combustion 
process. A quantitative analysis of forced 
con vection by "particle movement" still re-
mains to be made. 
The ignition process in zero gravity states is 
an interesting problem. Gas mixtures that 
would ordinarily not be ignited by a small 
heated object because convective flow past the 
hot spot limits contact time with the gas may 
now be susceptible to ignition. This factor is 
l 
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rather difficult to evaluate from theoretical 
considerations and requires empirical study. 
The principal experimental combustion stud-
ies have, of course, been made under normal 
gravitational conditions. The theoretical stud-
ies, on the other hand, have usually neglected 
gravitational effects. The reasonable agree-
ment between the two suggests, . at first glance, 
that gravity plays a minor role in the combus-
tion process. In the empirical equations which 
have been developed to include natural convec-
tion effects, gravity appears as a term raised to 
a fractional exponent. Spalding,207 for example, 
uses the following equation to describe the data 
obtained from the burning of single drops of 
liquid fuel in air: 
mdc =45B3/4 (gcfJ)1/4 
k a 2 
where 
m vaporization rate per unit surface area 
d sphere diameter 
c specific heat 
k thermal conductivity 
B transfer number, a function of fuel prop-
erties 
g acceleration due to gravity 
a thermal diffusivity 
The equation is purely empirical and the obvi-
ous conclusion cannot be drawn that the burning 
rate is zero when g is set equal to zero. An 
equation of the form 
mg=mo [1 +j(g)] 
would probably be more nearly correct, where 
the subscript g refers to gravity conditions and 
o to the zero gravity case. 136 The function 
j(g) would probably be relatively small com-
pared with unity. Irrespective of its magnitude, 
however, the burning rate would unquestion-
ably be less in the absence of con vecti ve effects. 
Let us consider a liquid or solid diffusion 
flame, a flame which could result from the 
burning of a pool of liquid or a piece of solid 
material. Gravity would be expected to in-
crease the burning rate above that at zero 
gravity by increasing heat and mass transfer 
through the addition of natural convection to 
the diffusion process. Product gases that 
normally rise and are convected away from the 
flame zone would tend to distribute uniformly 
about the burning zone and impede the flow of 
oxidant, with resultant extinguishment. Ex-
periments performed with burning candles in 
"freely falling" sealed containers showed flame 
extinguishment much before that which oc-
curred in static control testsY Kumagai and 
Isoda 129 recently demonstrated that the flame 
around a freely falling droplet of fuel was 
spherical when observed 0.1 to 0.4 second after 
ignition. The conclusions of this study of the 
combustion of single drops under various 
accelerations from zero gravity to normal 
gravity conditions are: 
(a) The dimensions of the flame boundary 
and the hot-air zone become higher and 
narrower as the acceleration increases, because 
natural convection becomes stronger. 
(b) Burning rates increase as acceleration 
increases. Burning rates can be expressed in 
the form 
where 
D drop diameter at time t 
Do initial drop diameter 
k evaporation constant 
The value of k roughly doubles in going from 
a zero gravity condition to the normal value 
for g. 
It has been known for some time that 
convective effects influence flammability limits. 
The limits are almost always narrower; that is, 
the flammable range of mixture ratios is 
narrower for downward propagation than for 
upward propagation. The most marked differ-
ence occurs on the rich side and is attributed to 
the inability of rich "cool" flames to move in the 
absence of convection in the direction of propa-
gation. It is postulated that convection serves 
to preheat the unburned mixtUres just ahead of 
the flame, thus increasing the ease of flame 
propagation. These hypotheses also suggest 
that flame vigor would be less under zero gravity 
conditions than under normal gravity condi-
tions. It would appear that changes in the 
gravitational field should not affect flame 
propagation through premixed combustible-
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oxidant systems. Actually, in the absence of a 
gravitational field, one would expect the 
flammable range to be narrowed, approaching 
the limits of flammability seen with horizontal 
propagation of flame. For example, Van 
Dolah et al,220 have reported that in horizontal 
propagation, the flammable range of hydrogen 
in air would be 6.5 to 71 percent instead of 4 to 
75 percent and the flammable range of ammonia 
would be 18 to 25.5 percent instead of 17 to 26.5 
percent (by volume). These are rather small 
changes but illustrate the principle involved. 
On the other side of the ledger, Wolfhard 243 
has pointed out that combustion involves the 
formation and expansion of gases. Unless a 
burning object is spherical, this would mean a 
preferential movement of gas in some direction. 
This movement could well supply oxygen to the 
flame. Also, the absence of convection currents 
may reduce heat loss from the flame front and 
prolong combustion events. Wolfhard feels 
that very small g loads from attitude control 
may be much worse than 19. 
The problem of zero gr vity in fire extin-
guishing is also of interest. The many agents 
of solid, vaporous, or gaseous nature currently 
in use would probably not "settle down" over a 
fire area but would scatter in random fashion 
throughout a cabin . However, fighting "over-
head" fires would probably be easier with these 
agents in zero gravity conditions. In view of 
the "scattering tendency" augmented by re-
duced gravity conditions, it may be well to 
review the problems of propulsion of many of 
these agents in the direction of the fire. More 
will be said of fire extinguishment in Chapter 7. 
On the basis of this very cursory examination 
of the problem of burning under zero gravity 
conditions, it appears that, in general, combus-
tion processes may be less severe than under 
normal gravity conditions. The overall effects 
may be small, however, and the only safe con-
clusion is that the same general precautions 
would be required with respect to fire hazards 
as are usually taken under normal gravity 
conditions. 
Oxidants and Inert Diluents 
The empirical effects of oxidants and inert 
diluents in combustion problems pertinent to 
space cabins are covered completely in Chapters 
2, 3, 4, and 5. At this point only the theoreti-
cal aspects of the oxidant-diluent problem will 
be considered. The review of Friedman and 
Levy 81 outlines the voluminous literature on 
this su bj ect. 
Insight into the oxidant-diluent problem 
may be attained by reviewing the basic theory 
of hydrogen-oxygen and hydrogen-air com-
bustion reactions.192 • 193 In such reactions, free 
radicals react in a chain process, creating more 
than one free radical for each one used up. 
Consequently, the rate of reaction increases 
exponentially with time and an explosion 
potential is created. The most likely elemen-
tary reactions at the flame front are: 
H 2+02 ~ 20H' (1) 
OH'+H2 ~ H 20+H' (2) 
H'+02 ~ H02 ' (3) 
O'+H2 ~ OH' +H' (4) 
H'+02 ~ OH'+O' (5) 
Reactions (2), (4), and (5) cause chain 
branching. Reaction (5) is actually endo-
thermic and is, therefore, the slowest. Flame 
is thought to be propagated by diffusion of 
hydrogen atoms into the unreacted gas, followed 
by reaction (5) to start a new chain. Because 
of their greater stability and diffusibility, the 
hydrogen atoms and not the other radicals 
are thought to be the actual propagating 
agents. In the "downstream" part of the flame, 
final reaction products are formed by three-
body reactions such as: 
The third body, M, carries off part of the 
energy liberated by combination of the radicals. 
It can either help to stop a chain reaction, as 
in (6), or reduce the reaction rate by aiding the 
formation of more stable free radicals such as 
The greater the complexity of M, which can be 
any other molecule or radical, the greater its 
J 
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specific heat and the more effective it is as an 
"energy trap." 
Nitrogen or any other inert diluent may serve 
as M . It can affect the reaction in several 
ways, the most obvious being as an energy 
attenuator for chain termination or retardation 
(reactions (6) and (7». The diluent helps 
maintain thermal equilibrium among the react-
ing molecules and can act as a third body in 
recombination reactions. In general, the flame 
temperature is reduced, as is the probability of 
detonation, by the presence of nitrogen or other 
inert gases. 
It is obvious that the role of inert compounds 
in the explosion process is quite complex. The 
so-call.ed "wall effect" contributed by the con-
taining medium is an example of inerting sur-
face reactions which exert a fine control over 
the chain process. The dividing line between 
explosive and nonexplosive conditions is a func-
tion of gas composition and of the size and 
material of the container. The temperature-
pressure relationship of such a system has 
fascinated physical chemists for many years.9 
Figure 12 represents these relationships. It is 
clear that for some temperatures (500° C) there 
is no explosion at low pressures. At inter-
mediate pressures there is an explosion poten-
tial. At higher pressures, explosions are again 
not possible; and at the highest pressures, ex-
plosions can once again occur. The pressures 
at which transitions occur are called the first, 
second, and third explosive limits. Different 
inerting agents (M) or inhibitors will raise the 
first and third pressure limits and lower the 
second pressure limit. If enough free radicals 
react with chain-terminating compounds in the 
gaseous phase or on the wall, the exponential 
rise in free radicals required for explosion will 
not occur. 
Pressure determines the explosion limits in a 
complex way. As was mentioned above, the 
hydrogen atoms are the ones most likely to 
diffuse to the wall. As long as more than 
one-half of these atoms hit the wall before react-
ing with other reactive gaseous components, 
no exponential rise in free radicals occurs. 
As soon as pressure rises, more hydrogen atoms 
collide with gaseous reactants prior to hitting 
the wall and explosions can occur, setting the 
first limit. At higher pressures, reaction (7) is 
favored because it is a three-body reaction. 
Since H02 • is more stable (less reactive) than 
H·, these hydroperoxo radicals can travel 
farther without reacting with active gaseous 
components. This allows the wall effect to take 
over and sets the second limit. The third 
limit is reached when there are enough H02• 
radicals present so that more than half will 
react or decompose before reaching the wall, 
allowing explosion to occur. The diffusive as 
well as thermal gas properties appear to affect 
the responses to the hydrogen-oxygen system. 
This complex picture gives one only a general 
feel for the "inerting" problem. Theoretical 
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analyses of hydrocarbon systems have more 
severe complexities,8l203 but appear to follow 
the general "rules of the game." It must be 
remembered that quenching and thermal con-
ductivity are not the only physical variables 
involved in inert-gas effects. The diffusion of 
atoms in and out of the flame zone is also im-
portant. Most of the detailed work on the 
complex inert-gas effects has been carried out in 
hydrocarbon gas-oxygen mixtures. It may be 
worthwhile to review several models of burning 
velocity in an attempt to analyze the role of the 
inert-gas components in the process. 
The relative validity of thermal and diffusion 
theories in modeling burning phenomena has 
been a matter of long-standing controversy. 
Ever since the pure thermal (heat conduction) 
theory of Mallard and LeChatelier was set forth 
in 1883, refinements of this theory have been 
numerous. Recent conflicts appear to center 
between the current thermal approach expressed 
by the Semenov-Zeldovich-Frank-Kamenetsky 
equation and the pure diffusion approach of the 
Tanford-Pease equ~tion. The former may be 
written: 28 
where 
u, burning velocity 
R gas constant 
P pressure 
T absolute temperature 
X, mole fraction of combustible 10 the un-
burned gas 
A, thermal conductivity at the flame tem-
perature 
OJ) mean molar heat capacity 
w chemical reaction rates 
o initial 
j final 
This version assumes that thermal and mass 
diffusivities are equal and neglects the change 
in the number of moles of gas across the flame. 
The theory of Tanford and Pease 214 assumes 
that the rate of flame propagation is controlled 
by the diffusion of atoms and radicals from the 
burned gas and the rate at which these active 
species react with the unburned fuels. The 
Tanford-Pease equation is as follows: 
where 
u, burning velocity 
a concentration of fuel in molecules/cc (a 
mean value over the combustion zone) 
P t partial pressure of the ith active species 
at the flame front 
D t the diffusion coefficient into the unburned 
gas for the ith active species 
Q mole fraction of potential combustion 
product 
kt rate constant for the reaction of the ith 
active species with the fuel 
The active particles considered are hydrogen 
and oxygen atoms, and hydroxyl radicals. 
Clingman et al. 43 compared the burning veloc-
ities of methane in varying mixtures of oxygen 
and the inert gases nitrogen, argon, and helium. 
The inert gas-oxygen ratios were kept at 80:20. 
In proceeding from nitrogen to argon mixtures, 
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the flame temperature and, consequently, the 
concentration of active particles increases while 
thermal conductivity and diffusion coefficients 
are little affected. On the other hand, on 
going from argon to helium, the flame tem-
perature and equilibrium concentrations of 
the burned gas will be the same, but diffusion 
coefficients and thermal conductivity 8:re 
markedly altered. The results of these early 
experiments favored the diffusion theory of 
Tanford and Pease. 
Using an improved technique, however, these 
investigators found that the ratio of burning 
velocity in argon to that in helium was 1:1.86, 
which is quite close to the 1:1.95 ratio predicted 
for the square root of the high-temperature con-
ductivity ratios.44 Figure 13 illustrates the 
effect of different inert gases on the burning 
velocities of various percentages of methane in 
oxygen. 
A thermal theory rather than an active-
particle diffusion theory also seems to explain 
the effect of inert diluents on flame quenching.172 
Further, simple thermal considerations relate 
the pressure dependencies of various flame 
properties. 28 Finally, the numerical calcula-
tions of Giddings and Herschfelder 90 suggest to 
Brokaw 28 that the pure Tanford-Pease model 
is essentially inadequate for explaining burning 
velocities. 
The complex relationship between thermal 
and diffusion factors in inert-gas interaction has 
also been emphasized by Mellish and Linnett 158 
in the theoretical analysis of the effect of inert 
gases on limits of flammability, spark ignition, 
and wall quenching effects. The relative im-
portance of thermal conductivity and diffusion 
varies with the changing physical parameters of 
the experimental conditions. ISS Quenching dis-
tances appear to be more dependent on the 
thermal conductivity of the gases than on 
TABLE 2.-Summary oj Effects oj Inert Gases 
on Flame Propagation [AFTER MELLISH AND 
LINN ETT 158] 
In reducing burning velocities __ CO,> N, > A > He 
In decreasing composition range for flammability: 
Wide tubes __________________ CO,> N, > He > A 
2.2 cm diam __________________ CO,> He > N2 > A 
1.6 cm diam __________________ He> CO2 > N, > A 
In increasing minimum spark-ignition pressure: 
(H,+O,), low pressure _________ He> A > 2 > CO, 
(H,+O,), high pressure ________ CO, > N, > A 
(H,+N,O), low pressure _______ He> CO, > N2 > A 
In increasing minimum spark-ignition energy: 
(H2 +O,), atm. pressure ________ He> CO, > N, > A 
(CH.+02), atm. pressure __ ____ He> N, > A 
In increasing quenching distance: 
(H, + O2)----- _______________ CO2> He > N~ > A (CH.+O,) ___________________ He> N, > A 
diffusion factors. Table 2 is a qualitative 
summary of the effects of different inert gases on 
flame phenomena. 
It would appear that in dealing with the 
complex systems presented by space-cabin 
environments, only an empirical approach is 
possible. This fact should be kept in mind 
when considering the experimental results of 
Chapters 2 to 6. 
Irradiation 
Certain fuels, hydraulic fluids, and lubricants 
tend to break down when irradiated and pro-
duce materials with lower flash points (refs. 
17, 75, 144, 149, 157, and 176). The space 
radiation hazard may, therefore, contribute 
to the fire hazard, though for present-day 
mission profiles and shielding parameters, the 
effect on internal cabin lubrication systems 
should be negligible. 
CHAPT E R 2 
Effects of Atmospheric Environment 
on Flammability of Fabrics 
and Carbonaceous Solids 
IN THIS CHAPTER AND IN THE OTHERS TO FOLLOW, 
an attempt will be made to outline empirical 
studies which shed some light on the effects of 
internal atmospheric conditions on the fire 
hazard in space cabins. The results of these 
experiments will be interpreted, whenever 
possible, in light of the theoretical considera-
tions outlined in Chapter 1. 
EFFECTS OF OXYGEN ENRICHMENT AND DE-
CREASED AMBIENT PRESSURE ON FLAMMA-
BILITY OF PAPER AND FABRICS 
Early quantitative studies of the effects of 
altitude, oxygen, and nitrogen on the burning 
rate of fabrics were performed in Germany by 
Clamann in 1939. 36 In these experiments, 
paper strips of uniform configuration and com-
position were used. Only the rate of burning 
and not the ignitibility was determined. Figure 
14 is a plot of the results. It can be seen that 
as the total air pressure is reduced from sea 
level to 25,000 feet, the combustion time is 
increased from about 6.8 to 9.2 seconds. Re-
duction in oxygen partial pressure (P02) is 
probably responsible for this . When the alti-
tude is increased with constant oxygen partial 
pressure in air, there is a progressive decrease 
in combustion time. Clamann interpreted the 
altitude effect at constant partial pressure as 
being due to decreasing the amount of nitrogen 
diluent. He felt that nitrogen "absorbs heat 
in the flame zone and acts like an extin-
guisher." 37 In the discussion on oxidizers and 
diluents in Chapter 1 the mechanism of nitrogen 
retardation in hydrogen-oxygen reactions was 
22 
discussed. Clamann's hypothesis appears 
plausible in the light of the studies of inerting 
agen ts in gaseous systems. One can assume 
that the basic principles hold true in the burning 
of solids as well. 
In an evaluation of the fire hazard for the 
Manhigh Projects, Simons and Archibald 201 
studied the burning of paper strips and cloth 
in various oxygen-nitrogen environments. 
Figure 15 is a plot of their results with paper 
strips. The general patterns are the same as 
those reported by Clamann. An increase in 
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altitude to 40,000 feet in the atmospheric air 
environment prolonged combustion time along 
a sigmoid curve from 7 to about 17 seconds. 
At constant oxygen partial pressure, increasing 
the altitude decreased the combustion t ime. 
Combustion of fabric from very light flying 
suits responded in the same general way. 
Figure 16 shows how decreasing the altitude ~ 
a 100-percent oxygen environment shortens the 
combustion time of fabric. There is, of course, 
no nitrogen effect under these condit ions. The 
same fabrics at constant oxygen partial pressure 
in air show the nitrogen effect with a doubling 
of combustion rate in going from a pressure 
altitude of 8,000 feet to one of 38,000 feet. 
Simons and Archibald reported in this paper 
that analogous experiments with helium were 
being planned. Communications with both of 
these investigators revealed that no further 
studies have been performed by their respective 
laboratories. 
Klein 125 has continued the study of fabric 
combustion in various gaseous environments. 
724-454 0-64-3 
For test material he used 2-inch squares of 
standard AA TCC cotton (crockmeter squares) 
having thread counts of 96 X 100 per square inch 
and weighing 4.05 ounces per square yard. 
Squares were preheated in an oven at 150 0 F to 
insure constant moisture content and were 
ignited betwee..n two electrodes. Figures 17 to 
19 are plots of the results. 
Figure 17 indicates that as the proportion of 
oxygen in the atmosphere increases under any 
fixed nitrogen partial pressure, the burning time 
decreases. It also indicates that at any fixed 
partial pressure of oxygen the burning time 
increases with increasing nitrogen pressure. 
The curve at the extreme right (79 percent 
nitrogen) represents burning time in normal air 
mixtures at altitudes from sea level to 10,000 
feet. 
In figure 18, the ratio of burning rate at test 
condit ions to burning rate at standard atmos-
pheric conditions encountered in present aircraft 
(8,OOO-foot altitude) is plotted against total 
pressure. The three curves represent constant 
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oxygen partial pressures equivalent to air at 
8,000 feet, 5,000 feet, and sea level. As the 
total pressure is reduced by lowering the nitro-
gen content, thus increasing the percentage of 
oxygen, the ratio of burning rates increases 
considerably. The ratio of burning rates for 
pure oxygen at 10 in. Hg (250 mm H g) is shown 
by a single point . This is the point for a cabin 
atmosphere of 100 percent oxygen at 5 psi and 
represents a burning rate 3.7 times that found 
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in an air cabin at 8,000 feet. The dotted lines 
connect points of equal percentage of oxygen 
in the atmosphere. These lines indicate that 
the ratio of burning rates also increases when 
total pressure is increased while the percentage 
of oxygen is maintained constant. Within the 
range of oxygen partial pressures considered 
(8,000 feet to sea level) these lines are essentially 
straight. 
EFFECTS OF A HELIUM ENVIRONMENT ON 
BURNING RATES OF FABRICS 
Figure 19 indicates that helium-oxygen mix-
tures behave quantitatively quite like nitrogen-
oxygen mixtures (fig. 17) in controlling burning 
times. It appears that helium offers no great 
advantage over nitrogen with respect to the 
fire hazard of burning fabrics. This is contrary 
to what was postulated by Simons and Arcru-
bald.201 These investigators felt that because 
helium has a thermal conductivity 6 times as 
great as that of nitrogen, this gas would be a 
better "quenching agent." From the discus-
sion of a model hydrogen-oxygen system in 
Chapter 1, it appears that the specific heat of 
a molecule as well as the thermal conductivity 
100% O2 at 5 psi 
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is a major factor in determining its "quenching" 
capacity. How would the specific heat factor 
fit the prediction of burning rates? 
The molar specific heat of helium is 5 
cal/mole and that of nitrogen is 7.2 cal/mole. loD 
This would predict almost equal quenching 
capacity, all other factors being equaL From 
figures 17 and 19 it can be seen that at a partial 
pressure of oxygen of 8 in. Hg (200 mm Hg) and 
inert gas of 10 in. Hg (250 mID Hg), the burning 
time in helium is 17 seconds and that in nitrogen 
is 20 seconds. These are approximately the 
burning times one would predict from the 
molar specific-heat figures given above. 
It is obvious, however, that diffusion and 
other factors playa role. These factors were 
presented in Chapter 1. The experiments on 
the methane-oxygen-inert gas system by Cling-
man et al.43 ,44 illustrated these points. It 
would be expected that the fabric-oxygen-inert 
gas system would also include a diffusion factor 
and probably others as well. It may be merely 
fortuitous that in the latter system the relative 
burning rates in helium and nitrogen followed 
the predictions based on heat capacity alone. 
RESISTANCE OF VARIOUS FABRICS TO 
BURNING IN HIGH-OXYGEN ENVIRONMENTS 
R ecent studies at the Fire Research Station 
at Boreham Wood, Hertfordshire, England, 
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have evaluated the effect of oxygen-enriched 
atmospheres on the burning rate of many 
different fabrics under the influence of fire-
retarding agentsY This is probably the most 
sophisticated study of this type yet performed . 
Table 3 indicates the specifications of the fabrics 
studied, and figure 20, the rates of burning 
(vertical flame speeds) under different volume 
percentages of oxygen in air at 1 atmosphere. 
The oxygen mixtures were admitted to the 
burning chamber at a flow rate giving linear 
speeds of 5 ft /min or 0.06 mifhr. This rate was 
considered adequate for combustion, but too 
slow to give a "forced draft" effect. In air, 
woolen fabrics were difficult to ig~ite and the 
strips burned for only a short distance. Cotton 
fabrics were easily ignited, and burned more 
rapidly and usually to completion. A T erylene 
fabric melted and burning drops fell from the 
strips, but when it was blended with wool, the 
wool matrix supported the molten burning 
Terylene, and both were consumed. The flame 
speed of the mixture was comparable to that of 
a cotton drill . The P .V.C.-coated fabric and 
the retardant-treated green drill did not burn 
in air. The flame speeds were increased when 
oxygen was added to the atmosphere, and, as 
shown in figure 21, the residues of carbon and 
ash decreased steadily. 
In the lower concentrations of oxygen it was 
noticed that, after ignition, a luminous flame 
ascended over the surface of the strip and was 
followed by a slower and less luminous flame. 
Combustion ceased when the upper flame was 
separated from the lower by more than 2 or 3 
inches. In higher oxygen concentrations, the 
distance and distinction between the flames 
lessened and the ash became lighter in color. 
These changes were considered to indicate 
changes in the mode of burning, and may be 
responsible for the plateaus or inflections shown 
in figure 20 where flame speed is affected only 
slightly by the increases in oxygen content. 
Above an oxygen concentration of about 40 
percent, the flame speeds increased r apidly 
with increase of concentration. 
The flame speeds of the woolen fabrics were 
increased by only slight additions of oxygen, 
and the strips burned completely, although the 
flame speeds were very much lower than those 
TABLE 3.- Fabrics Used in Flammability Tests 
oj Figures 20 and 21 [AFTER COLEMAN 47) 
Weight 
Material 
oz ~ 
sq yd sq cm 
Blue melton wool cloth, waterproofed_ 
Blue wool serge cloth ___ _____ ___ ___ _ 
Wool-T erylene mixture, 45- 55 % ____ _ 
Khaki cotton drilL __ ________ ______ _ 
White unbleached cotton drilL ___ __ _ 
Green cotton drilL ____ ____ ___ _____ _ 
Green cotton drill treated with flame 
21. 8 
15. 7 
7. 3 
10. 4 
9. 6 
7. 6 
retardant _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9. 1 
P.V.C.-coated cotton cloth ___ _____ __ 16. 2 
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of the cotton fabrics. P.V.C.-coated cloth 
burned in only 26 percent of oxygen, and the 
performance was similar to that of a wool fabric 
of comparable weight. The flame-retardant 
treatment given to the green drill was effective 
in air, but in 25.4 percent oxygen there was no 
significant difference between the treated and 
untreated fabric. 
A British Standards Institution report 27 
recommends that the flammability rating (in air) 
of fabrics should not be less than 150 seconds 
for a vertical flame traveling 100 inches, cor-
responding to a mean flame speed of 1.7 em/sec. 
Figure 20 shows that with slight enrichment to 
22.5 percent oxygen only the blue melton cloth 
would have satisfied this requirement, although 
it would have failed at 27.5 percent oxygen. 
EFFECTS OF OXYGEN ENRICHMENT ON FLAM-
MABILITY OF FABRICS IMPREGNATED WITH 
FLAME RETARDANTS 
It is evident that a comparatively slight addi-
tion of oxygen to the atmosphere would be 
sufficient to reduce considerably the protection 
afforded by fabrics of low flammability in air, 
and experiments were, therefore, made to deter-
mine the degree of protection provided by flame-
retardant treatments . The material used was the 
white unbleached cotton drill, and strips were 
impregnated by soaking them in solutions of 
mixtures of boric acid with borax or phosphates. 
These mixtures, listed in table 4, have been 
suggested by previous workers.47 The degree 
of impregnation of the retardant is expressed 
as a percentage of the original weight of the 
fabric. Thus, with 10 percent impregnation, 
100 grams of fabric would weigh 110 grams 
after treatment. The results with the mixture 
of boric acid and borax (A) are plotted in figure 
22. They show that the protection afforded 
by the white drill with 7 to 8 percent retardant 
approximates that of the blue wool serge; and 
with 10 percent retardant, approximates that 
of the heavy melton cloth. 
The use of vertical flame speed as a criterion 
to assess the effects of oxygen concentration 
and type and weight of retardant required the 
production of replicate strips with closely con-
trolled weight of deposit. This was difficult to 
achieve with the facilities available and ac-
TABLE 4.-Flame Retardants Used for Im-
pregnating White Cotton Drill [AFTER COLE-
MAN 47] 
Retard-
ant 
Composition 
A {30% boric acid (HaBOa) 
------ 70% borax ( a2B,07' 10 H 20) 
B {60% boric acid (H3B03) 
- - - - - - 40 % trisodium phosphate (N a3PO •. 12 H 20) 
C {60% boric acid (HaBOa) 
- - - - -- 40% disodium phosphate (Na2HPO.·12 H 20) 
D {60% boric acid (H3BOa) 
- - - - - - 40% monosodium phosphate (N aH2PO,· HlO) 
E {60% boric acid (HaB03) 
- - - - - - 40 % monammonium phosphate 
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cordingly other criteria, more convenient ex-
perimentally, were used ·in tests comparing the 
effects of different retardants. The criteria 
were: (a) the oxygen concentration above which 
the fabric burned, however much retardant had 
been added, and (b) the weight of retardant 
above which further additions had little effect. 
The results of the tests to compare retard-
ants are shown in figure 23. Strips with re-
tardant concentrations and in oxygen concen-
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sp eed o f w hite dri ll trea t ed with mixture of 30 
p ercent bor ic acid and 70 percent bor a x . ( AFTER 
COLEMAN .H) 
trations shown on the left-hand sides of the 
curves did not burn, whereas those to the right 
burned. For each mixture there was a critical 
level of retardant concentration above which 
further additions did not materially increase 
the degree of protection, and there was also a 
critical level of oxygen concentration above 
which the fabrics burned whatever the weight 
of retardant. These critical values are given 
in table 5. 
The boric acid-borax mixture was more 
effective than any of the others at lower con-
centrations of retardant and in higher oxygen 
concentrations. The optimum weight of this 
mixture was very close to the 10 percent 
recommended in many publications, and would 
afford protection in atmospheres containing up 
to about 32 percent of oxygen. The limits of 
35,.-----~----~--~~----~ 
5~~A~~~--~-----+----~ 
Air (21) 
O~ ____ -L ______ L-____ -L ____ ~ 
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FIGURE 23.-Criti cal concentrations of re t ardan t 
and o xyg en at limits of flammabi lity. (See 
table 4 for compositions. ) The strips of imp reg-
nated fabri c did not bur n under conditi ons ~n 
shaded si des of curves _ (AFTER COLEMAN .'?) 
TABLE 5.--Limiting Values oj Weight oj Re-
tardant and Oxygen Concentration [AFTER 
COLEMAN 47] 
Retardant* 
A ___ ____ ____ _____ ____ _ _ 
B _____ ___ ___ ___ __ ____ _ _ 
C ___ _____ _____ __ ___ ___ _ 
D __ __ _____ ___ ____ ___ __ _ 
E _____________________ _ 
Critical limiting values 
Oxygen, 
% vol. 
37 
36 
28 
24 
28 
Retardant, 
% wt. 
9 
12 
14 
19 
25 
*See table 4 for compositions . 
weight of deposit and oxygen concentration 
would be expected to vary with the weight of 
the fabric . 
The results of these studies on fire retardants 
are of interest in view of the recent report of 
Helvey 103 in which materials to be used in his 
-I 
j 
I 
I 
FLAMMABILITY OF FABRICS AND CARBONACEOUS SOLIDS 29 
TABLE 6.-Preliminary Screening Tests oj lvfaterialsjor Possible Use in 100 Percent Oxygen Atmos-
phere [AFTER HELVEY 103} 
Test 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Description 
Fiber-glass material coated white __ _ 
Fiber glass coated green ___ ___ ___ _ _ 
Dynel cloth fabric __ __ __ ____ _____ _ 
Dynel, static free _____ ___________ _ 
Dacron-rayon, static free _________ _ 
100% Dacron cloth fabric ___ ___ __ _ 
Scotch-Shield Type 75 (asbestos, 
aluminum coated) . 
Scotch-Shield Type 82 (flameproof 
rayon, aluminum coated). 
Nylon cloth fabric _______________ _ 
Pluton ___ ______________________ _ 
Army ducL ___ _________________ _ 
Goose down _____ ______ ____ ___ ___ _ 
Foam rubber ______ ______________ _ 
Epoxy foam __ _______ ____ __ ______ _ 
Wool rug (Harlok) __ ___ __ __ ___ ___ _ 
Wool rug, rubber coated ____ ______ _ 
Wash 'n Dri cloths, wet ___________ _ 
Wash 'n Dri cloths, dry ___ _____ ___ _ 
Paperbound book with coveL _____ _ 
Hardbound book (old paper) ______ _ 
Insulated wire __ ___ ____ _________ _ _ 
Braided insulated wire ___________ _ 
Plastic-insulated wire ___ ___ ______ _ 
Aluminum-covered insulated wire __ _ 
Asbestos-Dynel S/1445 ___________ _ 
Polyurethane foam _____________ __ _ 
Styrofoam (with combustion in-
hibitor). 
Paper towels _______ ____ ___ ______ _ 
Glass braided wire _____ ___ ____ __ _ _ 
Mattress sample composite (ure-
thane foam wrapped in aluminum 
foil and asbestos-Dynel). 
Results 
Coating burned off lJompletely __ 
Coating burned off completely __ 
Burned completely ____ ______ _ _ 
Burned completely ___ ____ ____ _ 
Burned completely ___________ _ 
Burned completely ___ ________ _ 
Coating burned completely ____ _ 
Burned completely _____ ______ _ 
Burned completely _____ ____ __ _ 
Burned completely _________ __ _ 
Burned completely ___ __ ______ _ 
Burned completely ____ _____ __ _ 
Burned with bright flame ______ _ 
Burned almost completely ___ __ _ 
Burned completely _________ __ _ 
Burned completely ___________ _ 
Did not burn _______ ____ _____ _ 
Burned completely ______ _____ _ 
Burned when flame applied; 
stopped when flame removed. 
Burned completely ___________ _ 
Largely consumed __________ __ _ 
Insulation completely burned __ _ 
Insulation almost completely 
burned. 
Insulation burned off with bright 
flame leaving aluminum wrap-
ping intact. 
Dynel consumed; asbestos re-
mained intact. 
Completely burned ___________ _ 
Material ignited but did not sup-
port combustion. 
Burned completely __ _________ _ 
Did not burn __ __ ___ _________ _ 
Did not burn ______ ___ _______ _ 
Remarks 
Fiber glass appeared brittle. 
Fiber glass appeared brittle. 
Asbestos appeared brittle and 
tore readily. 
Bright flame . 
Filled bell jar with black oily 
smoke. 
Bright flame. 
Bright flame. 
chamber were subjected to ignition by high-
voltage arcs in bell jars containing 100 percent 
oxygen at 1 atmosphere. Table 6 records the 
results of these screening tests. 
pletely in this environment. It is obvious 
that flameproofing materials need to be re-
tested in high-oxygen environments. 
The products of combustion of plastics under 
varying atmospheric conditions have not been 
adequately studied. The few pertinent re-
ports that have been obtained concern burning 
of electrical insulation and are, therefore, 
discussed under electrical fires in Chapter 4. 
It can be seen that most materials of car-
bonaceous nature exposed directly to the 
atmosphere burned completely in 100 percent 
oxygen. Even "flameproof" material such as 
Scotch-Shield Type 82 (test 8) burned com-
CHAPTE R 3 
Effects of Atmospheric Environment 
on Flammability of Gases, 
Liquids, and Vapors 
GASES 
IN SPACE CABINS, well-mixed gaseous combus-
tion systems will rarely be involved in the fire 
hazard. Most of the combustion studies have 
been performed in such systems. It will be of 
value, however, to review some of the empirical 
data on the role of o:lI:ygen and inert-gas pres-
sures on the combustion process in gaseous 
systems. One can derive an "order of magni-
tude feel" for the actual parameters involved 
in the space-cabin hazard. In Ohapter 1 the 
theoretical aspects of the role of inert gases on 
the ignition and propagation of flame in gaseous 
systems were outlined. Figure 4 was presented 
as an example of the increase in minimum spark 
energy and decrease in limits of flammability 
which result upon the addition of nitrogen to 
oxygen-propane mixtures. In Ohapter 1, also, 
a survey was made of the general effects of inert 
gases in reducing burning velocities, decreasing 
the range of flammability limits, increasing the 
minimum spark ignition pressure, increasing 
the minimum spark ignition energy, and in-
creasing the quenching distance between elec-
trodes in spark ignition. The experimental 
study of Olingman and Pease 4 4 was presented 
as an indication of the complexity of factors 
that control burning velocity in gaseous sys-
tems. Figure 13 indicated that in a 10-percent 
mixture of methane in different "airs" con-
taining nitrogen, argon, and helium, the rela-
tive burning velocities were 0.28: 1: 1.86 
( 2:A:He). Olingman and Pease concluded 
that these ratios indicated that thermal con-
30 
ductivity factors and not diffusion factors are 
most critical in determining burning velocity. 
A few more studies will now be presented to 
indicate how the nature of the combustible gas 
controls the degree of the inert-gas effect. 
Morgan and Kane 162 studied the effects of 
varying concentrations of nitrogen, argon, and 
he~um diluents on the flame speed and flame 
temperature of propane-, methane-, acetylene-, 
and hydrogen-oxygen combustion systems. 
Stoichiometric ratios of fuel to oxygen were used 
and all measurements were made at room tem-
perature and pressure. The flame speed was 
determined by the "total" area method, in 
which the flame speed is equal to the area of the 
flame issuing from a nozzle divided by the vol-
ume rate of gas flow. At low concentrations of 
diluents, the high flame speeds and limitations 
of metering equipment prompted the use of 
burner nozzle exits of smaller diameter. The 
effects of nozzle changes are evident in the ex-
perimental curves of figure 24. 
It can be seen in figure 24(a) that at a given 
volume percentage of diluent, the flame speed 
of the mixture containing nitrogen is lowest, 
that of the mixture with argon is somewhat 
higher, and that of the mixture containing hel-
ium is considerably higher than the others. 
Nozzle diameters affect the helium curve more 
than the curves of the other gases. The increase 
in flame speed at a helium concentration of 5 
percent was reproducible. Figures 24(b) and 
24(c) show that the variations of flame speed 
with the nature and concentration of the diluent 
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for stoichiometric mixtures of oxygen with pro-
pane and acetylene are similar to those for 
methane. The "helium effect" at low diluent 
concentrations is also present. The curves in 
figure 24 (c) are dashed below 40 percent diluent 
because ragged flame cones made measurements 
unreliable. Figure 24(d) shows the results for 
hydrogen. Measurement difficulties make the 
figures for low diluent concentrations relatively 
unreliable. The burner nozzle size is more 
critical than for the other fuels, even with nitro-
gen and argon as diluents. This may represent 
the effects of low density and high thermal con-
ductivity of hydrogen and helium. The results 
of flame-temperature measurements of the 
several fuels and diluents may be seen in figure 
25. The "sodium line reversal" temperatures 
of the burning mixtures containing helium and 
argon as diluents are about the same. Mixtures 
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FIGURE 25_- Flame temperatures in varied inert 
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TABLE 7.-Limits of Flammability of Fuel Gases in Mixtures of 21 Percent Oxygen and 79 Percent 
Inert Gas (Results Obtained by Egerton and Powling 64 and by Clusius and Gutschmidt 45) [AFTER 
MELLISH AND LINNETT 158] 
Ref. Fuel gas and limit 
Percent of fuel gas in mixture of oxygen and-
Direction of propagation I---..,..----~.--_---_--.-
He Ne A 
---1--- ---------1----------1----1---- -----------
64 CH., upper _________________ Upward ________________ 9. 0 14. 3 16. 1 -- ------ 17. 3 
64 CH., lower _________________ upward ________________ 9. 0 5. 26 4. 83 - ------ - 4. 01 
64 H 2, upper __________________ Upward ________________ 69. 8 74. 6 75. 7 ----- - -- 76.4 
64 H 2, lower __________________ Downward _____________ 13. 1 9. 0 8. 7 -------- 7. 0 
45 H 2, lower __________________ Downward _____________ -------- 9. 60 8. 07 7. 07 7. 10 
45 H 2, lower __________________ Upward ________________ -------- 3.90 5. 76 3. 55 2. 73 
45 D2, lower __________________ Downward ______ ______ _ -------- 11. 0 8. 36 7. 72 7. 72 
45 D2, lower ___ ___ ____________ upward __ ____ _____ __ ___ -------- 5. 65 7. 41 4. 28 3. 75 
containing nitrogen had lower flame tempera-
tures than those containing argon or helium. 
From these figures it would appear that in 
terms of flame speed and temperature of com-
bustion of gaseous mixtures, nitrogen is a safer 
diluent than helium for space-cabin use. The 
limits of flammability of gaseous fuels with 
diluents of carbon dioxide, nitrogen, helium, 
neon, and argon have been summarized by 
Mellish and Linnett I G8 as seen in table 7. The 
upper and lower limits of flammability of the 
different fuel gases are recorded with the ratio 
of oxygen to inert gas at 21: 79. 
The extinguishing power of any inert gas is 
measured by its ability to raise the lower limit 
and depress the upper limit of flammability. 
As can be seen from table 7, there are no dra-
matic effects produced by any of these inert 
gases except for carbon dioxide. The relative 
effects of nitrogen, helium, and argon vary from 
fuel to fuel and with direction of propagation. 
As was discussed in Ohapter 1, the complexities 
generated by the experimental variables make 
a clear-cut evaluation of the relative "safety" 
of the inert diluents most difficult for these 
gaseous combustion systems. 
Table 8 outlines the effects of different inert 
gases in determining minimum spark energies 
and minimum quenching distances. The ratio 
of oxygen to inert gas was 21 :79. It can be 
seen that in increasing minimum spark ignition 
energy, the order of effectiveness for hydrogen-
oxygen is helium>carbon dioxide>nitrogen> 
argon, and for methane-oxygen, helium>nitro-
gen>argon. Helium appears far more effective 
than nitrogen by a factor of almost 3 for both of 
these fuel systems. In increasing the quenching 
distance, the order of increasing effectiveness for 
hydrogen-oxygen is carbon dioxide>helium> 
nitrogen > argon, and for methane-oxygen, he-
lium>nitrogen>argon. Helium is twice as 
effective as nitrogen in methane mixtures and 
only very slightly more effective than nitrogen 
in hydrogen mixtures. 
A review of table 2 suggests that except for 
the reduction of burning velocity, a.nd the 
nanowing of the range of flammability limits 
TABLE 8. - Minimum Spark Ignition EnergMs 
CM. I .E.) and Minimum Q:uenching Distances 
(Q. D. ) As Determined by Blanc, Guest, von 
Elbe and Lewis 15 in Mixtures of 21 Percent 
Oxygen and 79 Percent Inert Gas [AFTER 
MELLISH AND LIN ETT 158] 
Methane-oxygen Hydrogen-oxygen 
Inert gas 
M.LE., Q.D., M.LE., Q.D., 
millijoules em millijoules em 
CO2 _____ -- ---------- -------- O. 038 0.086 He ________ 1. 08 O. 39 . 043 .070 
A _________ 
.06 . 1 .015 .058 
2-------- .42 .21 .019 .063 
l 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
FLAMMABILITY OF GASES, LIQUIDS, AND VAPORS 33 
in wide tubes, helium is more effective than 
nitrogen in the reduction of the fire potential. 
It is most difficult, however, to properly weight 
these factors in the overall evaluation of the 
fire risk in gaseous combustible systems. This 
pro blem is considered further in Ohapter 7. 
LIQUIDS AND VAPORS 
Much of the recent work on the atmospheric 
effects on burning of liquids and vapors has been 
performed by the Naval Research Laboratory 11 9 
and by the Explosives Research Laboratory of 
the Bureau of Mines. The reviews of Van 
Dolah et a1./20 Kuchta et a1., 127 .128 and Scott 
et a1. 194 summarize much of the work on hy-
draulic fluids, aircraft fuels, and liquid rocket 
propellants. Several pertinent experiments of 
this group are worth mentioning at this time. 
The general trend of the data suggests that 
oxygen enrichment of air tends to increase the 
upper limit of flammability and decrease the 
minimum spontaneous ignition temperature of 
flammable liquids. Figure 26 demonstrates the 
effect of increased oxygen concentration in air 
on seven hydraulic fluids. Five of the fluids 
exhibit a decrease in spontaneous ignition 
temperature with increasing oxygen concentra-
tion; two show no change between 21 percent 
and 100 percent oxygen. Figure 27 indicates 
how little the oxygen partial pressure in mix-
~ 
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FIGURE 26.-Mini:mu:m spontaneous i/lnition tem-
peratures of seven hydraulic fluids in oxy/len-
nitro/len atmospheres at 1 atmosphere pressure, 
in contact with Pyrex /llass surface, as a func-
tion of oxyAen concentration. (AFTER VAN DOLAH 
ET AL.220) 
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various initial pressures. (AFTER KUCHTA ET 
AL. 127) 
tures of JP-6 fuel with oxygen and nitrogen 
affects minimum auto ignition temperatures in 
20 percent to 100 percent oxygen (2.8 to 14.7 
psia) . Only at low oxygen partial pressures did 
auto ignition temperatures appear affected. The 
effects of oxygen concentration on the ignition 
of JP-6 were comparable to the effects produced 
by varying the pressure. 
The "quenching effect" of nitrogen on the 
ignition of liquid JP-6 fuel in this system is, 
therefore, quite unlike the "attenuation effect" 
of nitrogen in hydrogen-oxygen combustion and 
on the rate of burning of fabrics. The phase 
differences will be discussed below. The tem-
perature of the flame, once ignited, does appear 
to be determined by the oxygen partial pressure 
in the 21 percent to 100 percent oxygen range. 
These JP-6 fuel data are not pertinent to the 
space-cabin problem in a direct way, but illus-
trate how variable the oxygen-diluent effects are 
with different hazard parameters and different 
molecular structures. 
A much overlooked fire hazard is brought 
about by the "dieseling" of so-called "non-
flammable" hydraulic and lubricating fluids. 
---. ---.. ~---- ----_ .. 
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Dieseling is the increase of temperature by 
adiabatic compression and subsequent ignition 
of fuel. Mr. M. Braidech of the National 
Board of Fire Underwriters 25 reports that this 
dieseling phenomenon was probably responsible 
for the catapult room explosion of May 1954 
which took 100 lives on the aircraft carrier 
Bennington. Dieselization apparently occurred 
in a large pressurized compressed-air accumu-
lator filled with a mineral-oil hydraulic fluid. 
Pulses created by the "fill and draw" cycled 
operation with 1,500 psi peaks exploded the 
fluid, which had a 3500 F flash point. Com-
pression of the oil and air in the recharging gear 
pump of the apparatus was also suspected of 
contributing another point of dieselization to 
the system. 
Braidech has also related that fine sprays of 
"certain high-flash-point hydraulic fluids" eject-
ing from a break in a high-pressure line will 
explode under oxygen pressures elevated above 
sea-level conditions. Detailed studies of this 
phenomenon have been published.213 Braidech 
also mentioned that several explosions in Naval 
gun turrets were thought to be caused by spray-
ing of hot lubricant materials in air atmospheres. 
W. A. Zisman of the U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory, Washington, D .C., may be con-
tacted for more detailed information regarding 
these accidents and the entire explosive-mist 
problem. Petroleum companies now evaluate 
the safety of their hydraulic-fluid products by 
determining the minimal concentration of 
oxygen required to produce explosive mixtures 
with fine sprays of the material. 242 Data for 
many fluids are available. 213 Figure 28 illus-
trates the decrease in minimum spontaneous 
ignition temperature of hydraulic fluids as the 
fuel injection pressure increases. 
Klein 125 has recently studied ignition of air-
craft fluids under varying atmospheric condi-
tions. He utilized the hot-surface technique 
which closely simulates the cabin fire-hazard 
condition. A stainless-steel plate 0.048 inch 
thick was placed in the test chamber to serve as 
the heated surface. When the desired atmos-
pheric composition was attained, the plate tem-
perature was raised to test level. A few drops 
of test fluid were dripped on the plate frOID a 
17 -gage needle suspended approximately 8 
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TABLE 9.-Comparative Ignition Temperatures oj Aircrajt Fluids [AFTER KLEIN 125J 
Chamber condition 
Ignition temperature, of, for fluid*-
A B C D E F G 
850 ft alL _ _______________________________ 910 970 _______ _ 895 
-------- -------- --------
5,000 ft alt_ .. ______________________________ 950 1,010 1,015 935 955 1,095 990 
10,000 ft alt_______________________________ 1,010 1,065 1,025 985 975 1,115 1,050 
15,000 ft alt_______________________________ 1,100 1,100 1,045 1, 040 1,000 1,130 1, 090 
20,000 ft alt_______________________________ 1,200 1,120 1,090 1, 090 1, 025 1, 145 I, 125 
25,000 ft alt ____________________________________________ " _________ _ 1, 140 1, 045 
-- ------
1,145 
po2=UOp~~~~~~~~~~~~~=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~} 1,060 820 725 575 940 935 505 
P02={8 in .. Hg _____________________________ }_______ 920 975 
4 pSI- ______________________________ _ 790 980 975 550 
p02={6 in .. Hg __ ___________________________ }____ ___ 1,010 1,090 3 pSl _______________________________ _ 980 1,005 1, 040 675 
P02={4 in .. Hg _____________________________ }_______ 1, 080 1,185 2 pSl _______________________________ _ 1, 125 1, 030 1, 135 1, 020 
*The fluids are identified as follows: 
A-Hydraulic fluid, petroleum base, MIL-O-5606 
B-Aviation fuel, JP-4 
C--Lubricating oil, MIL-O-7808 
D-Hydraulic fluid, Oronite, MLO-8200, 93.38% disiloxane, 4.6% silicone 
E-Hydraulic fluid, methyltetrachlorophenyl, G.E. #81644 
F-Hydraulic fluid, disiloxane-ester blend, MIL-H-8446A, 78.68% disiloxane, 4.3% silicone, 15% di(2-ethyl-
hexyl)sebacate 
G--Naphthenic mineral oil, MLO-7117 
inches above the plate. Plate temperatures 
were recorded in degrees Fahrenheit and the 
minimum temperature required to ignite the 
fluid was determined within 5°. The lowest 
temperature that ignited the fluid was con-
sidered the ignition temperature. Fluids were 
tested under atmospheric conditions equivalent 
to 850 to 25,000 feet of altitude, and in pure 
oxygen at pressures of 4 to 10 in . Hg (2 to 5 psi). 
Test fluids, identified in table 9, included avia-
tion fuel, lubricating oil, and several types of 
hydraulic fluids. 
The data indicate that ignition temperatures 
of the several hydraulic fluids vary widely 
(table 9). Fluids E and F, which are high-
temperature fluids , ignited at about the same 
temperatures as the standard fluid A. Th e 
data for some of these fluids, plotted in figures 
29 to 33, show t4at the ignition temperature 
increases as the atmospheric pressure decreases, 
whether the atmosphere is pure oxygen or a 
normal air mixture. Suprisingly enough, the 
ignition temperatures are generally higher in 
pure oxygen than in an oxygen-nitrogen atmos-
phere with an equivalent oxygen partial pres-
sure. This appears to be the cause of much 
confusion regarding the hazard of oxygen in 
space cabins. These results and the results of 
studies of spontaneous ignition temperatures by 
other investigators 248 have been quoted to us as 
indications that "high oxygen may affect burn-
ing rates, but does not affect ignition temper-
atures." The physical parameters of these 
tests must be understood in order to really 
evaluate the relative fire hazards which they 
represent. The results of spontaneous ignition 
temperatures and plate ignition temperatures 
for some of these fluids will be compared next. 
The spontaneous ignition temperature for 
some of these fluids was previously measured by 
Zabetakis et al,248 at the Bureau of Mines. 
Curves for spontaneous ignition are included 
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in figures 29 to 32. The spontaneous ignition 
temperatures found by the Bureau of Mines 
are much lower than the plate ignition tempera-
tures Klein recorded. This difference is not 
unreasonable and can be explained by the 
difference in test conditions. In Klein's tests, 
the fluid, simulating a dropping leak, was 
heated one drop at a time as the drops con-
tacted the heated plate. In the Zabetakis 
studies, the fluid was heated in volume for the 
spontaneous ignition tests. Klein's drops boil 
as they contact the hot plate. This keeps the 
liquid and vapor temperature below that of the 
plate. The difference between the two ignition 
temperature.;; is a function of heat of vaporiza-
tion of the fluid, vapor pressure of the fluid, 
and chamber pressure. In the studies of 
Zabetakis et al. ,248 the atmospheric temperature 
approximates the plate temperature. When 
this condition exists, the heat of the atmosphere 
compensates for the heat of vapot'ization , and 
1,200 
1,100 
1,000 
900 
~ 
~ 800 
.... 
Q) 
a. 
E 
~ 700 
600 
500 
; 
\ 
\ 
o 
'" ~ Plate ignition, pure 02 
/ \ ~~ \ Plate ~gn ition , \ air \ 
\ ~ \ \ \ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ Spontaneous 
\..- ignit ion , air 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
2 4 6 8 10 
Oxygen pressure , in. Hg 
I I I ! 
1 234 5 
Oxygen pressure, psi 
F I GURE 30.-Igni t ion tem pera t ures for JP-4. 
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12 
6 
heat lost by vaporization delays ignition only 
momentarily. The ignition temperature in 
this test, then, would be close to the spontaneous 
ignition temperature. 
It must be realized that the ignition process in 
liquid hydrocarbon systems is quite com-
plex. The discu~sion under "Heterogeneous 
Systems" in Chapter 1 suggests the crucial role 
of oxygen during the lag period and in the 
conversion of initial cool-flame phenomena to 
a full propagating system. It was pointed out 
that the temperature of the hot surface is 
critical in evaluating the effects of oxygen 
on the ignition system (figs. 9 and 10). The 
"lobes" exhibited by the ignition curves can 
cause serious errors in determinations and 
interpretations of spontaneous ignition tem-
perature. For example, the spontaneous igni-
tion temperature of n-octane ("hot ignition") 
in air (21 percent oxygen).is about 280 0 C for 
the apparatus used. A slight change in appara-
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tus, such as a larger chamber, would cause the 
ignition curve to shift downward and to the left, 
so that the 21 percent line would intersect 
the first lobe in 1;he curve and yield a value 
which would be lower by 20 0 or more. In 
addition, at higher temperatures, "negative" 
ignition zones are observed. This is because 
cool-flame ignition is observable only in total 
darkness, not usually the condition in this type 
of determination. These factors introduce 
serious complications in the proper interpreta-
tion of spontaneous ignition temperature. 
For example, some of the spontaneous-ignition-
temperature data of the Bureau of Mines were 
determined in a 200 ml flask by standard 
procedures and might not, therefore, be appli-
cable to a space cabin. The effect of chamber 
geometry and other parameters as discussed 
by N. Setchkin 197 also points out the danger of 
using spontaneous-ignition-temperature data 
in evaluating fire hazards. 
1,200 
1,100 
1,000 
'7 "-
PI . ./ i~ _ Plate ignition , ate Igmtlon aIr pure O2 ~ 
-.......... 
'--\ 
1;"- 900 
\ 
e 
:l 
.... 
~ 800 ~ 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
" Spontaneous ignition, air 
E 
Q) 
I- 700 
'-<' , 
, 
, 
, 
600 
500 
4000 2 4 6 8 10 12 
Oxygen pressure, in. H~ 
I I I I I I I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Oxygen pressure, psi 
FIGURE 32 .-Ignition temp eratures for MI~H-
8446A. (AFTER K LEIN.126) 
Why are the ignition temperatures in pure 
oxygen generally higher than those in an oxygen-
nitrogen atmosphere with an equivalent oxygen 
partial pressure? There are several possible 
explanations. As the drops of fluid hit the hot 
test plate they vaporize. This vaporization 
removes heat from the surface of the fluid 
phase. The lower total pressure of the pure 
oxygen atmosphere promotes a more rapid 
rate of vaporization and heat removal for a 
given temperature. This vaporization can 
occur at temperatures below the ignition tem-
perature of the vapor-oxygen layer over the 
surface of the fluid drop. It would appear that 
at a plate temperature that would cause igni-
tion in the nitrogen-oxygen atmosphere, the 
liquid drop in the pure oxygen atmosphere can 
vaporize completely before the vapor-oxygen 
layer reaches ignition temperatures. This 
phenomenon would result in a measured plate 
ignition temperature which is higher in pure 
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oxygen than in air at the same partial pressure 
of oxygen. 
Another plausible explanation suggested by 
Brokaw 28 is based on the catalytic effect of 
surfaces in ignition phenomena. 133 In brief, 
the presence of pure oxygen predicts an en-
hanced catalytic oxidation on the surface of the 
plate. This may deplete the combustible near 
the surface, inert the combustion products, and 
result in an elevated ignition temperature. 
The complexities of the initial reactions in 
conversion of ignition phases to propagation 
phases 120 makes a more rigid analysis of the 
anomaly quite difficult. 
Once burning is started in a pure oxygen 
atmosphere, however, it proceeds much more 
vigorously and at higher temperatures. Flames 
are blue-white in contrast to the orange and 
yellow flame in normal air.125 Damage from 
fire in a pure oxygen atmosphere is greater and 
the conditions more dangerous than in an 
oxygen-nitrogen atmosphere, despite the some-
what higher ignition temperatures recorded in 
hot-plate tests. 
In figures 29 to 33, there are marked differ-
ences from fluid to fluid in the shape and position 
of the curves representing spontaneous ignition 
temperature, plate ingition temperature in air, 
and plate ignition temperature in pure oxygen. 
The vapor pressure, flash points, and, ulti-
mately, the molecular structure of each fluid 
determine the response to these atmospheric 
variables. Analysis of the fluid burning prob-
lem by study of only one or two fluids 
at several spot points on these curves has 
been performed in the past. It is obvious that 
thorough searches such as Klein and Zabetakis 
et a1. have reported are required to get a valid 
picture of the situation. It is apparent that 
there is a wide choice of fluids and lubricants 
for space-cabin equipment. Those most fa-
vorable for the operation should be screened for 
maximum resistance to all combustion param-
eters under conditions of elevated oxygen 
partial pressure. It is also apparent that the 
use of minimum oxygen content with maximum 
inert-gas content would provide an optimum 
atmosphere insofar as reducing the total fire 
hazard from burning fluids is concerned. 
CHAPTER 4 
Effects of Atmospheric Environment 
on Electrical Fire Hazards 
IN GENERAL, the problem of electrical fires in-
volves the ignition and flammability param-
eters relating to the metallic conductor as well 
as to the insulating materials. The recent 
study of Klein 125 has approached the problem 
by using three basic tests: (1) Determining the 
amount of current that causes wire to burn in 
various atmospheres, (2) measuring the effect 
of various atmospheres in propagating flame 
from a shorted wire to adjacent wires, and (3) 
measuring the effect of various atmospheres 
when extreme current is passed through wire. 
EFFECTS OF OXYGEN ON BURNING OF 
ELECTRICAL INSULATION 
Eight wire samples were selected for testing. 
They represented standard types of aircraft 
wire produced by different manufacturers . 
Some of the samples from different manufac-
turers had the same type of insulating materiaL 
Since the supply of wire was limited, not all 
samples with similar insulating material were 
exposed to all tests if preliminary tests indicated 
that results would be duplicated. Wires are 
identified as to insulating material and type as 
follows: 
Wire A. MIL-W-5274A, Type 1, Olass A-
Extruded polyvinyl chloride primary 
insulation, extruded nylon outer pro-
tective coating 20 gage 
Wire B. MIL-W-8777 (l50 0 0)-Silicone rub-
ber, glass, and Dacron braid, 20 gage 
Wire O. Same as wire B (different manu-
facturer) 
Wire D. MIL-W-16878, Type E (200°0)-
Teflon, 20 gage 
Wire E. Same as Wlre A (different manu-
facturer) 
724-454 0-64-4 
Wire F. Same as WIre B (different manu-
facturer) 
Wire G. MIL-0-25038 (fire resistant)-As-
bestos, 16 gage 
Wire H. MIL-W-7139 (400°F, flame re-
sistant)-Glass and Teflon, 20 gage. 
In order to determine the general burning 
characteristics of these wires in a typical 
spacecraft atmosphere, several samples were 
tested in an atmosphere of pure oxygen at a 
pressure of 10 in. Hg (5 psi). A lO-inch length 
of each wire was looped between two clamps in 
a circuit and subjected to a 50-ampere current. 
The following results were observed: 
Wire A. Insulation melted, bubbled, smoked 
considerably, then turned black. Af-
ter about % minute, the wire burst 
into flame. 
Wire B. Insulation melted, dripped, and started 
smoking after about H minute. Wire 
burst into bright flame in approxi-
mately 1 minute. 
Wire O. Insulation blackened, bubbled exces-
sively, smoked and split in one spot 
and exposed the wire before flame 
appeared. Wire burst into very bright 
white flame in approximately 15 
seconds. 
Wire D. Insulation turned cherry red. Wire 
burst into small blue-green flame in 
approximately % minute and broke a 
few seconds later. 
Wire G. Insulation blackened, smoked, and 
turned cherry red. Wire broke after 
approximately IH minutes. When 
examined after the tests, the insula-
tion appeared brittle but not burned. 
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TABLE 10.- Minimum Burning Current [AFTER 
KLE IN 125] 
Chamber content Burning current, amp, in 
wire-
O2, 2, A E F 
in . Hg in. Hg 
----
4. 0 o. 2 48 
- - - - --
50 
4. 0 6. 0 50 -- - -- - 58 
4. 0 10.0 78 
--- - - - - - - --
4. 0 12.0 > 80 ---- -- 62 
4. 0 18.0 
- ---- - --- ---
62 
4. 0 20. 0 
- - - - -- - - - -- -
62 
5. 0 .2 46 
---- --
- - - --
5. 0 6. 0 48 - -- - -- 62 
5. 0 12.0 68 -- - -- - - - - - -
5. 0 13. 0 80 
----- - - -- - -
5. 0 14. 0 > 80 ---- - - - - - --
6. 0 .2 44 44 48 
6. 0 6. 0 48 48 54 
6. 0 12. 0 50 50 54 
6. 0 18.0 70 70 56 
8. 0 . 2 40 36 46 
10.0 .2 38 36 44 
*6.15 *23. 11 > 130 -- -- - - - - - --
* Ambient. 
The three specific tests on these wires are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
Minimum Burning Current 
A lO-inch length of wire was placed between 
two alligator clamps in a test circuit. With 
the desired atmosphere established in the test 
chamber, the current passing through the wire 
was steadily increased until the wire started to 
burn. The amount of current required to start 
burning was considered the burning current. 
Burning current was measured and recorded at 
several different atmospheric conditions, and 
the results are shown in table 10. 
Only a limited number of tests were con-
ducted on wire B because results duplicated 
those of wire F . Ignition of wires D and H 
was erratic and the small flames were self-
extinguishing; wire H sometimes burned for a 
short time with a small blue flame when sub-
jected to current of 70 amperes in pure o>.J7gen 
at pressures of 6 and 10 in . Hg (3 and 5 psi); 
wire G did not burn at all. 
Data from table 10 are plotted in figure 34 . 
The oxygen partial pressure of the atmosphere 
was held constant and nitrogen was added to 
vary the total pressure. Oonditions repre-
sented by the areas above and to the left of each 
curve are considered safe for the specific oxygen 
partial pressure since fire would not result. The 
curves for polyvinyl-chloride-insulated wire 
level off when nitrogen is added, indicating that 
fire from wire with this type of insulation can 
be prevented with proper atmospheric condi-
tions. These conditions, however, require the 
ratio of the partial pressure of nitrogen to that 
of oxygen to be greater than about 6. The 
curves for wire F indicate that at higher cur-
rents, adding nitrogen has little or no effect, 
and no practical atmospheric composition will 
prevent this type of wire from burning. It is 
not obvious how the molecular structures of 
t hese compounds determine the disparate re-
sponses to nitrogen quenching. 
Burning Adjacent Wires 
Pieces of wire 5 inches long conducting no 
current were placed in planes perpendicular or 
parallel to, and }~ inch from, a 5-inch length of 
wire conducting current. 
Results are given in table 11. Results of 
these tests indicate that when sufficient oxygen 
exists in the atmosphere for a current-conduct-
ing wire to burn, flame will spread to an adjacent 
wire lying either perpendicular or parallel t o 
the burning wire, whether or not the adjacent 
wire is conducting current. 
Extreme Current 
Tests were performed to simulate a short cir-
cuit close to the current source. Twenty-eight 
volts were shorted across a I-foot length of 
wire in pure oxygen and in an oxygen partial 
pressure of 6 in. Hg (3 psi) with 12 in. Hg (6 
psi) of nitrogen. Ourrents as high as 160 to 
180 amperes were measured in the circuit . 
Results of these tests, presented in table 12, 
are similar to results of previous tests. The 
wire melted so fast in one case that the insulation 
was not ignited, and gases from the overheated 
Teflon, in another case, tore the insulation off 
the wire. 
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It would thus appear that in general, the 
asbestos-insulated wire (G) would be best as 
far as the fire hazard is concerned. In the 
absence of nitrogen the silicone rubber-glass-
Dacron insulation (B and F) appears safer than 
does the polyvinyl chloride (A and E). Only 
when the partial pressure of nitrogen is in-
creased to the point where it is more than 6 
times that of oxygen does the polyvinyl-chlo-
ride-covered wire begin to appear safer than 
wires Band F. The glass-Teflon wire (H) ap-
pears to be superior to wires Band F in both 
the adjacent-wire and extreme-current tests. 
There is a question, however, regarding the 
toxicity of buring Teflon. This is discussed 
below. 
TOXICOLOGY OF BURNING INSULATION 
In a sealed cabin, the products of combustion 
of most materials present hazards which might 
26 
600 
conceivably match those of the fire itself. The 
chlorinated plastics such as polyvinyl chloride 
and the fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers such 
as ReI F and Teflon have been mentioned in 
several broad reviews of space-cabin environ-
ments as . presenting special hazards. It ap-
pears worthwhile at this time to review the 
toxicology of the pyrolysis products of these 
electrical insulations. 
Polyvinyl Chloride 
A study in 1954 by Coleman and Thomas of 
the Joint Fire Research Organization, Bore-
ham Wood, England,48 defined quite ade-
quately the thermal decomposition products of 
various polyvinyl chlorides. The results 
of pyrolysis at 300°, 600°, and 900° C 
are reported. The samples were burned in air. 
Enough oxygen was present in the air to burn 
to completion 1 gram of the sample. The 0.25 
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TABLE ll.-Results oj Shorting Adjacent Wire [AFTER KLEIN 125] 
Chamber content 
Plane 
O2, 2, Con-
in. Hg in. Hg ductor 
. 
-
6. 0 O. 2 ParalleL _______ A 
6. 0 12. 0 ParalleL _______ A 
6. 0 .2 Perpendicular ___ A 
6. 0 12. 0 Perpendicular ___ A 
6. 0 .2 Perpendicular. __ F 
Ambient Ambient Perpendicular ___ F 
6. 0 12.0 Perpendicular ___ F 
6. 0 .2 ParalleL ______ _ F 
6. 0 .2 ParalleL __ ____ _ A 
gram samples burned in the apparatus were 
equivalent to 3 pounds of plastic burned in 
1 000 cubic feet of air. Table 13 represents the , 
results along with the maximum permissible 
concentrations corresponding to the U.S. Maxi-
mum Allowable Ooncentrations (MAO). The 
principal products were hydrogen chloride 
(HOI), carbon dioxide (002), and carbon mon-
oxide (00), with carbonyl chloride (phosgene) 
(00012) of small account compared with the 
other gases. Little chlorine was evolved. The 
maximum permissible concentrations for ex-
posure of ~ to 1 hour of hydrogen chloride 
(HOI) and carbon monoxide (00) were sur-
passed in all cases studied. On occasion, 
phosgene (00012) reached levels which were 
above the permissible concentration for expos-
ures of prolonged nature, but below that for 
~ to 1 hour. About 30 percent of the chlorine 
in the plastic was liberated as hydrogen 
chloride, a pungent compound which would 
give warning of its presence. Products of 
burning in 100 percent oxygen environments 
were not found in the literature. 
Wire 
Results 
Noncon-
ductor 
A Nonconductor burned with 60 amp 
current in conductor. 
A Nonconductor burned with 70 amp 
current in conductor. 
A Nonconductor burned with 60 amp 
current in conductor. 
A Nonconductor burned with 70 amp 
current in conductor. 
F Nonconductor burned with 60 amp 
current in conductor. 
F N oncond uctor burned with 70 amp 
current in conductor. 
F Nonconductor burned with 70 amp 
current in conductor. 
H Conductor burned with a bright flame 
but did not ignite nonconductor. 
H Conductor burned with bright flame; 
nonconductor slightly weakened at 
one point where Teflon appeared to 
be burned out. 
Teflon 
The history of toxicity of burning Teflon has 
been apparently replete with exaggeration. 
Recent reviews of the subject have been pub-
li:;hed by Zapp of the E. 1. du Pont Oompany 
in a monograph,m. 253 and by the Polychemicals 
Department of that company.65 
Ohemically, Teflon fluorocarbon resins a~e 
analogs of polyethylene and polypropylene ill 
which the hydrogens are replaced by fluorine. 
In the past decade, the formulation of Teflon 
has changed to give a variation of the old tetra-
fluoroetnylene (TFE) resin that would lend 
itself to conventional melt-processing methods. 
This new melt-processable polymer, Teflon 
FEP-fluorocarbon resin (fluorinated ethylene 
propylene) was introduced in 1956 and finally 
placed in commercial production during 1960. 
According to E. I. du Pont & 00.: 65 
Teflon resins show complete thermal stability up to 
about 4000 F. By using the most refined analytical 
equipment, some traces of decomposition products can 
be detected at temperatures between 4000 F (205 0 C) 
and 4500 F (2320 C). Above 4500 F weight losses be-
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come sufficient to provide a means of expressing de-
composition rates. By comparison with most 
organic materials, weight losses of T eflon resins 
are extremely small. At 5000 F (2600 C) they are 
small enough to be essentially negligible from the stand-
point of service life. The 5000 F continuous service 
rating of TFE resins is based in part on this performance. 
FEP resins exhibit changes in physical strength above 
4000 F (205 0 C), largely accounting for the lower 
temperature rating for these products. 
The pyrolysis products of Teflon have been 
studied.26.134.17o .202 Because of extremely low 
decomposition rates, complete identification of 
the products has not been possible with existing 
analytical techniques. It is known that the 
mechanism of decomposition is primarily one 
of reverting to the original gaseous monomers 
(the basic substances from which the resins are 
synthesized) as well as to some of the gases 
listed below. This means that the TFE resins 
produce tetrafluoroethylene and the FEP resins 
a mixture of tetrafluoroethylene and hexafluoro-
propylene. 
These substances comprise the major portion 
of the decomposition products. Tetrafluoro-
ethylene and hexafluoropropylene are relatively 
nontoxic and markedly less hazardous in this 
respect than the vapors from such commonly 
used solvents as carbon tetrachloride, benzene, 
and carbon disulfide. At temperatures between 
400 0 F and 800 0 F the remaining portion of 
decomposition products consists of fluorocarbon 
gases varying in chain length from C3 to C5 
(also relatively nontoxic) with small quantities 
of hydrogen fluoride, silicon tetrafluoride (from 
the glass equipment), and an incompletely 
characterized waxy sublimate. At 750° F 
and above, small amounts of the toxic gas 
perfluoroisobutylene have been isolated. Free 
fluorine has never been found among the 
decomposition products of Teflon, and its 
formation is not favored thermodynamically. 
If the pYJ.'olysis is carried out in moist air, more 
hydrogen fluoride may be liberated. However, 
this substance is rarely detected at temperatures 
below 750° F (400° C). 
Teflon fluorocarbon resins are "non-
flammable" and do not propagate flame in air 
(ASTM-470 vertical flame test). Decomposi-
tion products will burn at temperatures above 
1,274° F (690° C) but combustion is not self-
TABLE 12.- Eifect oj Extreme Ourrent on Wire 
[AFTER KLEIN 125] 
Chamber 
content 
Wire Results 
O2, N., 
in. Hg in. Hg 
6. 0 O. 2 A Wire broke like a fuse; 
insulation badly singed 
and destroyed but 
there was no open 
flame. 
6. 0 12.0 A Wire broke like a fuse 
and an explosive-like 
orange flame com-
pletely burned the 
wire. 
6. 0 .2 F Wire broke like a fuse 
and insulation com-
pletely burned with a 
bright flame. 
6. 0 12.0 F Wire broke like a fuse 
and insulation com-
pletely burned; the 
burning was slow 
with a yellow flame, 
but it was complete. 
6. 0 .2 H Insulation shot off the 
wire without any 
burning of the insula-
tion; wire was scat-
tered throughout the 
chamber. 
10.0 .2 H Wire broke like a fuse 
and a very small blue-
green flame appeared 
at insulation where 
Teflon was exposed ; 
otherwise insulation 
looked good. 
6. 0 12.0 H Wire broke like a fuse 
4 in. from the end 
and separated from 
the insulation; there 
was no flame and no 
damage to the insula-
tion. 
sustaining since the heat liberated is not, in 
itself, sufficient to maintain the polymer at 
decom posi tion temperatures. Com bus tion 
products consist primarily of carbon dioxide, 
carbon tetrafluoride, and small quantities of 
hydrogen fluoride. The effects of pure oxygen 
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T ABLE 13.-00ncentrations oj Toxic Gases Evoll1ed From Ohlorinated Plastics Decomposed in Air 
by Heat , and Marimum Permissible Ooncentrations [AFTER COLE MAN AN D THOMAS 48] 
Wt. of 
Sample sample, Temp., 
gm °C 
Cblorinated polymetbyl metbacry- 1 O. 55 350 
late (45% carbon, 27 % chlorine) ___ O. 50 550 
O. 50 950 
Polyvinyl chloride, unstabilized 1 O. 25 300 (57% chlorine) _____ __ ______ ___ __ O. 25 600 
O. 25 900 
Vinyl and vinylidene chloride copoly- 1 O. 25 300 
mer, unstabilized (61 % chlorine) __ O. 25 600 
0.25 900 
Polyvinyl chloride, stabilized, "di-
1 
O. 25 300 
octyl" phthalate plasticizer (33 % O. 25 600 
chlorine). O. 25 900 
Polyvinyl chloride, stabilized, tri-
1 
0. 25 300 
cresyl phosphate plasticizer (31% O. 25 600 
chlorine). 0. 25 900 
Polyvinyl chloride fabric (French) ___ O. 50 550 
Safe for prolonged exposure __ ____ _____ ___ ____ ____ ____ 
Safe for ~ to 1 hr ____ ____ __ __ ____ __ ____ ____ __ _____ __ 
Dangerous for short exposures (usually quoted as ~ to 1 br) ______________ ______ _____________ _____ ______ 
*n.d.=not determined. 
environments on combustion are, as yet, not 
recorded. In very hot fires, which cause 
appreciable decomposition of Teflon , heat is 
absorbed from the surroundings as heat of 
decomposition. This property tends to limit 
the damage to Teflon resins in such applications 
as electrical insulation subject to high thermal 
transients. Underwriters Laboratories have 
classified Teflon TFE- and FEP-fluorocarbon 
resins as "self-extinguishing, Group I," with 
respect to fire hazard. 
The pathological effects of these combustion 
products are of interest. The pyrolysis products 
of Teflon produce a syndrome similar to "metal 
fume fever." 66 .171 It is called "polymer fume 
Concentrations of gases, ppm 
HCI Ch COCta CO CO2 
6,000 Nil 3 n .d .* n.d .* 
6, 000 Nil 5 22, 000 26, 000 
15, 000 Nil n.d.* 14,000 60, 000 
13, 000 Nil Nil 5, 000 6,000 
15,000 Nil < 1 7,000 15, 000 
15, 000 Nil 3 5, 000 29, 000 
14,000 Nil Nil 2, 000 4, 000 
18, 000 Nil 5 11,000 21 , 000 
17,000 Nil 10 5, 000 29, 000 
5, 000 Nil Nil 7, 000 8, 000 
7, 000 Nil il 7,000 24, 000 
8, 000 <1 <1 10, 000 30, 000 
6, 000 Nil Nil 6, 000 6,000 
7, 000 Nil Nil 6, 000 15, 000 
8, 000 <1 <1 9,000 21 , 000 
29, 000 n.d.* n.d.* 4,000 20,000 
10 0. 35-1. 0 1.0 100 5, 000 
50-100 4 
- ---- -- -
400-500 
1,000-2,000 40-60 25. 0 1,500--2,000 
fever" or the "polymer shakes ." It is similar 
to influenza in symptomatology and passes off 
without treatment or apparent aftereffects 1 to 
2 days after exposure. Observations indicate 
that these attacks have no lasting effects , and 
that the effects are not cumulative. When 
such an attack occurs, it usually follows ex-
posure to vapors evolved from the polymer at 
the very high temperature (up to 800 0 F or 
423 0 C) used in resin processing operations, 
or from smoking cigarettes or tobacco con-
taminated with the polymer. The causative 
agent in the decomposition products has not 
been identified , since it has not been possible to 
produce the syndrome in laboratory animals. 
\ 
I 
\ 
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It, is possible, however, to kill animals with 
pyrolysis products of Teflon. Harris 98 has ex-
posed rats for 4 hours to the products evolved 
at 250 0 C and produced slight respiratory irri-
tation. Exposure for X hour to the products 
evolved at 260 0 C caused more severe respira-
tory irritation in the same rats. Exposure for 
2 hours to the products liberated at 3000 0, 
which included a fine sublimate, led to severe 
dyspnea and the death of one rat next day; the 
remaining rat was very ill and was sacrificed. Ex-
posure for periods of 1 hour and of X hour 
(separated by a day) to the products liberated 
at 315 0 to 325 0 C produced delayed deaLh in 
one rat and very severe toxic effects in the 
other. Post-mortem examination of the rats 
left no doubt that death and severe illness had 
been due to hemorrhage and edema of the lungs. 
Other organs were also congested. 
Du Pont 65 reports that tests have been con-
ducted with laboratory animals exposed to fab-
ricated forms of Teflon and other common poly-
mers at high temperatures. An example is the 
work in which several kinds of wire construc-
tions were studied for toxicity effects. In 
these tests, approximately 20 grams of sample 
were heated in a temperature range of 392 0 F 
(200 0 C) to 662 0 F (350 0 C); rats were exposed 
for periods up to 4 hours to the resultant py-
rolysis products carried in an airstream of 2 
liters per minute. The ranges of temperatures 
causing products lethal to one or more rats 
after 4 hours of exposure are shown in table 14 . 
Although rats exposed for 4 hours to polyvinyl 
chloride in these tests did not succumb, clinical 
response was severe and major pulmonary in-
jury was observed 12 days after exposure. 
In 1960, The American Conference of Gov-
ernmental Industrial Hygienists set the tenta-
tive threshold limit of 0.005 ppm of Teflon 
pyrolysis products without specifying what 
products. In 1962, the Armed Forces 60 thresh-
old values were given as 0.05 mg/cu m "as 
fluorine." No scientific basis for these figures 
has apparently been stated. 
Silicone Rubber 
The Dow Chemical Co. was contacted fo r 
information as to the toxicology of the pyrolysis 
products of silicone insulation. D ata on the 
TABLE 14.-Lethali.ty oj Polymers at High Tem-
peratures [AFTER E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS 
& CO. (0) 
Material heated 
Teflon 1 TFE resin _ ______ __ 
Teflon 6 T FE resin ___ ______ 
Teflon 100 FEP resin ___ ____ _ 
Silicone rubbeL _____ ____ ___ 
Polychlorotrifiuoroethylene ___ 
Polyvinyl chloride __ _______ _ 
Temp. causing products 
lethal to 1 or more 
rats after 4 hr ex-
posure 
572to 662 300 to 350 
482 to 572 250 to 300 
482 to 572 250 to 300 
482 to 572 250 to 300 
392 to 572 200 to 300 
572* 300* 
*No rats succumbed after 4 hr exposure. 
stability of silicones obtained in the Dow-
Corning Laboratories and supported by inde-
pendent groups elsewhere indicate that degra-
dation of methylpolysiloxane polymers, which 
constitute the major portion of the material in 
question, does not take place to any measur-
able extent below 2000 C. Table 15, taken in 
part from the data of Scala and Hickam,190 
shows that even at 250 0 C oxidative degra-
dation is extremely slow. It is only at tem-
peratures of 3000 C and above that the rate 
becomes significant. 
Treon et aU1S of the University of Cin-
cinnati, under a Wright Air Development 
Center contract, studied the effect on animals 
of vapors generated by dropping silicones onto 
TABLE 15.-Pyrolysis Products oj Methyl-
polysiloxane in Air [AFTER SCALA AND 
HICKAM 190] 
Run Moles gas/gm sample, Xl()5 
Temp.,oC time, 
hr 
H2 CO2 CO O2 
--
200 ______ ___ 6. 0 0 0 0 0 
250 ______ ___ 6. 3 .59 l. 56 0 88. 0 
250 _________ 1l. 0 .55 l. 83 0 93. 7 
300 _________ 6. 0 13. 44 2l. 0 0 139. 0 
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hot Inconel. Their report showed that dimeth-
ylpolysiloxanes in contact with the metal at 
temperatures in the range of 5000 to 6000 F 
resulted in the produdion of a dense fog in 
which formaldehyde and carbon monoxide 
could be detected. Under the conditions of 
the experiments all the animals that were sub-
jected to the fog formed in this manner survived 
exposure of 2~ hours or less. At 3.3 hours or 
longer some deaths resulted. Guinea pigs and 
mice were more susceptible than rats, hamsters, 
cats, or rabbits. It seems from these observa-
tions that there is little likelihood of injury 
resulting from local heating at temperatures 
below 3000 C. In the same series of experi-
ments, it was found that at much higher tem-
peratures (in the range of 1,4000 F), oxidation 
was apparently so rapid and complete that the 
decomposition products were either nontoxic 
or relatively low in toxicity. 
The Boeing Co. has studied the toxicology of 
various burning electrical insulations by expos-
ing mice in bell jars to the vapors from over-
heated wires. This study was performed under 
the Dynasoar contract. 0 reports have been 
obtained from Boeing or the Air Force Systems 
Command. 
The choice of insulation for space-cabin use 
is a rather difficult one. It would appear that 
glass fibers and asbestos are the best materials. 
One must be careful, of course, that the organic 
binders often used with these materials are not 
in themselves excessively flammable and toxic 
when heated. The choice between silicone and 
fluoroplastics is difficult. Fluoroplastics may 
have a slight edge in that they decompose at a 
somewhat higher temperature, but the products 
are possibly slightly more toxic. There are 
really not enough data on equivalent systems 
to make a decision at this point. Asbestos 
and/or glass fibers with small amounts of fluoro-
plastic or silicone binders would probably be 
the best solution. Polyvinyl chloride does not 
seem to be as safe for space-cabin use. 
I 
I 
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CHAPTER 5 
Fire and Blast Hazards 
From Meteoroid Penetration 
THE PENETRATIO OF SPACECRAFT CABI NS by 
meteoroids has been a subject of much specula-
tion and controversy. A review of the problem 
has been recently presented by Davidson and 
Sandorff. 58 This report of the ASA Research 
Advisory Committee on Missile and Space 
Vehicle Structures points out the data gaps 
which need to be filled before a more definitive 
prediction of the probability of vehicle penetra-
tion by meteoroids can be made. It points out 
the very important fact that present data and 
predictions involve so much inaccuracy that 
merely to cover the range of uncertainty in 
engineering design introduces a gross and 
intolerable weight penalty. 
It is not within the scope of thjs report to 
review in detail experiments which define either 
the mass-frequency parameters of the meteoroid 
problem or the equations for hypervelocity 
penetration. What will be discussed are several 
recent experiments which appear to fill in 
enough of the gaps to set at least a one-order-
of-magnitude envelope on the problem. This 
will be done only for the purpose of weighting 
the meteoroid factor in our discussion of cabin 
atmospheres. The several biological experi-
ments which define the "soft" side of the 
problem will also be covered. 
Throughout this section the word "mete-
oroid" will be used as a general term to refer to 
particles traveling in space. The word "me-
teor" is used to denote only the luminous 
phenomena exhibited by particles as they enter 
the atmosphere at high speeds. "Meteorite" 
will designate a body of extraterrestrial origin 
found on the surface of the earth. 
NATURE OF THE METEOROID HAZARD 
Meteoroids appear to be of asteroidal and 
cometary origin. Most, if not all, of the 
meteorites found on earth appear to be of 
asteroidal origin. The cometary particles ap -
pear to be of two types: periodic and sporadic. 
The meteor showers of the periodic type appear 
to be associated with particular comets or the 
scattered remains of comets. About 30 percent 
of the incoming flux appears to be associated 
with specific streams of particles and the 
remainder are classed as "sporadic." Some 
recent measurements have led to the hypothesis 
that all materials are members of streams.87 
The random directions of meteors during most 
periods may well be a result of the fact that the 
earth is simultaneously immersed in many 
streams of varying intensity. Intensity fluctu-
ations of even the well-defined streams may 
occur because of acLual changes of intensity at 
the sLream cores or because the earth does not 
always pass through the core. Perturbation 
forces modifying the stream have been defined 
and appear adequate to explain grossly the 
scattering of both asteroidal and cometary 
particles. 
Ground Observation of Meteors 
Observation of meteors has been accomplished 
by (1) photographic analysis of meteor trails, 
(2) radar analysis of ionization trails, and (3) 
radio interference studies. 
Photographic. Current study of meteors is 
being accomplished by use of a new Whipple 
camera system using super-Schmidt cameras. 
A calibrated rotating shutter system in ter-
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mittently interrupts the light path and allows 
velocity information to be obtained from film 
strips. The brightne s of the trail is measured 
on the logarithmic visual magnitude scale. A 
light source of zero magnitude is as bright as 
1 standard candle viewed from 1 km. On this 
scale, the sun has a magnitude of -26.7 and the 
full moon - 12. As the brightness of a body 
decreases, the number on the scale increases. 
Present cameras can record meteors as faint as 
+5 visual magnitude. The ratio of brightness 
intensity I between two steps of visual magni-
tude M is given by the equation: 
(8) 
From this light input, the mass of the meteoroid 
is determined. As discussed below, it is this 
step which is the greatest source of error in 
evaluation of the mass-frequency curves. 
Radar. R adar scanning of ionization trails 
of meteoroids has the advantage of permitting 
study in the presence of full sunlight and moonlight. 
It is now possible to detect particles of a size 
equivalent to a meteor of + 10 visual magnitude. 
By using multiple high-efficiency antenna 
systems, the trajectory of the meteoroid may be 
plotted as well. Radar analysis can theoreti-
cally be improved to allow sensitivity to + 16 
visual magni tude. 87 
Radio. The ionized trails of incoming me-
teors generate waves of radio frequency. These 
waves can be studied with the "beat frequency" 
techniques. As a rule, these measurements 
give only flux data. Since a given frequency is 
sensitive to meteors of a given size, care must 
be taken to define the meteor size limits of flux 
measuremen ts. 
A major uncertainty in all these measurement 
systems is the lack of confirmation by analysis 
of the meteoroid being studied. There is no 
absolute standard. Sorely lacking are data on 
mass, size, shape, density, porosity, aerodyna-
mic drag, and luminous efficiency of the mete-
oroid in question. Mass and density are usu-
ally determined by assumption of a figure for 
luminous efficiency. This factor is discussed 
below in greater detail. 
Meteoroid velocities relative to earth as de-
termined by the observations from ear th lie 
between 11 km/sec and 72 km/sec. The 11 
km /sec figure is determined by the minimal 
velocity a particle would have if, starting from 
rest, it fell a great distan ce only wlder the in-
fluence of the earth's gravitational field . The 
upper limit is based on the assumption that the 
meteoroid is at maximum velocity (42 km/sec) 
in a retrograde orbit about the sun and runs 
head on into the earth moving at 30 km/sec. 
Figure 35 represents the velocity distribution 
of 359 meteors: 74 from known large showers 
(cross hatched) and 285 from sporadic sources. 
The lower brightness limit was It visual magni-
tude of +4.5. 
Satellite and Space-Probe Observations 
Direct observations of meteoroids have been 
made by sounding rockets, atellites, and space 
probes. Most particles are detected by micro-
phones on the skin, though wire-wound coils or 
grids have also been used. The wire is broken 
or reduced in diameter by impact and the 
resistance is recorded electrically. The veloc-
ity of impl:lct is usually assumed to be 30 
krn./sec, and from momentum considerations 
the minimum mass may be estimated. It 
should be noted that the microphones and wire 
sensors have not been calibrated by using par-
ticles at hypervelocity meteoroid speeds. An-
other factor impeding the accuracy of this 
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method has recently been uncovered. This is 
the fact that for periods within 6 homs after 
launch, very high count rates have been re-
corded. Subsequent ground tests showed that 
the microphone pickups probably recorded 
creaking of the satellite skin as it changed its 
configuration under thermal stress. Only re-
cent studies have accounted for this factor. 
Discrepancies between the microphone sensors 
and wire-grid sensors on Midas II satellites 
have been noted by Soberman and Lucca. 206 
The Venus fly-trap experiments in which a 
recoverable plastic bag is opened to sample the 
meteoroid population has added a new dimen-
sion to analysis of the actual particles. Micron-
sized holes were found which showed jagged 
and irregular edges as well as round ones .205 
Soberman concluded from these studies that 
the particles are probably irregular in shape 
and are frangible. They shatter easily and do 
not break the wire grids as often as was cal-
culated. It is also possible that they are of 
fluffy or porous structme with a density as 
low as 0.05 gm/cm3 •99 • 167 
In all these satellite studies it must be re-
membered that the meteoroid flux rate is not 
constant. Even after the visible large-particle 
showers and known seasonal variations are 
subtracted from the data, it appears that a 
fluctuation in flux rate of one or two orders of 
magnitude is possible. These fluctuations have 
periods of only several days. Sampling satel-
lites must, therefore, operate for periods of 
weeks in order to average out these variations. 
Meteoroid Mass-Frequency Data 
Until recently, there has been a wide range 
of estimates in the mass-frequency spectrum 
of meteoroids. Figme 36 is a sample of the 
past uncertainty. It is taken from the data 
of Whipple 228.229 and Watson. 225 Also included 
are the results of satellite experiments in the 
small-particle range. This lower mass range 
may be of importance in the design of extra-
vehicular structmes and personal equipment. 
It is unfortunate that the most critical particle 
size is in a range that is entirely in the realm 
of extrapolation. Deviation of the low-mass 
data from the Watson and Whipple extrap-
olation is a function of the inherent errors 
of measmement already discussed. 
Several indications in the past have suggested 
that previous estimations of the density of 
meteorities were high. The wire-grid satellite 
experiments of Soberman 205 which have been 
mentioned suggested that most materials had 
lower densities than were estimated for meteor-
ite data. Recent studies on Satellite S- 55A 
(Explorer VIII or 1960 Xi 1) have corroborated 
this hypothesis. s On the satellite were pres-
surized semicylinders of beryllium copper 
with a wall thickness ranging from 1 to 5 
mils. Pressure loss upon puncture was 
recorded. In addition, stainless steel sheets 
(3 to 6 mils thick) backed · with a current-
carrying foil were placed on the surface of 
the satellite. Punctures were detected by 
grid breaks. Impact microphones and CDS 
light detectors also monitored the skin . In 
2 days of useful satellite life, microphone 
impacts occurred as frequently as previously 
recorded on other satellites. However, no 
punctures of the thin pressurized cans or 
steel panels were recorded. These findings 
were far more in line with the prediction of 
Watson than with that of Whipple. 
It is of great significance that recent studies 
by McCrosky 142 and McCrosky and Sober-
man 143 of the results of the Trailblazer I 
experiment (NASA Langley and MIT Lincoln 
Laboratories) have radically modified the 
luminous efficiency factor in interpretation of 
mass from meteor-trail photographic analysis. 
The studies by Cook et a1.51 of three asteroida.l 
meteors have also contributed to a new evalu-
ation of the mass-frequency analysis of 
Whipple. 230 It will be worthwhile to present 
Whipple's review of the new data which 
establishes a fresh picture of the meteoroid 
hazard with changes of several orders of 
magnitude from previous figures. 
The physical natme of meteoroids has been 
more clearly defined by the above papers. The 
drag equation by means of which velocity and 
deceleration of meteors is translated into mass 
and densi ty is 
(9) 
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For known velocity V and observed intensity 
I, the mass m may be calculated when the 
luminous efficiency To is known. Deceleration 
measurements then establish the density as well 
as the mass scale. In the Trailblazer I experi-
ment,143 the luminous efficiency was experi-
mentally defined. From a rocket an iron sphere 
of known mass was ejected down into the atmos-
phere at 10 km/sec. The meteor trail was 
photographed and a value of luminous efficiency 
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was obtained as To=8 X 10-19 zerO magnitude 
(phot) gm-1 cm-3 sec4. The log To was con-
verted to a value for the more frequent stony 
meteorite through the correction of Cook 
et al.,51 by a log factor of -0.80. This figure 
was then converted to the visual scale by a log 
factor of -0.72. The resultant log To for stony 
meteoroids is -19.63 on the visual scale. 
In compromise with the empirical studies of 
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nitude (visual) gm- I cm-3 sec4 was actually 
used to calculate the mass mo of a meteor 
traveling at 30 km/sec with a visual magnitude 
of zero. This critical constant mo= 1 gm. 
In order to calculate new frequency-mass 
curves, the density of the average particle is 
required. Whipple used the equation of 
Jacchia 116 which relates density p to the drag 
coefficient r and shape factor A through a 
constant K, such that log K=6.203 : 
(10) 
Whipple, assuming rA=0.92 and the value of 
To calculated from equation (10), arrived at the 
mean density of stony meteoroids as p=0.44 
gm cm-3• The value of mop2 was then calcu-
Jated to be 0.196 gm3 cm-6• 
The flux rate of meteoroids for a randomly 
oriented surface above the earth has been cal-
culated by Hawkins and Upton .102 Assuming 
that mo= 1 gm and correcting Hawkins' flux 
rate by a factor of X for self-shielding, Whipple 
calculated the flux rate N as 
log tq=-1.34 log m+210g(0.443/p)-14.48 
(11) 
Correspondingly, the older "Watson law" 224 
becomes 
log N=log m+210g(0.433/p)-13.80 (12) 
Equation (11) is probably trustworthy to within 
a factor of 5.100 Figure 37 is a mass-frequency 
plot representing the new Whipple pred iction of 
equation (11) (labeled 1963A) and the older 
prediction (Met. risk 1957).22g Also compared 
in this plot are the predictions derived from 
the " Watson law" as corrected in equation (12) 
(labeled B), and the determinations of Mc-
Cracken et al.,141 Hemenway and Soberman, 104 
and van de Hulst 112 for zodiacal light. The 
curves also fit the flux rates predicted by Mill-
man and Burland/61 though the fit may be 
entirely fortuitous. lOo • 101 Most encouraging is 
the meeting of Whipple's extrapolation from 
large-particle data with McCracken's extrap-
olation from small-particle data (at m=10-6 
or 10- 7 gm). It is hoped that the recent work 
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of Hawkins and Southworth at the Harvard 
Radar-Meteor Project will give more precise 
data in the 10-2 to 10-4 gm range. Whipple 230 
reports that preliminary results of this project 
fall in line with his current extrapolation. 
Hawkins 100 has recently reported that it is 
also possible to determine the mass of the 
meteor from the ionization efficiency. This 
method gives an entirely independent estimate 
of the mass of meteoroids and is actually being 
used to determine the flux of meteoroids. 
Hawkins states: 
In many respects the determination from ionizing 
efficiency may be more reliable than the determination 
from luminous efficiency . Although the luminous 
effie iency has been calibrated by artificial meteoroid 
injections, the problem of estimating the effective 
luminous efficiency of a meteoroid is difficult. The 
art ific ial meteoroids were composed of iron and there 
are many different electron transitions involved in 
determining the luminous efficiency of all the possible 
constituents in a meteoroid. However, for the ionizing 
probability each atom has one main energy level only 
and the extrapolation is perhaps less subject to error . 
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Vehicle-Penetration Parameters 
The immediate result of meteoroid impinge-
ment on a vehicle structure is erosion or pene-
tration of the skin. Much theoretical and 
experimental work has gone into the analysis 
of hypervelocity impact and cratering. Earlier 
work on lower velocity impact «10 km/sec) 
and eA'trapolations to the meteoroid velocity 
range has been reviewed by Herrmann and 
Jones.105.106 Much of the following discussion 
is taken from these papers. It is generally 
believed that the stress waves in hypervelocity 
penetration are many orders of magnitude 
higher than the strength of the target. Upon 
impact, target material, even if brittle, will 
flow like a liquid. Penetration appears to 
occur in a time equal to only one reverberation 
of the stress waves through a plate target in 
contrast to the multiple reverberations of wave 
systems in impacts at lower velocity. Pro-
jectile and target material are projected both 
forward and backward as a spray of fine par-
ticles. For thicker targets and for threshold 
penetration, the fluid phase will occupy only 
the initial part of the impact period. Stress 
waves are then attenuated to the degree where 
the target acts once again as a solid and ma-
terial strength becomes important. The final 
phase of penetration involves all possible com-
binations of spallation, plugging, petalling, and 
ductile failure of the residual target material. 
As very high meteoroid velocities are reached, 
additional phenomena are encountered. !felt -
ing and vaporization of the projectile are 
intensified by the heating due to elltropy gain 
across the shock wave at the target-projectile 
interface. The liquid phase continues for longer 
periods of time and may be ejected out of or 
through the crater . The model for threshold 
penetration presents a picture similar to thresh-
old penetration at somewhat lower velocities, 
but the fluid and vapor phases last longer. 
Mathematical models of the penetration 
phenomenon are numerous. Most assume a 
fluid target with either a rigid or hydrodynamic 
projectile. Bjork's theory has served as a 
reasonable first approximation for predicting 
cratering under hypervelocity impact.13 . 14 
Strength, work hardening, and so forth, of both 
the target material and the projectile are 
neglected. A theoretical, though experimen-
tally valid, equation of state relates the internal 
energy, pressure, and specific volume of the 
material. Solving the problem for the cylindri-
cal projectile with Length/Diameter=l, Bjork 
computed the equation: 
(13) 
where 
p depth of penetration, meters 
mp mass of projectile, kg 
V velocity, m/sec 
K for iron projectile and target, 6.06 X 10 - 3 
m 2/3 sec l /3 kg1/3 ; for aluminum projectile 
and target, 10 .9X 10-3 m 2/3 secl/3 kgl /3 
Some recent equations for the 30 km/sec 
range of velocities involve a thermal model in 
which the kinetic energy is entirely converted 
to heat of fusion or vaporization. In spite 
of the general absence of equations for low-
density, porous, stony particles, much progress 
has been made in the theoretical realm. The 
empirical formula of Herrmann and Jones 106 
appears to be generally accepted as including 
most of the pertinent variables and quite 
reliable for penetration calculations. Hyper-
velocity-impact laws appear to scale linearly 
the mass of projectile with volume of the crater 
TABLE 16.-00mparison oj Penetration Formu-
las jar Aluminum and Iron Targets (1'vleteoroid 
Density, 0.44 gm/cm3; Velocity, 22 km/sec) 
[AFTER WHIPPLE230) 
Aluminum Iron 
Author 
p/ml/3, P/ml/3, p/ml/3, P /ml/3, 
cm/gml/3 cm/gml/3 cm/gml/3 cm/gml/3 
Herrmann and 
Jones 106 ______ 1. 29 1. 94 O. 56 0.83 
Bjork 13 ________ 3. 06 4. 58 
-------- --------
Whipple 228 _____ 
--------
6. 04 
-------- --------
Bruce 29 __ _ _____ 3. 56 5. 34 2.05 3. 07 
6pik 167 ________ 2. 13 3. 19 1. 30 1. 95 
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for similar materials. The Herrmann-Jones 
formula for depth of penetration p into a 
emi-infinite target of density p, and Brinell 
hardne s I-I by a projectile of density p, mass 
m, and velocity V is: 
p=0.6 (~y /3 ;~~3 10g e [1+ (p/p,)?/3~'V2/H)J m i /3 
(14) 
Depth of penetration P of the projectile into 
a thin target of finite thiclmess can be obtained 
from P/p =1.5. 
Whipple 230 has compared the Herrmann-
Jones penetration equation with equations of 
other investigators for a model meteoroid 
with a density of 0.44 gm/cm3 and velocity of 
22 km/sec. Table 16 is a compilation of these 
results. Most of these other equations are 
for projectile and targets of the same density, 
a most unlikely event. The lower penetrations 
of the Herrmann-Jones prediction would appear 
more in line with the reality of meteoroid 
hazards. 
Estimates of Meteoroid-Penetration Hazard 
The probability of damage to a spacecraft 
from a perforating meteoroid impact involves 
the statistical problem of the likelihood of 
meteoroid encounter during a given mission. 
This encounter probability depends on the size 
of vehicle or component, the space environment 
in question, and the duration and path of 
flight. 
Whipple's recent prediction of perforation 
probability makes use of the new equations for 
flux iates (11) and (12) and the most recent 
penetration equation of Herrmann and Jones 
(14). The "best estimate" is a combination of 
equations (11) and (14) for the perforation rate 
N of randomly oriented surfaces near the earth: 
log N=-4.02 log P-13.33 (15) 
This "best estimate" line is plotted in figure 
38 as the relation between average time to 
perforate and thickness of aluminum skin. 
The "optimistic" curve for small particles is 
a plot of the combination of the revised "Watson 
law" (12) and the Herrmann-Jones equation 
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FIGURE 38.-Meteoroid perforation of thin metal 
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(14). The "pessimistic" line is a plot of 
equation (11) in combination with equation 
(14) in which P/2=0.75 p. 
For a spherical satellite of 3 meters' diameter 
and surface o[ 7rd2=28 square meters, the 
average time [or penetration of the vehicle wall 
(0 .03 cm of aluminum) is 2.3 years by the "best 
estimate." The corresponding figure was given 
as 6 hours by the 1957 estimate of Whipple. 228 
This involves a correction factor of 3,000. As 
we have seen, tbis factor al'ises from favorable 
corrections in meteoroid freq uency, mass, and 
density data as well as [rom the penetration 
data. 
At this time, uncertaintif's still remain. 
Density and frangibility data are still the 
weakest links. There is partial cancellation of 
the density factor in the combination flux rate 
equation (11) and penetration equation (14). 
Equation (15) may be corrected for new density 
figures by the factor (0.44/p) 1.34. Uncertainty 
regarding the dem;ity factor throw:> a "halo" 
about the lines of figure 38 of about 1 order of 
magnitude. Whipple feels that this holds for 
skin thickness above 0.03 em. The curves are 
probably too optimistic [or thinner shells near 
the surface of t.he earth. The "dust belt" 
about the earth 229 increases the flux rate of 
smaller particles above the calculated levels. 
On the other hand, the zodiacal-light data 
suggest that the curves are too pessimistic for 
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great distances from the earth.112 It is pertinent 
at this point to relate that a piecc of an Atlas 
booster skin section was recently recovered with 
what appears to be meteoroid cratering. The 
actual structmc is at General Dynamic / 
Astronautics, San Diego, California. A photo-
graph showing a hemispherical-lipped crater 
0.045 inch in diameter and several shallow 
craters is available at the Lovelhce Foundation 
(GD /A photograph 86597 A, unclassififld). 
),1any such craters were apparently found in 
this stainless-steel skin section which was picked 
up in Africa. This is the only space-vehicle 
specimen of which we are aware that has what 
appears to be meteoroid cratering of this type. 
Penetra tion Barriers 
It is beyond the scope of this report to dwell 
on the various devices being studied as penetra-
tion barriers against meteoroids. It is worth-
while, however, to approximate the degree of 
protection that barriers may offer in om evalu-
ation of the meteoroid hazard discussed above. 
The original idea of Whipple that a thin ex-
ternal shield will shatter the meteoroid and thus 
spread the impact energy over a wide area has 
motivated recent experimental study of this 
concept. 
Bumper Shields. Humes et a1.113 have re-
cently investigated the effects of bumper thick-
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ness and standoff distance with copper 
projectiles. The bumper was half as thick as 
the projectile diameter, the near-optimum 
thickness. Results of these experiments are 
seen in figure 39 . The total penetra ion (the 
sum of the bumper thickness and the depth of 
the deepest hole in the semi-infinite target) is 
plot t ed against the bumper standoff distance 
with the copper-projectile velocity as a param-
eter. At speeds up to 9,000 ft/sec the projectile 
pierced the bumper as an unbroken body. At 
higher velocities the projectile was shattered. 
The fragment size decreased as the velocity in-
creased, thus decreasing the depth of the holes 
in the semi-infinite rear target. This occmred 
only when the standoff distance was sufficient 
to permit the fragments to scatter and not more 
than one impinged at anyone point. Thus, 
the amount of damage was directly related to 
the size of the fragments. The decrease in 
total penetration was observed as the velocity 
increased from 9,000 ft/sec to the maximum test 
velocity of 14,000 ft/sec. 
Nysmith and Summersl65 studied the mode of 
failme of parallel aluminum sheets bombarded 
with glass projectiles. They observed that 
with impact velocities greater than 20,000 
ft/sec a plate behind a bumper fails in a different 
manner than with lower speed impacts. Figure 
40 is a graphic result of their study where t is 
the sum of the thicknesses of parallel sheets 
and d is the diameter of the glass prOJectile. 
At the highest test velocities, the projectile 
and material removed from the bumper are 
shattered into a thin shell of fine fragments 
which travel in a diverging pattern. This 
ruptures or cracks the plate behind the bumper 
before it is perforated by any fragments. 
Tests at impact velocities of 20,000 ft/sec 
indicated no change in the ballistic limit when 
the relative thicknesses of the bumper and the 
rear sheet were changed if the sum of their 
thicknesses was held constant. Going to the 
extreme of a 1 mil bumper, however, resulted in 
a great loss in performance because the pro-
jectile was not shattered. Nysmith and 
Summers conclude that for impact at meteoric 
speed, a sheet behind the bumper is more 
likely to be ruptured by a spray of fine particles 
than to be penetrated by individual particles . 
I 
I 
1 
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Bumper Cores. Rolsten et al. l83 of General 
Dynamics/Astronautics have recently studied 
the principles of meteoroid protection under 
NASA contract. In ihis, the most sophisticated 
study of protection engineering, the "bumper 
concept" was investigated with shield materials 
of various types and thicknesses, at various 
separations from the main skin. The bumpers 
were separated by core materials of various 
types. In general, findings are similar to those 
of the above investigators. The core material 
between bumpers was inyestigated in great 
detail. Even though the optimum system was 
not determined, the general principles of 
energy absorption by cores were outlined. It 
is worthwhile to review these principles since 
they may reduce, by a factor of 2 or more, the 
penetration hazard for a given total skin and 
bumper weight. 
The energy-absorbing or core material placed 
between the bumper and the vehicle hull may 
insulate, support, stiffen, and hold the bumper 
and hull plates in their respecti \'e positions. 
From the standpoint of protection from 
meteoric particles, this energy-absorbing ma-
terial is to be sacrificed to save the vehicle hull. 
Adequate COre material pro\'ed to be either 
fibrous, such as glass fibers, Refrasil (R. r. 
Thomp on Fiber Glass Co.), 1Iin-K (Johns-
~.rall\'ille), Linde S- 10 (Linde Co.), Tipersul 
(E. I. du Pont de Nemours), Crystal-M 
(Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.) 
and metal wool; or sponge or foam, such as 
cellular magnesium (Dow Chemical 0.). From 
the experimental data it was found that the 
energy-absorbing material must have moderate 
compre si ve and shear strength, low density, 
directionality of mechanical properties, and low 
ablation rates. In addition, the material must 
not measurably contribute to the shock cone 
or to the fast-moving fragments. AI 0, it should 
be capable of reducing the velocity of all 
particle lllo\'ing toward the main hull. 
Thermal stability, moderate toughne s, and a 
uniform texture are also desirable. 
The preliminary experiments show that in-
sula,ting materials increase the protection [rom 
meteoric particles when used us core materials 
in the bumpered systems. The exact principle 
whereby fibrous material fUl'l1ishes this in-
72~54 0--64-5 
f 
(j 
2.0 
0 
1.0 
.9 
0 
0 
.8 
.7 
.6 
.5 
.4 
.3 / 
.2 
2,000 
d, in. h d 
.0625 8 
.125 8 /> 
.188 8 / 
2024·T3 aluminum· 
IcY alloy sheets~h----j 
./ df ~>~,,~ V 
Glass ---.j I-.t L.j I-
2 2 
4,000 10,000 20,000 40,000 
Ballistic limit, ft/sec 
F I G URE 40.-Effect o f thickness o n the ballistic 
limit . T he balli stic limit is the minimum 
velocity required t o penetrate o r rupture the 
rear s h eet. (AFTER NYSMITH AND SUMMERS. ISS) 
creased protection has not been determined. 
On the basis of these preliminary data, it can 
be concluded that energy-absorbing material 
placed between the bumper and the main hull 
of the vehicle will significantly reduce the 
weight per unit area of the meteoroid-protection 
system. For example, the total weight per 
unit area can be lowered from approximately 
8.8 to 5.9 lb/sq ft by the incorporation of a 
1-inch-thick pad of fibrous potassium titanate 
placed flush with both the 0.063-inch aluminum 
bumper and the vehicle hull . It should be 
recognized that further improvement may be 
forthcoming, since the panels studied may not 
actually represent the minimum spacing for the 
5.9 lb/sq Ii pH,nel. ew and more efficient 
fibrous core materials may also be found. 
What is the mechanism of action of these 
materiHIs? Differences in impact behavior for 
the same total weight of several test panel con-
figurations can be attributed to projectile frag-
mentation on acceleration, mode of proJectile 
impact (flat face or edge), or changes in test 
panel design. Apparently, materials such as 
pressed fine fibers and foams transfer or accept 
momentum or energy from the particles moving 
from the bumper toward the hull plate. Any 
reduction in particle velocity corresponding to 
the momentum transfer may release large quan-
tities of kinetic energy. This reduction in 
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velocity indicates that large amounts of the 
kinetic energy as ociated with the velocity 
change must be consumed in mel ting, vapor-
izing, and/or pulverizing the core material. 
Fine fibers provide large surface areas to absorb 
energy as well as to reflect and refract the im-
pact shock waves. Furthermore, the fine ma-
terial eliminated the pos ibility that the forces 
of impact would remove and accelerate large 
solid fragments of core material toward the 
vehicle hull. 
The spray pattern , when a fibrous material 
was placed between the bumper and vehicle 
hull, was masked somewhat by the material 
destroyed and by gases and fragments rebound-
ing from the surface of the plate. However, 
there were usually 3 to 10 closely grouped small 
craters or nicks in the vehicle hull. The impact 
pattern was usually very small in comparison 
with that on similar test panels in which core 
material was not used. There appears to be an 
optimum density and thickness for the core 
material. Under the test conditions, the opti-
mum density is apparently greater than 10 and 
less than 45 lb/cu ft. The optimum thickness 
of this sacrifice material was evidently not 
greater than 1 inch under the test conditions. 
Thus, the basic principles of core protection 
systems have been moderately well defined. 
In a recent report under ASA contract, 
D'Anna et aJ.57 have evaluated the possible role 
of self-sealing elastomers as pllnetration bar-
riers. The basic philosophy behind the shift in 
concept from a simple double wall to a sealing 
barrier was the fear that at meteoritic velocities 
the impacting conglomeration of fragmented 
particles from the front shield, though not com-
pletely penetrating the inner pressurized shell , 
may still possess sufficient energy to spall par-
ticles from the back face of the inner shell. 
These studies were only preliminary. It still 
remains to be demonstrated whether the overall 
protection efficiency of the self-sealing elastomer 
core is greater than that of the fibrous cores 
described above. 
Pen etration Hazard Estimates for Vehicles 
With Bum per Systems 
How must the figures for probabili ty of 
penetration be revised? It is still premature 
to estimate the effect that protective bumpers 
ard cores will have in decreasing the penetra-
tion probability of spacecraft. Davidson and 
andorff 58 point out that even for the more 
conservative equations for penetration and 
simple bumper effect, meteoroid bumpers can 
diminish by a factor of 4 the total structural 
weight required for a given degree of protection. 
The core materials further diminish this by a 
factor of about 2. The latest predictions of 
Whipple would appear to be on the conservative 
side by at least an order of magnitude if ideal 
bumper configurations were to replace the 
single-sheet skin in penetration equations.228 
For a 3-meter-diameter spacecraft in the 
vicinity of the earth with idealized, integral, 
wall-shield system (bumper and core) equiva-
lent in weight to a 0.03-cm aluminum skin, 
this would give an overall projected possibility 
of penetration of about once every 23 years. 
EFFECTS O F METEOROID P ENETRATION 
o INT ERIOR O F SPACE CABI S 
As has been pointed out above, the meteoroid 
penetration of vehicle walls results in passage 
of molten and vaporized materials (projectile 
and wall) into the cabin space or fuel com-
partments. Spallation of the inner wall in 
partial-penetration conditions may introduce 
high-velocity particles into the interior with 
direct damage to personnel and equipment. 
Introduction of molten and vaporized ma-
terial into the interior of the vehicle might be 
expected to create local temperature and pres-
sure conditions which could cause ignition of 
propellants, initiate chemical reactions in 
materials, and directly ignite flammable ma-
terials within the cabin. Also possible is the 
subsequent oxidation of the vaporized materials 
to form a flash hazard in the cabin atmosphere. 
In evaluating the total fire hazard, it must 
be remembered that spallation of the cabin wall 
IDay result in secondary missiles which may 
penetrate containers, disrupt tubes and pipes, 
and even cut electric wires. The release of 
flammable liquids and gases by these secondary 
projectiles creates fire hazards which have al-
ready been discussed. Ignition of these mate-
rials by the simultaneous appearance of molten 
liquids and vapors would follow the patterns 
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described in previous sections. Disruption of 
electric wires by secondary missiles would also 
create the "break spark" ignition hazard in 
addition to molten-liquid and hot-vapor haz-
ards. Impingement of a metal fragment against 
a cabin structure might even create a friction 
spark which could ignite flammable materials 
within the cabin. The most significant hazard 
in cabin penetration, however, appears to be 
the formation of an "explosive" flash of oxi-
dizing metal vapors in the gaseous environment 
of the cabin. The rest of this chapter will be 
devoted to an analysis of the flash hazard. 
Penetration of Test Cylinders Containing 
Pressurized Oxygen 
It is worthwhile to review the effect of 
meteoroid penetration of o~"ygen-filled struc-
tures. Recent studies by General Dynam-
ics 139. 183. 184 show that pure liquid or gaseous 
oxygen at relatively low pressures has a marked 
effect on the penetration damage to cylinders 
containing it. 
In preliminary control studies, cylinders con-
taining water at pressures from 20 to 60 psi 
were hit with projectiles impacting at 17,000 
ft/sec. 139 • 184 There was catastrophic ripping of 
the vessel wall. The kinetic energy of the 
projectile is apparently delivered to the cylinder 
wall at a high rate. This energy supplements 
hoop tension and causes wall failure at the point 
of impact. Gas-filled structures behave in a 
different manner. The kinetic energy is de-
livered to the vessel walls at a much slower rate 
than in liquid-filled vessels. This is due to the 
lower density of the gas and lower speed of 
sound through the medium. Failure occurs by 
spallation, puncture, and continued flight of the 
hypervelocity particles through the gas and out 
the opposite side of the tank. If, however, the 
crack or tear produced in the wall of the pres-
surized gas cylinder exceeds the critical crack 
length of the material for the wall stresses which 
prevail, catastrophic fracture of the tank wall 
may occur just as in the case of a liquid-filled 
tank. 
In the study of the oxygen-filled cylinders, 
a heavy test vessel was designed 5 inches in 
diameter and 6.75 inches long. The end dia-
phragms were replaceable targets of varied 
materials and thicknesses. Explosively accel-
erated steel projectiles were used in this study. 
In the first test, the front and back diaphragms 
were fabricated from 5 Al-2.5 Sn-Ti alloy 
and the system was pressurized to 20 psi with 
pure gaseous oxygen. A 0.2110-gm projectile 
impacted at 15,900 ft/sec formed a 0.33-inch-
diameter hole and a 0.75-inch-diameter oxi-
dized and burned area in the front diaphragm. 
Impact with the titanium-alloy diaphragm 
fragmented the projectile but did not prevent 
particles from penetrating the rear diaphragm. 
This rear diaphragm burned rapidly in the 
oxygen-rich environment and produced a 
burned-out area about 4 inches in diameter. 
Ignition appears to have originated from at 
least three points in the back diaphragm. 
In photographs of one test cylinder, it was 
demonstrated that the projectile broke into 
at least two pieces as evidenced from two flame 
jets. Details of the burning could not be 
followed because the entire area of the front 
diaphragm was obscured with the cloud of 
many fine particles "of titanium alloy, titanium 
oxides, iron and iron oxides." Oxidation was 
quite rapid as evidenced by the progressive 
increase in illumination of this cloud of material. 
In another test, the front and back 
diaphragms (0.010 inch thick) of the test 
cylinder were made of 301 extra-full-hard 
stainless steel and the system was pressurized 
to 60 psi with pure gaseous oxygen. The 
0.2154-gram projectile, with an impact velocity 
of 13,600 ft/sec, formed a 0.25-inch-diameter 
hole in the front diaphragm. Fragmentation 
of the projectile was extensive as evidenced by 
the numerous small holes in the rear diaphragm. 
An explosion was initiated as a result of the 
impact and the rear diaphragm was ruptured, 
but only after it was penetrated by the forward-
moving fragments. 
Studies on liquid oxygen were ·performed with 
the same test cylinder at 60 psi. In the first 
test, the front diaphragm of the titanium 
(6 Al-4 V-Ti) test panel ruptured from the 
impact of the 0.97-gram projectile traveling 
at 12,300 ft/sec . A flap of titanium was 
ripped· from the front diaphragm (0.016 inch 
thick) as the liquid-oxygen pressure was re-
leased. This flap of metal burned (about 10 
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percent burned) in the oxygen atmosphere. 
The rear diaphragm (0.016 inch thick) was 
neither pierced nor damaged. 
In the second test, the front and back dia-
phragms (0.016 inch thick) of the test cylinder 
were fabricated of 2024-T3 aluminum. A 
0.097-gram projectile with an impact velocity 
of 12,300 ft/sec formed the two holes (0.20 
inch and 0.10 inch in diameter) in the front 
diaphragm. There was extensive fragmenta-
tion of the projectile on impact, as evidenced 
by the numerous small holes (1 hole with a 0.15 
inch diameter, plus 12 smaller holes) in the 
rear diaphragm. Slight oxidation occurred 
only at the rear diaphragm. Sequence photo-
graphs showed a jet of oxygen escaping from 
the punctures produced in the rear diaphragm 
of the pressurized aluminum (2024-T3) struc-
ture. There was no apparent burning of these 
aluminum diaphragms, in contrast to the 
titanium diaphragms in the previous test. 
It would thus appear that titanium-alloy 
walls increase the "flash oxidation" hazard 
in a closed system filled with oxygen. Elevated 
pressures as found in gaseous or liquid-oxygen 
storage systems increase the danger of ex-
plosive reactions. More severe flash and burn-
ing of metals is to be expected from punctures 
at meteoroid velocities. A study published 
by the G. C. Marshall Space Flight Center 1B1 
covers in great detail the reactivity of oxygen 
with titanium systems. 
Penetration of Model Space Cabins by 
Simulated Meteor oids 
Recent studies by Gell et al,89 and Mc-
Kinney 145 at Ling-Temco-Vought Co., D allas, 
Texas, have covered, in greater detail, the 
hazard to inhabitants of spacecraft cabins 
penetrated by meteorites. The preliminary 
studies of Gell et al,89 made use of projectiles 
of S-aluminum accelerated by a shaped charge 
to velocities of 8 km/sec for large particles 
(about 2 mm diameter) and 20 km/sec for 
smaller particles (about 10 microns diameter). 
Particles passed through a vacuum tube 
(175 J..L Hg) to impact against a target dia-
phragm of 0.07-inch aluminum forming the 
walls of 2-cu-ft and 4-cu-ft test chambera. 
This simulates the impacting of an aluminum 
wall of a spacecraft by particles at low mete-
oroid velocity in vacuo with subsequent de-
compression of the contents. The atmospheric 
contents studied were: (a) air at sea-level 
pressure, (b) air at ~ atmosphere with oxygen 
partial pressure at sea level, (c) 100 percent 
oxygen at sea-level pressure, and (d) 100 percent 
oxygen at 5 psi. 
Effects on the Cabin . Impaction of the parti-
cles against the wall resulted in melting and/or 
vaporizing of the particle and wall with crater-
ing in the manner demonstrated in the General 
Dynamics/Astronautics experiments described 
previously. Shrapnel from spalled material of 
the inner side of the wall was evident. Pene-
tration of the wall resulted in passage of melted 
or vaporized material into the cabin atmos-
phere. A very rapid, almost e)..'Plosive, oxida-
tion occurred. An intense flash of light was 
evidenced for a period of 0.8 to 1.2 milliseconds. 
Open-shutter photographs were taken of the 
flash in the test chamber through an aluminum-
coated Mylar filter having a transmissibility of 
approximately 0.1 percent. The flash occurring 
in various atmospheres of oxygen and nitrogen 
was of great interest. The flash observed in 
runs (a) and (b) with sea-level oxygen partial 
pressure in air were of similar intensity. In 
the presence of 100 percent oxygen (runs (c) 
and (d)) the flash extended to about 8 inches 
from the diaphragm. It is of interest that in 
100 percent oxygen the flash was greater at 
5 psi than at sea-level pressure. The peak 
flash intensity varied from a low of about 3 
million lumens for a standard atmospheric 
composition at sea-level pressure to approxi-
mately 20 million lumens for a pure oxygen 
atmosphere at 5 psia. In comparison, a stand-
ard General Electric o. 5 flashbulb reaches a 
peak intensity of only 1.2 million lumens. 
Temperature measurements taken in free air 
at a distance of 1 inch from the flash indicated 
values in excess of 1,500 0 F. The method of 
measurement was not recorded. 
Gross Effects on Animals. White rats were 
exposed within the chamber by fastening them 
to boards placed below the central axis of the 
internally concave diaphragm. The animals 
were within 2~ inches of the lower border of 
the diaphragm. Even when exposed in air 
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environments, all the rats demonstrated hair 
and skin burns of varying degree and extent. 
Minor injuries were demonstrated and in most 
cases subjective symptoms of shock were 
present. In two cases, there were fractured 
backs with total paralysis of the lower extrem-
ities. N one of these animals succumbed in the 
test, but post-mortem studies were made. In 
the final test, a rat was exposed to oxidative 
explosion in 100 percent oxygen. The result 
was catastrophic with instant death of the 
creature. There was total charring of the 
body. Microscopic damage involved second-
and third-degree burns of the skin and extensive 
lung damage. 
Personal Protection Against Meteoroid Pene-
tration. Is there the possibility of personal 
equipment to furnish protection against mete-
oroid penetration? The meteoroid hazard must 
be considered for persons working in orbit 
outside cabins or on an atmosphere-free body 
such as the moon·. One must, of course, take 
into consideration the reduced shielding po-
tential in constructing the hazard picture. 
Since this problem is not pertinent to the 
space-cabin atmosphere per se, it will not be 
further analyzed. 
Personal meteoroid-protection equipment 
within a cabin is a possibility. It will have 
to be considered only in the high-risk missions 
that have been mentioned. McKinney 145 
has related some very preliminary experiments 
performed at Ling-Temco-Vought on the pro-
tective effects of "chain-mail" clothing placed 
external to a loose fibrous paper shield. The 
only available "chain-mail" was a loosely woven 
metallic mesh found on the outside of a lady's 
pocketbook. This material apparently reduced 
by 80 percent the penetration of hypervelocity 
(35,000 ft/sec) particles into the fibrous backing. 
It would appear that other materials of this 
type should be tested for protective efficiency. 
PATHOLOGICAL PHYSIOLOGY FROM METE-
OROID PENETRATION OF CABINS 
These preliminary studies of Gell have been 
recently followed up by McKinney and Stem-
bridge l45 at Ling-Temco-Vought. Although 
the final report was not available at the time 
this paper was written, the facility has been 
visited and the experiments in progress observed. 
The results to be presented were related to the 
author by Mr. McKinney. Much of the statis-
tical analysis has not yet been performed and so 
only a semiquantitative evaluation can be made 
at this time. . 
The earlier studies of this series were per-
formed with silicon carbide pellets (density 
approximately 2.5 gm/cm3) projected by a 
shaped charge to a maximum of 25,000 ft/sec or 
about 8 km/sec, just below minimum meteoroid 
velocity. It was discovered by accident that 
glass pellets (density approximately 2.3 gm/cm3) 
could be accelerated up to velocities of 35,000 
ft/sec (11 km/sec) by the same system. 
Whether these velocities represent gaseous diR-
charge or actual gross projectiles was not made 
clear. The more fragile glass pellets probably 
simulated the total meteoroid impact picture 
more closely than did the silicon carbide. Rats 
were placed on wooden boards 2X inches from 
the diaphragm and below the cen tral axis of the 
concavity. Piezoelectric pressure sensors were 
placed 1 inch below the animal boards for 
analyzing blast overpressures in the vicinity of 
the rats. 
In evaluating damage to the diaphragms, it 
was noted that the glass pellets at 35,000 ft/sec 
(11 km/sec) produced larger boles and more 
severe flashes than did the silicon carbide pellets 
at 25,000 ft/sec (8 km/sec). Titanium-alloy 
diaphragms produced more severe flashes in 
100 percent oxygen environments than did 
aluminum alloys. This is what was observed 
by the General Dynamics group 183 at lower 
velocities. Another interesting penetration 
study involved the use of plastic-impregnated 
Fiberglas diaphragms. These were of the 
same general thickness as the aluminum and 
titanium specimens and were studied in an 
evaluation of helmet penetration. Surprisingly, 
Fiberglas-plastic diaphragms resisted penetra-
tion better than did the metals. There was 
also much less flash than with the metal dia-
phragms. A X-inch-thick diaphragm of alumi-
num was required to completely stop penetra-
tion by glass at 35,000 ft/sec (11 km/sec), 
whereas Fiberglas-plastic from ~ inch to %6 inch 
thick provided the same resistance to penetra-
tion. McKinney suggests that the plastic 
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probably vaporizes at a lower temperature and 
acts in the manner of an ablating coating on a 
reentry body in resisting the thermal effects of 
the impact phenomenon. This resistance to 
penetration requires further study. It will be 
mentioned again in Part III of this report when 
the case for glass-fiber cabin walls is reviewed. 
Pathology in Animals From Flash Oxidation 
and Hot Particles 
The burning of animals by the flash of oxidiz-
ing metallic vapors was studied under varying 
atmospheric conditions. Under particle impact 
at 35,000 ft/sec rats exposed to 100 percent 
oxygen at pressures greater than 3.5 psi re-
ceived total-body burns. In spite of the fact 
that the light :dash was greater at 3.5 psi than 
at sea-level pressure, it is reported that the 
burning was more severe at sea-level pressure. 
At all pressures in 100 percent oxygen, the 
tongues were also burned. Presence of nitrogen 
in the chamber reduced burn areas roughly in 
proportion to the partial pressure of nitrogen. 
In pure nitrogen, no burns were seen though 
the hair was singed by the hot vapor and molten 
material ejected from the diaphragm. In air, 
a burned area about Yz inch in diameter was 
found on the hair with occasional penetration 
to the skin. In general, only the terminal 0.25 
to 0.5 inch of hair was burJ;led in air. The 
higher the pellet velocity, the greater the flash 
and the more extensive the burn. 
Some attempts were made to study the burn-
ing of rat hair by match squibs under varying 
oxygen conditions. Rat hair did not flame up 
in 100 percent oxygen at 5 psi, but did so in 
100 percent oxygen at sea level. When hairs 
were put on a hot calrod heating element at an 
undetermined temperature, the hair was charred 
but did not burst into flame, even in a 100 
percent oxygen environment. Human hair 
freshly clipped from subjects behaved similarly 
in these tests. 
Because hair appeared to be the prime fuel 
source of the burning rats, attempts were made 
to clip the exposed animals. Apparently, even 
the nonremovable hairs about the eyes and in 
the limb folds were enough to cause skin burns 
in these animals. McKinney removed all the 
hair from several animals by dipping them in a 
depilatory fluid with the trade name of Nair. 
These animals showed much less skin burn than 
did .even the clipped animals. The fluid, how-
ever, proved to be a skin and eye irritant and 
itself produced enough pathology to obscure 
the detailed burn picture in the depilated 
animals. 
The problem of shrapnel wounds from the 
hot or molten wall and projectile fragments 
was reviewed. Apparently hair protects the 
animals from all but the larger spalled particles 
which give typical sharpnel wounds. Animals 
depilated with Nair, however, showed an inter-
esting wound picture. Several pellets of 20-
to 40-micron size were found embedded in the 
tissues of these animals. On occasion, the 
abdominal wall of the depilated rats explosively 
disrupted, spewing fecal cont.ents all over the 
cabin. McKinney feels that the heated pellets 
may have converted the liquid of the gut con-
tents to steam to produce the explosive disrup-
tion. There are other possible explanations. 
It is hard to imagine that the heat content of 
several 20- to 40-micron particles found in the 
animals and the cabin would be great enough t o 
cause a steam explosion. It is possible that 
larger metal particles were overlooked in the 
search for the initiating agents. If the small 
20- to 40-micron particles were indeed respon-
sible, disruption of the gastrointestinal tract 
was as likely caused by shock-wave implosion 
of the wall of the tract at gas pocket sites in 
the lumen. Small particles traveling at hyper-
velocities would probably have enough kinetic 
energy to generate these tissue shock waves. 
These matters are in the realm of speculation 
since no good data are available for either case. 
The intense flash oxidation of metallic vapor 
in the vicinity of the rat appears to be respon-
sible for corneal opacities which were found in 
those animals that survived. No details were 
available as to the precise correlation between 
the severity of burns and atmospheric condi-
tions. No chorioretinal burns were observed. 
Only focal necrosis of the corneal epithelium was 
evident. Birefringent particles of what ap-
peared to be aluminum oxide were found in 
some of the corneas. 
The pulmonary pathology is of great interest. 
In those animals exposed in a sea-level air 
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environment, "only dilatation of the alveolar 
ducts" was noted. Dr. Stembridge of the 
Department of Pathology, Southwestern Med-
ical School, who did the post-mortem studies, 
reported that these findings were not typical of 
any blast injury he had seen in small animals. 
He was not sure exactly what these microscopic 
findings represented. In those animals exposed 
to 100 percent oxygen at sea level or 5 psi 
environments, there was found pulmonary 
edema, hemorrhage, alveolar wall fragmenta-
tion, and atelectasis. Black birefringent par-
ticles of aluminum oxide were found "in a few 
but not in all the animals with this lung pa-
thology." Some of the animals showed "cen-
trilobular alveolar emphysema." 
It was the opinion of Dr. Stembridge that 
blast was not the cause of this lung pathology. 
Peak overpressures in sea-level-pressure air 
environments were reportedly "not much dif-
ferent than those experienced in the 100% 
oxygen at sea level pressure." In view of the 
differences in intensity of light flash, this is 
somewhat surprising. It suggests that the 
primary cause of overpressure is the initial 
impact and penetration and not the flash oxi-
dation. We were not able to review any of 
the pertinent pressure tracings and are unaware 
of any apparent contribution of the flash phe-
nomenon to the pressure profiles. The presence 
of aluminum oxide particles in the alveoli 
of some animals suggests that inspiration by 
the animals during or immediately after the 
flash oxidation brought hot gases along with 
the oxide particles to the alveoli. These gases 
may have been the primary cause of lung path-
ology. Absence of aluminum oxide in some of 
the animals with lung pathology may represent 
the fact that some animals lived longer and 
inspired more fine particles than did others, 
or that the blast caught animals in different 
phases of the respiratory cycle. Since a short-
rise short-duration blast actually forces air out 
of the trachea,233 the phase of inspiration is 
probably not important. It is doubtful that 
passage of particles to the alveoli is more 
dependent on the relative timing of the flash 
and respiratory phase than is the passage of 
hot gases. The impression that the amount 
of aluminum oxide was probably correlated 
with survival time has been seconded by Dr. 
Mercer of the Aerosol Physics Section, Lovelace 
Foundation. 
Mortality in Animals and Humans From 
Blast Effects 
The cause of death of these animals exposed 
to the explosive flash is of immense interest. 
Was blast really a factor in mortality? It has 
been only speculated in the past that the blast 
overpressures of the meteoroid impact would 
probably be the primary cause of death, with 
burns as a secondary factor. In the present 
studies, piezoelectric sensors detected maximum 
peak overpressures of 36 to 38 psi in several 
runs in the 5 psi 100-percent oxygen chambers. 
The rise time to peak pressure was only 15 
microseconds and the duration of overpressure 
was "of about the same time span as the rise." 
Most peak overpressures were about 22 to 25 
psi and of the same rise time and duration. 
Pressure sensors were placed 1 inch below the 
rat boards and, therefore, several inches below 
the actual axis of penetration of the diaphragm. 
The measured overpressures were probably 
lower than the peaks experienced by the rat 
bodies, but how much lower is difficult to say. 
The rat board may well have "protected" the 
sensor from the direct blast wave. It is im-
portant to realize that overpressures of this 
short duration have been poorly studied in the 
past. The role of chamber and barrier geo-
metries is also not well known for these short 
durations. The importance of these factors 
has been pointed out in the Lovelace Founda-
tion study for AEC Operation Teapot.232 
Could lung blast have been a cause of death 
in these animals? 
Blast Hazards in Experimental Animals. 
The effects of fast-rising short-duration blast 
waves on rats and other animals will be reviewed 
next. The studies of White, Richmond, and 
their associates at the Lovelace Foundation 
shed some light on the lung pathology that may 
be expected from these short-duration 
blasts.178 • 235 Figure 41 represents a composite 
graph of maximym overpressure against over-
pressure duration for small and large animals as 
studied by the Lovelace Foundation and other. 
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groups. Although some of the data are frag-
mentary and incomplete for durations much 
shorter than 1 millisecond, a general pattern is 
quite clear. It is seen that both overpressure 
and duration determine the lethality. It is also 
clear that for fast-rising overpressures there is a 
critically short pulse duration below which 
overpressure required for mortality rises rapidly. 
For durations longer than the critical, it is only 
the magnitude of overpressure that is significant. 
The critical duration varies with animal size, 
being on the order of many hundreds of micro-
seconds for small animals and a few to many 
tens of milliseconds for larger animals. There 
is a close correspondence between shock-tube 
data and data derived from direct exposure to 
high-explosive blast charge. The lower curve 
includes the data for rats and suggests that for 
periods as short as 800 microseconds, over-
pressures of about 70 psi are required to kill 
rats. If the curve were extrapolated to the 
durations of about 30 microseconds experienced 
in the meteoroid impact studies at Ling-Temco-
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Vought, it would appear that several hundred 
psi would be required. 
One factor has been overlooked here. The 
Lovelace Foundation curves were for ambient 
pressures of 14 .7 psi. The Ling-Temco-Vought 
studies were performed at 5 psi. Preliminary 
studies of blast at elevated pressures performed 
by Richmond 177 have corroborated the pre-
dicted phenomenon that the ratio of over-
pressure to ambient pressure appears to be the 
critical factor in lethality. When one considers 
the implosive effect of a fluid pressure wave on 
the alveoli, it appears that the lower the air 
density at the fluid-air interface, the greater the 
implosion and spallation for any given over-
pressure. It would seem that with an ambient 
pressure of 5 psi, a 36 psi peak overpressure 
would be equivalent in pathological effects to 
about 108 psi overpressure with 14.7 psi ambient 
pressure. This equivalent pressure would, how-
ever, still appear to be inadeq'.late for production 
of lethal lung blast damage in rats exposed for 
durations of less than 30 microseconds (fig. 41). 
Species Richmond Desaga Fishe'r (ref. 178) (ref. 61) (re,f.78) 
Mouse • 0 
Rat -
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FIGURE 41.-Lethality curves for " larAer" and "smaller" animals. (AFTER WHITE.233) 
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It is possible, however, that some nonlethal 
lung damage may be experienced under these 
conditions. 
Another aspect of the Ling-Temco-Vought 
experiments which cannot be accurately defined 
is the effect of reflected waves on the animals. 
McKinney was unaware of reflections in his 
recordings and so we can assume that none 
were present. White 233 has pointed out that 
the distance from the end plate of a shock tube 
markedly affects the mortality of animals. 
Table 17 indicates how this distance from the 
end plate determines the delay time between 
application of incident and reflected waves and 
the resultant changes in resistance to over-
pressures. The peak resistance appears at 
6 to 12 inches (0.63 to 1.36 msec delay). Here, 
reflected-wave overpressures of 57 to 59 psi 
are required for 50 percent mortality as opposed 
to 36 psi when there is almost no time separation 
between overpressures. 
This increase in tolerance was associated with 
a quantitative variation among three variables; 
namely, an increase in magnitude of the incident 
pressure, the reflected pressure, and the time 
between arrival of the incident and reflected 
pulses. To reduce the variables and to extend 
the work to other species, experiments were 
performed with incident and reflected over-
pressures of about 18 and 52 psi, respectively, 
a total overpressure combination which when 
applied "simultaneously" to animals exposed 
against the end plate was 100 percent fatal to 
mice, rats, guinea pigs, and rabbits. Under 
these circumstances, only the time between 
the incident pressure rise and the subsequent 
increase in pressure due to reflection was the 
variable. 
Figure 42 shows these results. Of interest is 
the ability of the animals to detect time dif-
feI·ences. Mortality for the mouse, for in-
stance, dropped from 100 percent to 63 percent 
at X inch with a time interval between over-
pressures of about 50 microseconds. At 1 inch, 
equivalent to a 100-microsecond interval, 
mortality was 29 percent. At 2 inches, where 
a 200-microsecond interval separated the two 
steps comprising the pressure pulse, mortality 
was zero. Each of the other species exhibited 
similar behavior, though the larger the animal, 
TABLE 17.-M.ortality Data jor Guinea Pigs jor 
Fast-Rising, Long-Duration Shock-Tube-Pro-
duced Overpressures When Incident and Re-
flected Overpressures Are Applied in Two Steps 
[AFTER WHITE 233) 
Overpressures asso- Time 
ciated with 50 percent between 
Distance Num-
mortality, psi applica-
tion of 
from end ber of incident 
plate, in. animals and 
Incident Reflected * reflected 
pressures, 
msec 
0 140 12. 1 36.7 ±O. 7 0 
1 75 13. 4 40. 8±2. 1 **.10 
2 78 15.6 48.3 ± 1. 3 .20 
3 87 16.9 52. 8±1. 9 .30 
6 99 18.7 58.6 ±1. 6 .63 
12 109 18. 2 57. 1 ± 1. 1 1. 36 
*All plus-or-minus figures refer to the standard error 
of the mean. 
**Estimated. 
the more slowly mortality decreased with 
increasing distance from the end plate. Only 
the guinea pig failed to drop to zero mortality. 
Animals no larger than rabbits were studied. 
Another way to express this result is to say 
that for very short separations in time «200 
to 400 microseconds) between arrival of the 
incident and reflected pulses, the animal "sees" 
them as one pulse. This is evidenced by the 
fact that mortality is higher than it would be 
from either of the pulses applied alone. For 
periods longer than this, the animal obviously 
makes an adaptation so that application of the 
first pulse protects him from the second. The 
mathematical chest model of Bowen and 
Holladay (discussed subsequently) has ex-
plained how phase differences between pressure 
pulses in the gas medium of the lung may bring 
about these results. 
Blast Hazards in Humans. How do these 
blast data apply to humans? It is obvious 
that extrapolation of animal data to humans 
may be made only when keeping in mind all the 
environmental and time variables that have 
been discussed. The British have pointed 
out that man may tolerate as much as 350 to 
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450 psi for pulses of 1 to 3 milliseconds. Fisher 
et a1. 77. 78 used high explosives to produce fast-
rising pressure pulses from 1 to 3 milliseconds 
in duration. They showed that the over-
pressures associated with 50 percent mortality 
(Pso) in mice, guinea pigs, rabbits, monkeys, 
and goats were near 27, 32, 55, 100, and 200 psi, 
respectively. The authors related the P so data 
to the weight of the three smaller animal 
species by the equation 
where 
P 60 local static overpressure, psi 
W body weight, gm 
From this relation, PoD for 60 and 80 kg 
men was predicted to be 390 and 470 psi, 
respectively. The same authors cited 12 
human exposures to bombs dropped on British 
cities under circumstances wherein the pressure 
could be estimated. One fatality occurred at 
450 psi. There were, however, 10 survivors 
at pressures between 170 and 450 psi and one 
between 500 and 600 psi. 
The results of Desaga 61 indicate that an esti-
mated 235 psi for 4 to 6 milliseconds is another 
possible point on the overpressure-duration curve . 
During World War II, 2 deaths were found 
among 13 men exposed to blast from a high-
explosive bomb in an open-topped concrete gun 
emplacement. Estimates of the overpressure 
which occurred in a corner where the fatally 
injured men were located were said to involve 
an incident overpressure of 57 psi which re-
flected to a maximum of 235 psi. 
The most recent extrapolation to humans 
from the Lovelace Foundation blast studies is 
presented in table 18.179 These human extrap-
olations and test pressures are far more severe 
than the peak overpressures of 36 to 38 psi for 
<50 microseconds recorded in the Ling-Temco-
Vought study. It is apparent that a human 
sitting in the center of even a 100-cu-ft cabin 
would probably not suffer from lethal blast 
injury when exposed to meteoroid penetration 
of the cabin by particles similar in size, density, 
configuration, and velocity to those of the Ling-
TABLE 18.- Tentative Estimate oj Pressure-
Duration Relationship jor 50-Percent Lethality 
in Adult Humans (70 kg)* [AFTER RICHMO D 
A D WHITE 179] 
Pulse 
Pso, psi duration, 
msec 
42 to 57 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 400 
46 to 64___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 60 
51 to 70_____ __ _____ ________________ _ 30 
78 to 108__ _______ __ ____ _____ ________ 10 
148 to 204___________________________ 5 
345 to 474___________________________ 3 
* Applies to sharp-rising overpressures of ideal or 
near-ideal wave forms. 
Temco-Vought study. One must consider, how-
ever, the rare chance that a very large meteoroid 
may penetrate the cabin and produce much 
higher overpressures with longer durations. 
This may conceivably occur without complete 
destruction of the cabin and with a repairable 
hole in the wall. What would be the pathology 
from these higher blast pressures? Both mete-
oroid blast and explosions from other causes 
will result in tissue damage of the same general 
character. This will now be discussed. 
Patholo~y of Blast Dama~e in Animals 
The pathology of lung blast was briefly de-
scribed in Part I of this report in regard to the 
oxygen toxicity factor. The general biophys-
ical mechanisms of injury by fast-rise short-
duration blasts as postulated by White 233 . 235 
and Clemedson 40. 41 are outlined in greater de-
tail below. 
Mechanisms oj Blast Injury. A blast wave 
impinging on a biological target transfers 
momen tum to tissue masses according to the 
laws of momentum transfer . The acceleration 
and peak velocity of any organ or tissue mass 
gaining the momentum of the wave is inversely 
related to the mass. Shearing forces and local 
stresses are thus the rule in the heterogeneous 
multiphase matter which comprises the animal 
body. These stresses and shearing forces 
ultimately determine the local pathology. 
J 
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In fast-rising short-duration blasts, the great 
inertia of the large structures such as the chest 
and abdominal walls limits initial movement 
of these structures. Since there is li ttle time 
for flow of fluid or air, most of the pathology 
would be expected to arise from compression 
by the induced pressure pulse which moves at 
close to the specific speed of sound through the 
"tissue and gas phases" of the body. Damage 
would appear to be primarily at density inter-
faces in the path of this pulse.H6 Whether on 
the basis of shearing, spalling, or direct com-
pressive effects on closed gas pockets, the tissue-
Distance 
from 
end plate, 
No. in. 
0 20 
112 24 
1 24 
2 15 
3 15 
6 
12 ... I: 
CI) 
U 
... 
CI) 
air interfaces should be the sites of greatest 
damage. 
What is the actual local mechanism respon-
sible for tissue damage? Because of poor 
coupling and compressive effects at the air-
body interface, shock waves from air blast are 
converted to subsonic pressure waves in body 
tissue. U In underwater blast exposure, how-
ever, shock waves most probably enter the 
body with much less energy 10ss.239 The rela-
tively undegraded shock waves in tissues in 
underwater blast should result in spallation at 
density interfaces more readily than in air blast. 
Mice Rats Guinea pigs Rabbits 
Mortality No. Mortality ~o. Mortality No Mortal it~ % . % % % 
100 15 100 20 100 12 100 
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FIGURE 42.-Mortality change with exposure. Incident overpressure, 17.8 psi (a v.); reflected over-
pressure, 52.1 psi (av.) ; overpressure duration, 6 to 8 seconds. (AFTER WHITE.233) 
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The spallation of metal from the inner wall of 
the cabin as a result of the shock wave passing 
through the cabin wall has already been dis-
cussed. The same events should occur as a 
shock wave passes from the semiliquid tissue 
phase at the alveolar wall to the gaseous phase 
within the alveoli .I ~6 A negative reflection is 
set up which places the alveolar wall at the air 
interface in severe tension. As suggested by 
Schardin 191 the alveolar lung cells and blood 
capillaries would be expected to spall into the 
alveolar space. This would result in hemor-
rhage, pulmonary edema, and general frag-
mentation of the alveolar wall. That a sub-
sonic pressure pulse can cause this spallation is 
still open to question . 
One may also consider the lung as a mass of 
tiny air bubbles in a liquid matrix as have 
Clements 42 and Schardin. 191 A shock wave 
may compress these tiny air bubbles and build 
up large gas pressures. As the shock wave 
passes, the imploded bubbles may then expand 
eA"plosively, setting up multiple shock waves 
emanating radially. These could compound 
the damage initiated at the spallation stage. 
The relative contributions of spallation and im-
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plosion to lung damage have not been de-
termined. There has been no direct evidence 
for either spallation or implosion factors in the 
basic mechanism of lung damage in underwater 
or in air blast. Fragmentation of alveoli, 
however, does occur. 
One can get a general picture' of the dynamics 
of fast-rise short-duration blast injury from a 
model of the chest-abdomen system as in figure 
43. This diagram focuses on the pressure 
differentials between external pressure p., 
thoracic fluid pbase P" and pulmonary gaseous 
phase Pg' These pressure predictions were 
made by White several years ago.23~ In this 
model, the fluid phase experiences a pressure 
peak almost coincident with and smaller than 
the external wave. There was predicted only 
a mild compression of the gas phase because the 
"piston action" of the abdominal and chest wall 
was anticipated only for slow-rise long-duration 
blast. The rise to peak pressure in the alveoli 
was also thought to be quite rapid . Of im-
portnnce is the fact that there is no pressw'e 
pulse of significance passing down the trachea. 
Oscillation of external pressures due to the 
multiple reflection problems within a closed 
cabin and resonances of vibrating mechanical 
systems within the total body structure are, 
of course, not accounted for in this idealized 
model. 
Clemedson 40,41 has recently pointed out the 
complex degradation of the pressure pulse 
patterns in rabbits exposed to air blast . At 
the air-body interface the shock wave is 
converted to a pressure pulse primarily because 
of an impedance mismatch between air and 
body which causes a reflection of the shock-
wave energy. After entering the body, the 
pressure pulse is modified by interaction with 
inhomogeneous tissue elements that cause dis-
persion, divergence, and attenuation. The 
velocity of this pulse is sonic or subsonic and 
must be thought of as a pressure pulse and 
not a shock wave. The velocity of sound in 
muscular tissue is 1,580 m/sec; in fat, about 
1,450 m/sec; and in bone, 3,500 m/sec . In 
lungs, the velocity is reduced to 15 to 30 
m/sec by the presence of gas in the medium. 
Clemedson postulated that as the air 
shock wave encompasses the body, a pressure 
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FIGURE 44.-Lunt!/ pressures after fast-rise short-
duration blast. (AFTER BOWEN AND HOLLADAy.23) 
pulse passes around the body through the 
chest and abdominal walls. Pressure wavelets 
probably propagate inward to the internal 
organs and so pressures converge on the central 
organs from all sides. The pressure pulses 
converge on the alveoli at much reduced 
velocities because of the presence of the low-
density air. (Vascular fluid channels do repre-
sent a high-velocity path through the lungs). 
Alveoli are compressed, giving an internal 
gaseous pressure pulse that overshoots the 
level of the external blast wave at that time. 
Figure 44 indicates the measured alveolar 
pressure of Clem edson 41 in the "recorded 
internal" curve. The lag of 0.8 second to 
peak pressure in the alveoli is seen in comparison 
with the application time of external air 
pressure. It would appear that damage to 
the alveoli is caused by the compression stress 
on the inner wall or by tension stress after 
sudden reexpansion as the pressure pulse 
passes. This matter is still open to question. 
Disturbance of surface tension in the water 
film lining the alveoli may well be a factor.42 
A recent mathematical model of the chest 
has been presented by Bowen and Holladay of 
the Lovelace Foundation.23 The lung is treated 
as an air-filled cavity and the chest wall and 
abdomen are treated as two classical damped 
spring-mass piston systems. The only force 
allowed to act on the system is the difference 
between external blast pressure and the pressure 
inside the cavity. The equation of motion of 
the pistons, an empirical airflow equation, and 
a pressure-volume (adiabatic) equation of the 
piston effects are combined to give a mathe-
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matical model of the system. The "computed 
internal" curve simulating lung gas pressure 
after exposure to a fast-rise short-duration 
external blast wave is recorded in figure 44. 
The "recorded internal" curve is from the 
paper of Clemedson 41 where lung pressure 
traces were recorded with implanted lead zir-
conate titanate transducers during the external 
blast pattern. There is no indication of an 
"implosion effect" in the alveolar pressure 
tracing. 
It can be seen that the lung pressure peak 
occurs after a greater delay and is somewhat 
higher than the original prediction by White. 
Bowen and Holladay 23 believe that this is 
probably due to several factors. One is the 
failure of the body tissues to transmit any 
significant shock wave because of poor coupling 
of the shock wave at the air-body surface and 
further reflection and degradation of the shock 
wave at the tissue density interfaces. This 
impedance mismatch resul ts in a net com-
pression of gaseous lung volume by gross 
movement of chest wall and diaphragm. The 
inertia of the thoracoabdominal system helps 
account for the relatively slow response time 
compared with previous predictions (fig. 43) 
and, moreover, can produce an overshoot of 
lung pressure that reaches peaks higher than 
external pressure. 
The mathematical model of Bowen and Holla-
day has also been used to explain the effects of 
the" two step" fast-rise blast picture previou ly 
discussed. Figure 45 represents the predicted 
pressure pulses for given time intervals t' be-
tween external pressure rises. It can be seen 
that at t'=1.15 msec the oscillating pressure 
waves from the first shock wave are "out of 
phase" with the pressure pul es produced by 
the second step. This may reduce the peak 
pressure pulse in the alveoli and thereby de-
crease damage to the wall or may counter the 
reexpansion of the alveoli and decrease the 
tension stress on the walls. 
The model is currently being revised to in-
clude the response of the complex resonant 
vibrating systems of the chest and abdomen to 
applied vibratory forces . Closer fits to the 
empirical data have already been obtained. 
The model has recently been used to predict, 
----------------
with moderate success, the effects of explosive 
decompression on the chest. Since the blast 
wave of meteoroid impact will probably be 
followed by a decompressive event, the mathe-
matical model could be useful in predicting this 
complex interaction. Bowen and Holladay 
hope to be able to study this in the near future. 
Tissue Pathology. Since atmospheric condi-
tions appear to playa major role, the actual 
pathological physiology of blast injury is also of 
interest to the present study. There have been 
many reviews of this subject, but those of 
Clemedson 39 and, more recently, White 235 ap-
pear to be the most excellent. Much of the 
pathology studied was produced by high-
explosive fast-rising short-duration blast and is 
quite pertinent to the present problem. The 
general pathological picture after exposure to 
blast from small explosive charges corroborates 
the hypotheses of White 233 regarding the basic 
biophysical factors involved. We shall present 
the material directly from the review of White. 235 
References to the actual experiments will not 
be included but may be found in White's paper. 
If an animal is shielded from an otherwise fatal ex-
plosive charge by a steel box from which the head 
protrudes, there is no detectable damage providing the 
head and neck are padded to avoid violent contact with 
the steel wall of the box. This is so, even if a tracheot-
omy tube is attached to a funnel facing the charge, 
indicating that the propagation of the blast overpres-
sures down the respiratory tree is not of primary 
significance. Other measures for protecting the trunk 
of the animal from the "blow" of the blast wave also 
give protection as illustrated by such things as a rigid 
plaster of Paris cover and appropriate padding with 
sponge rubber, but not a thin plaster bandage applied 
to the chest and abdomen to avoid overdistension of the 
thorax. Such observations suggest that it is the im-
pact of the blast wave and overpressure against the 
body wall that is critical and not the negative phase of 
the pressure pulse. This view is also supported by the 
protection offered by experimental pneumothorax which 
if unilateral or bilateral offers considerable protection 
to the lung on the side of the pneumothorax. 
Animals immersed hind feet first in water up to the 
diaphragm and exposed to an underwater charge show 
only abdominal pathology. When immersion of the 
abdomen and thorax is arranged, there is abdominal 
damage and also pulmonary lesions plus signs of central 
nervous system damage. These facts and those above, 
along with electrocardiographic signs of anoxic cardiac 
disturbances, suggest that gaseous emboli arising in the 
chest during or subsequent to the blast and migrating 
r---
METEOROID PENETRATION 69 
via the circulation to tbe heart and central nervous 
system might be one important pathophysiologic event 
that could well prove fatal of itself. 
Air emboli have been visualized by many investiga-
tors on the arterial side of the circulation in dogs, 
rabbits, gunea pigs, rats and man exposed to blast over-
pressures. Studies with experimental air emboli [in-
jected by needle] have demonstrated that (a) injected 
air migrates to the most superior portions of the vascular 
system and the consequence to the animal is largely in-
fluenced by body position, and (b) the detailed anatomy 
involved and blood flow as well as the amount of intra-
vascular gas are of considerable significance. There is 
an element of chance in certain experiments wherein a 
single air embolus may migrate into a large coronary 
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vessel or vital area of the central nervous system with 
death resulting in a few minutes. Almost immediate 
signs of severe and progressive anoxia of the myocar-
dium demonstrable with the electrocardiogram are 
seen, both in blast and experimental arterial air em-
bolism, with death often following fibrillation that de-
velops fairly quickly. 
In contrast, animals severely injured from blast do 
not die immediately but apparently suffer various de-
grees of broncho-venous or alveolar-venous fistulas 
through which air may enter the pulmonary venous 
circulation with each respiratory cycle "pumping" 
additional air into the circulation. The result can be 
massive air embolism involving the heart, brain and 
other organs. Further, it is important to recognize 
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that under circumstances of moderate lung damage, 
pulmonary vasoconstriction and hemorrhage-particu-
larly the latter-can act protectively in that the fluid 
"seals" the alveolar-venous or bronchovenous fistulas. 
An animal so situated may escape immediate death 
from emboli, but then faces the dangers from continued 
hemorrhage and edema. To these two factors, which 
in themselves embarrass the pulmonary circulatiop , 
are added the additional effects of transient circulatory 
arrest; bradycardia; lower systemic arterial pressure; 
vasoconstr'ction, followed by vasodilatation; increased 
venous pressure; and nonfatal, acute insult to the heart, 
signs of which are known to persist in some cases for 
days in animals and man. . . . 
Additional observations bearing upon the existence 
of air emboli in animals exposed to blast include 
reports that: (a) electrocardiographic evidence of 
hypoxia and myocardial damage, which appear after 
exposure of animals to blast, can be reversed by u e of 
a compression chamber; (b) animals, otherwise fatally 
injured by blast, can be saved but not invariably so by 
immediate com pression; (c) the electrocardiographic 
changes following arterial air emboli are similar in 
man and animals to the findings after exposure to blast; 
and (d) compression markedly improves the electro-
cardiographic signs of coronary malfunction produced 
by experimental arterial air emboli. 
The significant role of aero emboli brings up 
the problem of simultaneous decompression 
which will occur immediately after the bla t 
overpressure in space cabins. Expansion of 
the intravascular bubbles upon decompression 
will certainly aggravate the condition. 
Pressure suits at 5 psi may still present an 
aggravating pressure enrivonment for the 
embolic condition. It would appear that a 
cabin atmosphere of 100 percent oxygen would 
be more favorable than one containing an 
inert gas. Aeroemboli would probably appear, 
but would be absorbed at a faster rate. Even 
if the cabin were to be self-sealing, a transient 
switch to a 100 percent oxygen pressure-suit 
environment after blast would probably be 
a wise move. This act would reduce the effects 
of whatever gas may be "pumped" into the 
circulation after the overpressure event is 
completed and would simultaneously protect 
against inhalation of residual metal oxides 
that may be floating about the cabin. Part I 
of this report covers the dangers of prolonged 
exposure to high oxygen tension after blast. 
In addition to damage to the heart directly from 
coronary air embolism and indirectly from hemorrhage, 
edema and the subsequent anoxia and dilatation, there 
apparently occurs significant bruising of the heart some-
times noted under the term "commotio cordis." In-
ternal and external hemorrhagic areas and bruising of 
the epicardium and myocardium do occur but rarely 
rupture. . . . The damage which can occur at air-fluid 
junctions due to differences in tissue density has been 
mentioned earlier. This, of course, can damage both 
the heart and the lung. In the former case, the patho-
logic signs and the immediate and persistent electro-
cardiographic findings can be, in part, a reflection of 
such injury and may involve early fatality or delayed 
effects in surviving animals. It is difficult, if not 
impossible under certain specific circumstances, to es-
tablish whether the critical etiologic factors involve air 
emboli or commotio cordis as the single cause of death 
or malfunction, if indeed, such is the case. 
Various signs of focal damage to the central nervous 
system have been described involving lethargy and 
paralysis of the posterior extremities, . . . ataxia, and 
a variety of other symptoms . . . in water blast where 
the animals' heads were not immersed. . .. [There 
have beenl reported delayed electroencephalographic 
signs of circulatory disturbances or cerebral hypoxia in 
monkeys exposed to blast. From what is known today, 
air embolic insult to the central nervous system offers 
adequate explanation of nervous symptoms and pathol-
ogy, and it is doubtful that the mechanism involving 
transmission of hydrostatic "shock" waves from the 
body fluids into the closed cranium . . . plays a sig-
nificant role. It is conceivable that air embolism to 
vital nervous centers, particularly in animals e'{posed 
to blast with the head uppermost, can contribute to 
early death as well as to delayed focal signs. 
Pathology is noted in the air-containing 
organs other than the lungs-that is, the ears, 
paranasal sinuses, and gastrointestinal tract. 
Symptoms of very mild blast, of course, are 
often related to the ears and sinuses. Rupture 
of the eardrum and sinus bleeding are probably 
not a threat to the organism. Rupture of the 
viscera is relatively rare unless total body dis-
placement and impact also occur. Abdominal 
pathology is more prominent in underwater 
blast situations. However, ear damage may 
temporarily impair hearing and, therefore, com-
munication is disturbed. 
Though no precise explanations of the causes of 
death and the etiologic events applicable to blast can 
be set forth, it appears clear that: (a) direct damage 
to the heart can, but rarely causes death immediately ; 
(b) coronary air emboli can and do produce almost 
immediate death, but typically the fatally injured 
animal expires in from 2 to 10 minutes; (c) suffocation 
due to hemorrhage and edema with concomitant 
hypoxia probably produces fatality in a somewhat 
~~------- -------~-,., .- ~ 
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longer period, though it is not common for animals 
who survive 15 to 20 minutes to succumb later; (d) 
malfunction of vital centers of the central nervous 
system may be a factor in early death from massive air 
embolism which is to be distinguished from damage 
due to frank physical head trauma; and lastly (e) the 
animal escaping early death may face the cballenge of 
delayed complications from post-concussion pneumonia, 
perforations of the abdominal viscera, peritonitis, 
prolonged coronary signs with possible infarction and 
persistent local areas of damage in the central nervous 
system. 
Typical time curves of mortality appear in 
figure 46. Most animals are dead within 30 
minutes. The initial steep portions of the 
curve (5 to 10 minutes) may be due to hemor-
rhage or massive arterial emboli involving the 
heart or central nervous system. The following 
less steep portion probably represents continued 
hemorrhage, aeroemboli, or progressive pul-
monary edema. The flat part of the curve 
after 30 minutes is probably indicative of death 
due to continued pulmonary edema, prolonged 
subacute hypoxemia from lung damage, late 
hemorrhage, or progressive right-sided heart 
failure. 
Translational Aspects oj the Blast Ha zard. 
Oomplicating the meteoroid blast effect is the 
actual movement of the astronaut by transla-
Rats 
tional wind loads. Also, secondary to the blast 
is injury by missiles of disrupted cabin struc-
tures. Since these problems are not to any 
major degree dependent on the oxygen concen-
tration within the cabin they will not be 
reviewed in detail. The absolute level of over-
pressure and, therefore, the wind effect is 
determined by the ambient density. The 
lower the density, the less wind effect in trans-
lation. The focusing of shock waves and 
other geometric blast anomalies created by 
cabin configurations and structures makes a 
theoretical assessment of the actual cabin 
problem most difficult. The studies of the 
Lovelace Foundation have covered translational 
impact damage and the geometric variables 
involved. 232. 233. 234 These reports also cover 
the problem of secondary missiles arising from 
blast environments, as does the report of 
Bowen et al. 24 
Thus, blast injury following impact by a large 
meteoroid presents a serious and complicated 
hazard. As has been pointed out, such an 
event can be expected only once in about every 
30 years in a well-shielded, spherical 3-meter-
diameter space cabin in the vicinity of the earth. 
In the asteroidal belt between Mars and Jupiter, 
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the probability of such an event increases con-
siderably. For missions of this type, it would 
be wise to review the therapeutic approaches 
to blast injury as outlined by White. 233, 235 
This problem will not be considered here beyond 
the coverage in Part I of this report. 
Hazards to t he Eye from Oxidative Flash Exposu re 
An area which has been studied in only a 
preliminary way i the eye hazard resulting 
from the oxidative flash of vaporized metals. 
It was mentioned earlier that McKinney found 
corneal burns associated with aluminum 
oxide particles embedded in the epithelium. 
The absence of obvious chorioretinal burns 
does not preclude flash-blindness problems. 
As was mentioned above, titanium targets gave 
flashes of greater intensity than did aluminum 
or steel. Magnesium targets would be ex-
pected to behave like titanium in this respect. 
The study of Gell et al. at Ling-Temco-
Vought 89 revealed that in 100 percent oxygen 
environments, even aluminum targets pene-
trated by hypervelocity particles gave light 
flashes of 20 million lumens or about the equiva-
len t of 17 General Electric o. 5 flash bul bs. 
This was reported to be a light flux of 273,000 
foot-candles (lumens/ft2), but the exact location 
of the detector relative to the diaphragms is not 
clear. The flash duration, as determined from 
camera frame analysis, was 0.8 to 1.2 milli-
seconds. How dangerous is this light flash to 
the human eye? 
The general problem of high-intensity light 
flash has received much emphasis from those 
groups interested in nuclear flash effects and 
optical problems in orbital flight in near-solar 
orbits such as trips to the planet Mercury. 
These data will be reviewed briefly in order to 
extrapolate from the study of Gell et al. to the 
meteoroid flash hazard in humans. 
Retinal Burns. Danger to the eyes from 
exposure to intense light fields has been well 
documented in case reports of eclipse blind-
ness. lI5 The testing of atomic weapons resulted 
in additional cases of retinal burns from un-
protected ocular exposure to the flash of the 
fireball. 169 , 185 Animal experimentation has es-
tablished the concept that the mechanism is the 
same in both cases.31 , 32, 237 Visible light is 
concentrated upon the retina by the optical 
system of the eye, forming an image of thermal 
intensity as the light is absorbed primarily by 
the retinal pigment and converted into heat. 
If a critical amount of heat is generated, irre-
versible coagulative destruction occurS. 31 
Recent studies of retinal burns by coherent 
light (lasers) 254, 255 approach the short durations 
found for simulated meteoroid flash in the Ling-
Temco-Vought studies. Laser outputs of 0.1 
joule per 0.5-millisecond pulse emitted in a 
coherent, monochromatic (wavelength 694.3 
mj.L) beam 1 cm in diameter produced burns in 
the eyes of adult pigmented rabbits. Pupils 
were dilated with N eo-synephrine and eyes were 
30 cm from the emission face of the ruby. 
Lesions were similar to those in rabbits exposed 
to nuclear flash. 32 
The estimated chorioretinal burn threshold 
for the dilated human eye is about 0.66 calfcm2-
sec. 96 I t is calcula ted that the thermal level 
would be reached at 240,000 lumens/W.159 
This would be present in most tactical exposures 
to nominal-yield nuclear eA1Jlosions. Ham 
et al,96 have predicted that the human retina 
would receive a threshold burn lesion at 9 to 14 
miles from a 1 to 100 KT nuclear weapon if 
atmospheric visibility were 25 miles, maximum 
dark adaptation prevailed, and a normal 
blink reflex were present. A computer model 
for prediction of retinal burns has recently 
been presented by Wray.246 0 actual testing 
of the model is reported. 
Flash Blindness. In many flash exposures 
the energy absorbed will not be adequate to 
produce a retinal burn, but the effects of the 
light will be sufficient to cause an alteration 
in the sensitivity of the retina due to the 
excessive bleaching of the visual pigments of 
the rods and cones. In this case, transient 
visual impairment will result, lasting until' the 
eye can readapt. 
Three factors contribute to the relative 
scotoma and lowering of visual acuity during 
and following exposure of the eye to high-
intensity light. These are glare from the light 
source, bleaching of the visual pigment with the 
resultant time interval necessary for readapt:1-
tion, and afterimages. Because of the inter-
relationship of these three factors, the effects of 
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intense stimuli are complicated and difficult to 
estimate. 159 
Glare is defined as any degree of light falling 
upon the retina in excess of that which enables 
one to see clearly; that is, any excess of light 
which hinders instead of helps vision. Glare 
can be further differentiated into: 
(1) Veiling glare: created by light uniformly 
superimposed on the retinal image which 
reduces contrast and, therefore, visibility 
(2) Dazzling glare: adventitious light 
scattered in the ocular media so as not to 
form part of the retinal image 
(3) Scotoma tic or blinding glare: produced 
by light of sufficient intensity to reduce the 
sensitivity of the retina. 
Although all three types of glare are present 
in the rase of high-intensity light, the effects 
of the first two are primarily evident only when 
the source is present. The third type, scoto-
matic or blinding glare, is especially significant 
in this study because it plays the greatest part 
in producing those symptoms (afterimages) 
which persist long after the light itself has 
vanished. The afterimage is a prolongation of 
the physiological processes which produced the 
original sensation response after cessation of 
stimulation. An afterimage may be experi-
enced if the gaze is directed to a bright light 
bulb for a short time. If the bulb is then 
switched off an image of the bulb will Gontinue 
to be perceived. This prolongation of the 
visual sensation shows that the processes 
which occur within the retina have persistence. 
The afterimage is essentially a temporary 
blind area or scotoma in the field of vision. 
The time duration of this blind area is pro-
portional to the intensity and duration of 
the light exposure. The greater the intensity 
and/or the longer the duration of exposure, the 
more intense and, to a certain extent, the 
more persistent the afterimage. Ordinarily, 
the sequence of events following stimulation 
of the retina by a flash of light is the primary 
sensation of light followed by a series of pos-
itive and negative afterimages. With mod-
erate light intensities, afterimages are not 
noticed because of the complex action of 
successive stimulation and continuous move-
ment of the eye. However, if the original 
724-454 0--64-7 
stimulation IS of sufficient dura tion and ill-
tensity, the sensation will persist with an 
intensity adequate to reduce or entirely oblit-
erate foveal perception until the effect is 
dissipated. This is the primary factor in 
flash blindness. 
Before World War II several investigators 
attempted to relate the intensity of light flashes 
to the alterations in sensitivity of the dark-
adapted eye. Their experiments utilize illumi-
nances of less than 50 lumens/ft2• They found 
no alteration in the course of dark adaptation 
and a general correlation with the reciprocity 
law for momentary losses of sensitivity.2.212 
The reciprocity law indicates that within cer-
tain limits LX T=K when L is in units of 
luminance of the dazzle and T is the duration 
of the dazzle. This expresses a total summa-
tion with the effect being the same for a lumi-
nance decreased by one-half but maintained 
twice as long and one that is doubled but lasts 
half as long. 
The development of the atomic weapon, with 
its attendant hazards, provided impetus for 
further investigation. Crawford, in 1946,53 and 
Fry, in 1951,86 utilized a light source of moderate 
intensity and confirmed the validity of the law 
of reciprocity. Whiteside, in 1952, attempted 
to simulate the dazzling effect of nighttime 
atomic explosions by using the sun as a light 
source.237 Several years later he reported on 
a method whereby he visualized from afar the 
flash of a 20 KT explosion, measured his re-
covery, and reported the time required to regain 
visual discrimination. 238 
More recently, Metcalf and Horn 159 reported 
an investigation they made on the effects of 
high-intensity light flashes on visual recovery. 
They studied the visual recovery of four human 
subjects after exposure to illumination ranging 
from 60 to over 12,000 lumens/ft2 at the dilated 
eye ( eo-synephrine) . Exposure times were 
limited to 0.1 second, the approximate human 
blink time. They found that recovery time 
plotted against illumination at the eye produced 
the curve seen in figure 47. This gives a 
straight line in a semilog plot, as seen for higher 
illuminations at the eye in figure 48. 
As would be expected, the luminance of the 
o bj ect to be visualized after a flash determines 
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the recovery time. Figure 49 illustrates the 
change in recovery time when the luminance of 
the test target is varied. Each of the four 
points represents the average illumination and 
recovery time for 15 trials at the indicated test 
target luminance. The log of source of lumi-
nance for each of the four trials was 6.6810 
(4,798,000 foot-Iamberts). Average recovery 
time was 4.8 seconds for the 71 ft-l test target, 
14.6 seconds for the 7 ft-l test target, and 35 
seconds for the 0.45 ft-l test target. The dashed 
curves have been drawn with the slope of the 
regression line determined in the main experi-
ment. Several points on these extrapolated 
curves were spot checked and found to be in 
close agreement. It is seen that recovery time 
is markedly reduced if instrument illumination 
is increased. For example, the normal lumi-
nance of red-lighted instruments has been found 
to vary from 0.02 to 0.05 ft_l,IlB approximately 
equal to the readaptation test stimulus used in 
the major part of this experiment. Assuming 
60 percent reflectance for the instrument dial 
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and an illumination on the instruments of 65 
lumens/W, the recovery time would be reduced 
by a factor of 18. Thus, exposure to a lumi-
nance of 5,000,000 ft-l, comparable to viewing 
an overcast with a 50 percent reflectance illumi-
nated by a normal weapon at a distance of 2 
to 3 statute miles, would result in a recovery 
time of approximately 5 seconds as compared 
with about 90 seconds for ordinary, red-lighted 
instruments. The recent data of Severin and 
his associates 19B. 199 corroborate these recovery-
time figures, but stress the variability from 
subject to subject in the slope of the recovery 
function (fig. 50) . The pupillary factor was 
also demonstrated as seen in figure 51. 
Do the recent Ling-Temco-Vought studies by 
Gell et al,89 and McKinney 145 shed any light on 
the problem of recovery time after meteoroid 
flash oxidation inside space cabins? McKinney 
attempted a preliminary study of recovery of 
vision in rats exposed to flashes of about 273,000 
lumens/W lasting periods of 0.8 to 1.2 milli-
seconds in the meteoroid impact chamber. 
Observations of surviving animals free of cor-
neal burns suggested that they were blinded by the 
flash for at least 15 to 20 minutes. Blindness 
was determined by a crude conditioning experi-
ment. The conditioning stimulus was a pencil 
poked at the corneas of the animals until a 
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uniform withdrawal was obtained by mere 
sight of the pencil. The condi tioned animals 
were exposed to t,he impact flash and immedi-
ately retested for the withdrawal response. 
There was apparently a 15 to 20 minute lag 
from time of flash to first response. It must be 
pointed out that in these preliminary studies, 
there were no control animals blindfolded during 
the blast . The relative roles of noise, blast 
overpressure, hypoxemia, and light in the 
"visual disturbances" are still a ma t t e r 
which can be resolved only after a more 
defini tive study. 
How do these recovery times in the rats 
compare with those of humans exposed to light 
of similar intensity from other sources? The 
human experiments reported above suggest 
t hat t he 15 to 20 minute recovery time is high 
for t he light factor alone. T he illlmination of 
273,000 lumens/W reported in the Ling-Temco-
Vought experiments produced no retinal burns 
in spite of t he 240,000 lumens/ft2 estimated as 
the probable threshold [or retinal burns in 
humans .1s9 Species differences could, of course, 
playa role. It would appear , however, that 
an even greater factor is the geometry of 
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exposure. The thermal threshold for rabbits 
varies from 1.0 to 15 cal/cm2, depending on 
image size, rate of energy delivery, and pulse 
shape.96 In the human experiments the sub-
jects were looking directly at the light source . 
The main penetrations of the diaphragms and 
probably the focal point of the flash in the 
Ling-Temco-Vought experiments were above 
and behind the rats' eyes. Thus the rats' eyes 
were probably exposed to much less illumination 
than actually reported in the test chambers. 
The light flash of only 0.8 to 1.2 milliseconds' 
duration in the Ling-Temco-Vought experi-
ments precludes blinking. Visual recovery in 
the human experiments after exposure to 
240,000 lumens/ft2 for 0.1 second would be 
approximately 3 minutes (fig. 48). Yet, ex-
posures to less than 273,000 lumens/ft2 for only 
0.001 second in the rat experiments required 
15 to 20 minutes for recovery, or 5 to 7 times 
as long. Since the (Illumination X Time) 
factor appears to determine recovery time, it 
would seem that the relatively prolonged 
period of recovery in the rat is due to some 
peculiar quality of the light or, what is more 
likely, to the many complicating factors already 
mentioned in the meteoroid flash experiments. 
It cannot, at this time, be concluded that the 
light flash resul ting from meteoroid penetration 
requires greater time for visual recovery than 
do light flashes of the same intensity and time 
from other known sources. It is obvious that 
much work is required in this area. 
What does a meteoroid flash mean to the 
crew inside a cabin several yards in diameter? 
From the data of Gell and McKinney it would 
appear that the zone of flash oxidation produced 
by a meteoroid in the low velocity range ex-
tends only about 8 inches from the cabin wall. 
The problem of corneal burns would arise only 
if, by chance, the eyes were within this flash 
zone. There would also be a possibility of 
chorioretinal burn only if the crew were looking 
directly at and were close to the flash from such 
a small particle. The chances of being exposed 
to much larger meteoroids are even lower than 
those predicted for minimal penetration par-
ticles. It is only remotely possible that a 
large enough particle could enter a cabin 
and produce a flash large enough to blind the 
crew permanently without killing them or 
destroying the craft. It is very possible that 
the flash from even a minimal penetration 
particle would blind the crew for periods up to 
several minutes even when they were at the 
center of the cabin. What are the solutions to 
this flash problem? 
The two obvious solutions to the meteoroid 
flash problem are either to prevent the light 
from reaching the eye or, if this is impossible, 
to increase the luminance of the instruments 
after exposure of the eye by flooding them 
with white lighting. Auxiliary storm lights 
have been used in aircraft for years to combat 
the relatively mild flash blindness (afterimage 
formation and loss of dark adaptation) re-
sulting from exposure to lightning flashes. 
Such lights could be used after meteoroid 
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flash as well. The problem of preventing 
light from reaching the eyes has been recently 
studied in the CBse of nuclear weapons. The 
use of reversible electroplating shutters and 
electrochemical light modulators with very 
rapid response time has been reviewed by 
Aitkenl and Fox 79. Design specifications for 
current devices Bre for 50-microsecond maxi-
mum rise times and clearing in 1 second with 
an open-state transmission of 33 percent for 
visible light. Some crude early working models 
of these flash goggles are available, but they 
Bre not entirely satisfactory. It would appear 
that these devices will be of practical value only 
in missions involving the high-particle-density 
asteroid belts. 
CHAPTER 6 
Problems of Fire Prevention 
and Extinguishment 
in Space Cabins 
THE PROBLEMS of prevention and extinguish-
ment of fires in space cabins are, except for a 
few specific situations, not much different from 
those at sea level or in aircraft conditions. The 
unusual atmospheric environment and limita-
tions of space and firefighting equipment com-
pound the general problem. The zero-gravity 
environment modifies firefighting procedures in 
a rather profound way and will be given detailed 
treatment in this report. 
FIRE PREVENTION 
The selection of optimum material with the 
lowest potential as an ignition source, the high-
est ignition temperature, slowest rate of com-
bustion, lowest explosion potential, and lowest 
potential as a source of toxic combustion prod-
ucts is of paramount importance. These factors 
should be considered in choosing materials for 
use in the location categories of the following 
list, taken from Ciccotti.35 It would seem that 
displays and controls, oxygen plumbing, and 
miscellaneous instruments should be upgraded 
to the category of "other potential fire sources." 
Major potential fire sources: 
Power supply (nuclear reactor, solar cells 
plus batteries, or fuel cells) 
Navigation and communication equipment 
Attitude-stabilization system 
Rocket for initiating rotation 
Electrical wiring 
Other potent1'al fire sources: 
Air circulating and filtering equipment 
Temperature-regulating equipment 
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Furniture 
Clothing 
G-Ioad protective pallet 
Escape mechanisms (atmospheric reentry) 
Communication equipment, telemetering, 
monitoring 
Food-preparation equipment 
Emergency oxygen, water and food reserves 
Entertainment equipment 
Waste-disposal equipment 
Housekeeping equipment 
Safety equipment, hull-repair gear 
First-aid kit 
Atmosphere-analysis equipment 
Space suits 
Miscellaneous lines and cables 
Data-recording equipment 
Possible fire sources: 
Food-storage locker 
Acoustic shielding 
Insulation 
Improbablefire SOUl'ces: 
Protective shell, gas tight 
Meteorite bumper (outer protective shell) 
Humidity-control equipment 
Plumbing for ox"ygen, water, etc, 
Radiation shielding 
Observation windows 
Access doors, air locks 
Fire extinguishers 
Displays, controls 
Utensils, tools 
Observation aids 
Internal partitions, decks 
Miscellaneous instrumentation 
---- --- -- ----
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Much of the discussion that follows has been 
stimulaLed by the reports of Ciccotti 35 and the 
Lockheed-California Company. 136 
Structural Mater ials 
Current design concepts of aerospace craft 
attempt to limit the amount of combustible 
materials to the minimum required for pilot 
comfort and capsule operation. Examples of 
combustible materials that should be mini-
mized or possibly eliminated from space cabins 
have also been given by Ciccotti. 35 
acrylics polyesters 
cellulose polyethylene 
cotton polystyrenes 
enamel rayon 
epoxy rubber 
grease shellac 
lacquer silk 
lanolins Teflon 
leather varnish 
magnesium vinyls 
neoprene vulcanized fibers 
nylon wood 
paints wool 
phenolics 
There is, of course, an irreducible mlnImum. 
Clothing and maps fall into this category as do 
books and papers required for normal mission 
work and, on extended trips, for relaxation. 
The foam rubber or foam plastics in seats are 
also required. Although these materials have 
relatively high spontaneous-ignition tempera-
ture, they are often placed near potential 
"hot spots." This should be avoided. Fire-
proofing of fabrics should be accomplished, 
keeping in mind the principles of oxygen effects 
outlined in Chapter 2 . No material which 
supports combustion in high-oxygen environ-
ments after the ignition source is r emoved 
should be used. T hese tests should be per-
formed at the maximum temperature expected 
at the potential locations within the cabin. 
Textiles and papers should all be made flame-
resistant to this degree, and the flame-resistant 
treatment should be unaffected by aging, dry-
cleaning, or laundering. Flammable waste 
and baggage should be isolated in flameproof 
aluminum-alloy containers or compartments. 
Some of the newer high-temperature non-
metallic materials such as perfluoroalkyl tria-
zine elastomers have been discussed in a recent 
review. 122 
Magnesium should be avoided in potential 
fire zones whenever possible, since it can be 
ignited relatively easily by burning flammables 
used in flight vehicles. As has been discussed 
in the section on meteoroid penetration, mag-
nesium supports combustion under certain 
conditions, especially in high-oxygen environ-
ments.46 When magnesium casings are used, 
if they are completely filled with a reasonable 
bulk of fluid the fire resistance is generally 
satisfactory . Magnesium parts should be 
coated with a fire-retarding coating which pre-
vents "weeping out" of easily ignitible eutectic 
material and contains molten material to some 
extent .49. 136 
When magnesium is used in high-speed 
rotating equipment, it should be tested for 
failure conditions which cause high friction 
temperatures, since ignition of magnesium by 
friction can occur, and criteria have not been 
established for analytical evaluation of the 
potential hazard condition. (See Chapter 1 of 
this report.) 
Electrical Insulation and Plastics 
The electrical insulation problem has been 
covered in Chapter 4. It would appear that 
basic glass-fiber or asbestos insulation with 
silicone or fluoroplastic binders would be the 
safest. Polyvinyl chlorides should be avoided. 
Hydraulic Fluids 
The presence of hydraulic lines, pumps, and 
actuators within cabins should also be avoided. 
rrhe problem surrounding the dieseling effect, 
spraying, and hot-plate combustion of these 
materials with high spontaneous-ignition tem-
pel'atures should be kept in mind whenever 
operational necessity requires these materials 
within cabins. If design priorities require the 
hydraulic systems within cabins, the flame 
hazard in high-o)..'Ygen environments, as out-
lined in Ohapter 3, should be kep t in mind 
as a major cri terion in the choice of fluid. 
TABLE 19.-Thermal Properties oj Liquid Rocket Oxidizers [AFTER LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO. 136] 
00 
o 
Oxidizer 
, 
Formula 
Molecu-
lar 
weight 
Bromine pentafluoride __ 1 BrFs __________ -' 174.92 
Bromine trifluoride _____ 1 BrF3 __________ -' 136.92 
Freezing 
point, 
of 
- 78.34 
47. 84 
Boiling 
point, 
of 
104.54 
260. 6 
Chlorine triflUOride ___ __ 1 ClF3 __ __ ______ _ 
Fluorine ______________ F
2 
____________ _ 
92.4571 - 117.4 
38.0 - 369.4 
52. 34 
-306.4 
Hydrogen peroxide _____ 1 H 20 2 __________ -' 34.016 
90 % hydrogen peroxide_ 
Iodine pentafluoride ___ _ 
Liquid oxygen ___ __ ___ _ 
90.0% H 20 2 
10.0% H 20. 
IFs_ -----------O
2 
____________ _ 
31. 24 
221. 91 
32.0 
Nitrogen tetroxide ______ 1 N20. __________ -' 92.02 
30.4 (**) 
12. 7 I 285 
47.3 1 206.6 
- 361. 12 -297.4 
12 70 
Ozone _________________ 1 0 3 ____________ -1 48 1-313.78 1-168 
Oxygen fluoride ________ 1 OF2 ___________ -' 54 1-370.84 1-228.64 
Nitrogen trifluoride _____ 1 NF3 __________ -' 71. 01 1-357.88 1-184 
Perchloryl fluoride ____ _ 1 ClOaF _____ ____ _ 
Red fuming nitric acid__ 84.0% HN03* 
14.0% N02 
2.0% H 20. 
Tetra-nitro methane ____ 1 C(N02). _______ _ 
White fuming nitric acid_ 97.5 % HN03* 
2.0% H 20 
0.5% N02• 
*Average composition. 
**Decomposes before boiling. 
-- ._--- --~--.~-~---
102. 3 
59. 09 
196.042 
59. 912 
-230.8 
-50 
55. 4 
-45 
-52.2 
140 
258. 3 
186 
Liquid density, 
gm/cc 
Viscosity. 
centipoises 
2.466 at 77° F __ -' No info _______ _ 
2.843 at 47.8° F_I No info _______ _ 
1.75 at 68° F ____ No info _______ _ 
1.108 at 0.555 at 
-305° F. -303.2° F. 
1.543 at 60° F ___ 1.272 at 67° F __ _ 
1.3922 at 68° F_-' 1.301 at 64.4° F _ 
3.50 at 206.6° F _ 
1.14 at 
-299.2° F. 
1.45 at 68° F ___ _ 
1.46 at -168° F_ 
No info ___ ___ _ _ 
0.U9 at 
-250° F. 
0.4720 at 
48-47° F. 
1.42 at 
-297.4° F. 
Comments 
Equipment must be kept clean to pre-
vent possibility of fire and explosion. 
Reacts explosively with most organic 
substances and very rapidly with 
many inorganic compounds. 
More reactive than fluorine. 
Gas and liquid ignite nearly anything. 
May cause spontaneous combustion 
if allowed to remain in contact with 
readily oxidizable organic materials. 
Explosive hazard due to catalytic de-
composition if tanks are not vented. 
Liquid oxygen mixed with organic 
substances is explosive. 
Not flammable but supports combus-
tion. 
Gas and liquid are explosive. 
1.53 at 
-228.64° F. 
1.537 at 
0.2826 at I Spark explodes moist gas but not dry 
-229° F. gas . 
No info_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Explodes on contact with organic 
-200° F. matter. 
1.434 at 68° F __ _ 0.184 at 68° F __ _ 
1.573 (max.) 1.37 at 77° F ____ I Forms explosive mixture with organic 
at 60° F. materials. 
1.65 at 55° F ____ I No info ________ 1 Very explosive, tricky, undependable. 
1.46 to 1.52 0.84 at 68° F _ _ _ _ Explosive with hydrocarbons and 
at 68° F. organic material. 
::l 
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Propellants 
Whenever possible, rocket propellants for 
self-maneuvering devices should be stored 
out~ide the cabin. Refilling of these personal 
deVIces should be performed in parts of the 
cabin which are well isolated from the crew 
compartments. All precautions used in launch-
pad environments should be followed. A 
matter .frequentl~ overlooked in the handling 
of fuel IS the statIc charge built up by friction 
during loading of tanks and containers.136 In 
the past, explosions have arisen from this 
ignition source. It is possible, but not prob-
able, that the sloshing of combustible fluids 
in flight can build up a charge to some degree. 
The presence of inerting agents in the o-ases 
. . b 
pressunzlllg these fuel tanks can considerably 
reduce this hazard. 
Whenever possible, fuel or oxidizer materials 
inside cabins should be selected for highest 
freezing point, highest boiling point, highest 
autoignition point, and narrowest limits of 
flammability. Tables 19 and 20 review some 
critical properties of these fluids. Design of 
pipes should include the optimum diameters 
and loopings to keep detonation hazards to a 
min~um . (see Chapter 1). The engineering 
cons~deratlOns in safe storage and handling of 
speCIfic propellants and oxidizers have been 
outlined in the Lockheed report 136 and will 
not be detailed here. It must be remembered 
in dealing with oxygen or other oxidizers that 
most are shock sensitive; that is, they tend to 
cause an explosion or a fire in combination 
with a combustible such as oil, grease, dust, 
lint, metal chips, some valve-seat material , 
rust, and so on. Valves in oxidizer systems 
should, therefore, be of the type which do not 
allow quick opening, whenever quick opening 
can cause a hazardous surge shock, or the surge 
should be reduced to a safe level by proper 
orifices. 10. 63. 175 
Ignition Sources 
The many sources and conditions for ignition 
were outlined in Chapter 1. Basic design 
features of space cabins should, of course, 
avoid these conditions or reduce them to a 
minimum. General approaches are listed below 
and discussed in the following paragraphs. 130 
~a) Avoid whenever possible equipment 
whlCh may cause ignition in flammables 
especially in areas of potential leakage of 
flammables. 
(b) Make equipment and lines containing 
hot gases or hot air as leakproof as possible 
by proper design. 
(c) Insulate, shroud, or cool hot surfaces. 
(d) Arrange ignition sources remote from 
liquid flammables and combustibles. 
(e) Separate ignition sources from com-
bustibles and flammables by compartmentation 
or other equally effective means. 
(f) Prevent sparking and arcing of electric 
or electronic equipment. 
(g) Prevent static discharge sparks. 
(h) Make electric and electronic equipment 
explosion proof. 173 
It has been pointed out in Chapter 1 that hot 
gases are ignition sources if their temperatures 
reach or exceed the hot-gas ignition tempera-
ture of a flammable fluid, vapor, or gas. 
Therefore , whenever possible, equipment and/or 
lines carrying hot gases should not be located 
in a compartment with potential leakage of 
flammables if the hot-gas temperature is 
equal to or exceeds the minimum hot-gas 
ignition temperature of the flammable minus 
50° F. Thus: 
Max. temp. of hot gas< (Min. hot-gas-ignition 
temp. of material-50° F) 
If hot-gas equipment and/or lines are located in 
a compartment with a potential flammable 
leakage, they should be optimally protected 
against occurrence of leakage. 
For hydrocarbons the hot-gas ignition tem-
perature is roughly twice the autogenous 
ignition temperature in °C, whereas for hydrogen 
and carbon monoxide it is only slightly higher 
than the spontaneous-ignition temperature. 
If the potential fire and explosion hazards due 
to hot-gas ignition are to be evaluated for 
flammables for which the ignition temperatures 
under high-oxygen conditions are not known, 
the ignition temperatures should be established 
by testing. 
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Fuel Formula 
Aluminum trimethyL _________ Al(CH 3h _____ --- ---
Anhydrous ammonia __________ NH3 __________ -----Aniline ___ __________ ____ _____ C6H 5NH2 __ -- _ -- _ ---
I>ecaborane __________________ BlOHI4 ______________ 
I>iborane _________ ___________ B2H 6 ___ -- - - _ -- _ -- --
Ethylene oxide _______________ (CH2hO ___ -- __ -- ---
Propyl nitrate _______________ C3H7N03 - ________ --UI>MH _____________________ (CH3hNNH2 ____ -- --Ethanol ___ __________________ C2H 60 H ____ -- _ -----
Furfuryl alcohoL _____________ C.H30CH20H _____ --
Liquid hydrogen _____________ H 2 ____ - -- - - ___ -- - --
Isopropyl alcohoL ____________ CaH 70 H _______ -- _ --Methanol ___________________ CH30H __ ----------
Pentaborane _________________ B6H O ___ - - - - __ --- ---
Anhydrous hydrazine _________ N2H 4 ___________ -- --
Hydrazine hydrate ___________ N 2H •. H 20 _______ ---
I>iethy lenE'triamine ___________ (NH2C2H')2NH ___ --U-I>eta _____________________ 
--------------------JP-4 _______________________ 
--------------------JP-5 _________________ _______ 
--------------------JP-6 ________________________ 
---- ----------------RP-l _______________________ 
--------------------
* OC=open cup; CC=c)osed cup. 
In regard to item (c), keep the surface 
temperature of any component that is in an 
area of potential leakage of flammables or in a 
flammable-containing tank, line, or device 
below a temperature that is equal to the most 
applicable minimum autogenous ingition tem-
peratures of the flammable minus 50° F. 
Thus: 
Max. surface temp.< (Min. autogenous ignition 
temp.-50° F) 
If surface temperature exceeds the maximum 
allowable, insulation, compartmentation, or 
equivalent protection should be provided. A 
careful comparison should be made between the 
maximum theoretical surface temperatures of 
TABLE 20.-Thermal Properties oj Liquid Rocket 
Molecular Freezing Boiling Liquid density, grn/cc 
weight point, of point, of 
72. 072 59 258. 98 0.8 at 68° F ________ 
17.03 -107.86 -28.03 0.6386 at 32° F _____ 
93. 124 21. 02 364 1.022 at 68° F ______ 
122. 312 211. 5 415.4 0.78 at 212° F ______ 
27. 69 -265.9 -134.5 0.43 at -187.6° F ___ 
44. 05 -170.5 51. 3 0.8711 at 68° F _____ 
105. 094 <-150 231 1.059 at 59° F ______ 
60.1 -70.7 144. 5 0.7782 at 80° F _____ 
46. 068 -173.47 173.3 0.7894 at 68° F _____ 
98. 10 -23.8 339. 8 1.135 at 68" F ______ 
2.016 -434. 56 -422.99 0.070 at -423.4° F __ 
60. 094 -129 180. 2 0.785 at 68° F ______ 
32. 04 -144.22 148. 5 0.7915 at 68° F _____ 
63.172 -52.28 140.11 0.61 at 68° F _______ 
32. 05 34. 05 236 1.005 at 68° F ______ 
50.06 -40 245. 3 1.035 at 68° F ______ 
103. 1 <-38 404 0.948 at 77° F ______ 
72 <-121 161 0.858 at 60° F ______ 
125 -76 296 0.825 at 60° F ______ 
169 -40 432 0.845 at 68° F ______ 
----------
-65 250 0.840 at 68° F ______ 
----------
-40 
----------
0.815 at 68° F ______ 
components and the maximum allowable sur-
face temperatures over the entire ground and 
flight regime of the vehicle under normal and 
abnormal conditions. The unusual conditions 
which should be especially considered are 
ground crashes, abnormal and emergency 
descent, and overheat conditions. In these 
reviews, consideration should be given to the 
fact that reduction or elimination of convection 
and reduction of heat dissipation at high 
altitudes and in space can create high-tem-
perature hot spots on operating equipment. 
Item (f) can be complied with by the use of 
capacitors across potential arc points; by use 
of abrasion-resistant electric wiring; by en-
closure of wiring which has inadequate abrasion 
resistance in rigid or flexible conduits; by 
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Fuels [AFTER LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO. 136J 
Viscosity, centipoises F lash point, * 
of 
Auto-
ignition, 
Flammability 
limits 
of Lower, Upper, 
percent percent 
No info ___________________ ________ ____________________________ _ 
0.00982 at 68° F (gas) _______ __ ______ __ _ 
5.299 at 59° F ________ 15800,168 OC_ 
1,204 
1, 415 
16 25 
Solid at room temp _________________________________________ ____ _ 
0 .245 at -197.3° F____ ________________ __________ 25 75 
0.32 at 32° F _____ ___ _ < 0 _____ __ __ 804.2 to 3. 0 100 
1,060 
0 .51 at 100° F ________ 7000,6800.__ 379 2 100 
0.405 at 104° F ________ 3400, -6 00__ 454 2.5 95 
1.075 at 77° F ________ 5400_________ 700 3.28 18.95 
5.6 at 68° F ___ _____ __ 1670C____ ____ 915 1. 8 16. 2 
0.0139 at -423.4 °F___ _____ __ __ ____ __ _ 1, 076 4 74. 2 
2.3 at 68° F _______ ___ 5300_________ 750 2.02 12 
0.623 at 59° F ________ 5200_________ 878 6 36. 5 
0.342 at 55.8° F _________________________________________ - - ____ _ _ 
0.95at68°F _________ 12400, 1040C_ 329 4.7 100 
2.0 at 68° F _______ __ __________________________________________ _ 
6.6 at 70° F _______ - _____ - - - __ __ - - - -_ - - - - - - _ - - - - - - __ - -- - - - - - - ---
1.96 at 60" F _________ 4600 __ __________________________ -- _____ _ 
0.83 at 60° F _________ < 0 484.8 5.63 
2.2 at 68° F __________ 140_ ___________ 473 .6 4.53 
___ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 450 . 6 3. 7 
16.5 (cs) ______________ 110 _________ __ _ 
Oomments 
Spontaneously flammable in air, de-
composes explosively in water. 
Unstable to sudden heat and sunlight. 
Vapor explosive when mixed with air . 
Explodes in 0, at 212° F, stable in air. 
Flashes at very low temperature. 
Extremely flammable. 
Classified by IOO as nonflammable. 
Sudden exposure of even small quan-
tity of liquid to air will result in 
explosion . 
May cause spontaneous combustion. 
Dangerous . 
Low fire hazard. 
proper support of electric wiring; by protection 
of wiring against pulling out of connectors, 
terminals, and ground studs ; and by proper 
grounding. 
wiring should be arranged above and not below 
components carrying flammable fluids and 
oxidizers. 
All electric and electronic equipment and 
wires with sufficient energy to ignite flammables 
should be considered as ignition sources, re-
gardless of how well they are protected . Only 
low-energy electric or electronic equipment 
which has been demonstrated not to be an 
ignition source for all flammables concerned , 
under any possible oxygen environment and 
under any failure condition , should be con-
sidered safe. Electric equipment and wiring 
should be located as remotely as possible from 
components carrying flammables and oxidizers . 
If this is not possible, electric equipment and 
Sealed-type electric connectors should be 
used in potential fire zones. The connector 
materials should not be adversely affected by 
fluids such as fuel, oil, and cleaning agents or 
by temperature. All these connectors should 
either be safetied or be of a type that is in-
herently safetied. The wall connectors for 
electric wires should be made so that they do 
not allow propagation of flames through them 
under the most severe conditions of fire, vibra-
tion, and duration of exposure likely to occur 
at their location. 
The wall connectors for fire detection and fire 
extinguishing systems should operate properly 
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under the most severe conditions of fire, vibra-
tion, and duration of exposure likely to occur 
at their location. Fire-wall connectors for 
other fire control equipment should operate 
properly under the most severe condition of fire 
and vibration likely to occur at their location 
for at least 5 minutes. If connector failure 
occurs after this time, the failure should not 
cause actuation of the attached equipment. 
To prevent static discharge sparks (item (g», 
reduce electrostatic accumulation by use of 
semiconducting material on external plastic sur-
faces, by bonding of isolated metal surfaces to 
basic structure, and by use of static dischargers 
located remotely from explosive materials or 
vents. I73 
To make electric and electronic equipment 
explosion proof 173 (item (h», all electric equip-
ment including connectors, terminal blocks, and 
ground studs located in compartments with 
flammables or possible flammable leakage 
should be explosion proof. The following meth-
ods of making electric equipment explosion 
proof are acceptable: 
(i) Using flameproof casings and structures: 
The criteria for flameproofing must be contain-
ment of flames and prevention of ignition. 
Explosion-proof testing should be conducted 
with the combinations of flammables and air or 
flammables and oxidizers which are likely to con-
tact the equipment; or with substitutes of 
proven equal ignition and flame-propagation 
characteristics. The testing should be per-
formed at ground level and at altitude, with a 
mixture ratio and pressure which is most con-
ducive to flame propagation and ignition. 
(ii) Enclosing in a hermetically sealed case. 
(iii) Potting or coating: Only potting and 
coating material which will not be ignited by 
overheating or failed electric equipment should 
be used. 
Details regarding engineering practices sug-
gested for accomplishing the above may be 
found in the Lockheed report.136 
Maintainability, Accessibility, and Inspectability 
Good maintainability, accessibility, and 
inspectability are absolute requisites for pre-
serving the functional integrity which is neces-
sary for prevention of fires and their spread, 
and for timely and easy detection of hazardous 
conditions. 
All equipment containing flammables or 
constituting an ignition source should be easily 
accessible without removal of the equipment or 
surrounding parts in the area. All seams, con-
nectors, flanges, seals, and so forth, of flam-
mable fluid and oxidizer systems should be 
easily inspectable. Fuel and oxidizer line con-
nectors should be easily maintainable with 
standard tools to assure proper tightening by 
maintenance personnel. 
Access doors in fire barriers separating poten-
tial fire zones should be constructed so that 
service handling or flame exposure does not 
damage them to such an extent that fire is per-
mitted to spread to the adjacent zone. Access 
doors should not be used in any barrier which 
separates a combustion-system area from the 
rest of the vehicle. 
In laying out the interior cabin design, the 
limited volume must not be allowed to over-
shadow the consideration of equipment accessi-
bility. A fire in the back of an instrument 
panel in which relatively large chassis were 
closely fitted would necessitate flooding the 
entire compartment with extinguishing agents 
even if the fire were in one localized area. At-
tempts should be made to avoid placing in 
obstructed locations any items that would be 
apt to overheat or burn. This, of course, can 
be done only after matters of greater design 
priority have been met. The accessibility 
factor, however, is very often overlooked. 
Compartmentation and Isolation 
Concepts that place electrical equipment 
and auxiliary power systems in completely 
separated unpressurized compartments greatly 
reduce the probability of fire. However, the 
arcing of electrical contacts in these vacuum 
environments must be kept in mind. Lack 
of gas for convection cooling in extracabin 
vacuum areas may also create unexpected hot 
spots adjacent to the cabin wall. These should 
be avoided by appropriate design practices. 
The cooling systems for nuclear or direct solar 
heating power units may be at a very high 
temperature and should be kept as far from 
the cabin wall as possible. 
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A much overlooked factor in cabin design 
is the location of redundant items. Because 
of the relatively short "free-mean-life-to-failure" 
of certain critical electronic components, two-
or three-time redundancy features need to be 
employed to increase the probability of con-
tinuous operation. Generally, this is done by 
placing items side by side. Very often the 
fact is overlooked that fire or explosion hazards 
in the vicinity of, or even within, one of the 
redundant units may incapacitate the others. 
By planning the separation of these items in 
isolatable compartments, this loss of effective 
overall redundancy can be avoided. The re-
dundancy of firefighting equipment in each of 
these compartments would appear to be a 
worthwhile goal. 
Materials used for fire barriers should prevent 
flame penetration and/or propagation under 
the most severe conditions of fire, vibration, 
and duration of exposure likely to occur at their 
location. Aluminum alloy or equally fire-
resistant materials should be used for ventila-
tion flow-control barriers. As discussed above, 
magnesium should be avoided in barrier design. 
Baggage and cargo compartments should 
have no electric or flammable equipment except 
compartment lights and fire detectors. Electric 
wiring and lines carrying flammable materials 
should be excluded from baggage and cargo 
compartments or they should be separated 
from each other and from the compartmen ts by 
rugged fire-barrier materials. Inaccessible com-
partments containing combustibles should have 
fire or smoke detection equipment, and built-in 
extinguishing equipment wherever possible. 
Walls of these compartments should also be as 
"airtight" as possible to restrict oxygen in case 
a fire does start. 
The Civil Aeronautics Manual 4b character-
izes four classes of compartments and Asa-
dourian 7 has outlined optimum means of pro-
tection for each class. Table 21 represents 
this classification. 
Exceptionally Hazardous Equipment 
There are many extremely hazardous devices 
which might find their way in and about space 
cabins. These will be only briefly outlined: 
(1) Electroexplosive systems such as igniters, 
squibs, flares, destructors, ejectors, and so 
forth. Ammunition for firearms is included in 
this category. 
(2) High-pressure gas compressors such as 
those found in hydraulic systems, moisture 
separators, and refrigeration systems. The 
problems of dieseling effects and lubrication 
failures in these devices have already been 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
(3) High-speed rotating equipment. 
(4) High-pressure vessels and lines (up to 
7,500 psi). 
(5) Electric batteries, regardless of chemical 
systems involved (silver oxide-zinc, silver oxide-
cadmium, nickel oxide-cadmium; all with po-
tassium hydroxide electrolytes). Any battery 
will emit gas during charge if the charging end 
voltage is exceeded. Both oxygen and hydrogen 
are released and create a serious hazard. 
Vented batteries with pressure-relief valves are 
preferred over sealed uni ts. Hydrogen-oxygen 
fuel cells require consideration. 
(6) Oxygen-breathing systems. Much of this 
problem has been covered in Chapter 1 and in 
references 18, 63, 64, and 183. 
Whenever possible, these systems should be 
located outside of the manned cabin and should 
be isolated from the cabin by the appropriate 
barriers. 
Crash-Fire Prevention Systems 
A fire resulting from crash landing of a space 
vehicle may compound the hazard of an other-
wise minor crash and make rescue difficult. 
Crashes in uninhabited areas will probably be 
the rule and require that the emergency be 
handled entirely by the crew. It is in crash 
conditions that ignition sources such as hot 
surfaces, friction sparks from abrading metal, 
exhaust flames, and electric sparks and arcs are 
more important than the others, though just 
about any ignition condition may exist. The 
fuel types span the range already discussed, 
but combustible fluids and vapors playa more 
siO'nificant role in crashes than in the usual t:> 
flight mishaps. 
The capacity to jettison hazardous materials 
helps enormously in prevention of crash fires 
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and is probably the greatest ma;or design 
factor that can be brought to bear. Friction 
sparks from the undercarriage striking the 
ground can be reduced by avoiding the use of 
magnesium, titanium, or steel in these stllUC-
tures. Emergency relief of high-oxygen atmos-
pheres within the cabin is also desirable. The 
emergency shutdown of all electrical and com-
bustion systems not necessary for landing also 
helps. Emergency clircuits required for cabin 
escape should be well protected from potential 
crash damage and be isolated in areas of low 
fire probability. 
FIRE-HAZARD DETECTION 
The prediction and detection of conditions 
predisposing to fire or representing incipient 
flame conditions in flight vehicles have been 
studied by Cary et al. at the Battelle Insti-
tute. 33 The engineering aspects of this problem 
have been reviewed by Lockheed-California 
Co. 136 In general, it is felt that detectors 
should be employed only when proper action 
can be taken either to reduce or eliminate the 
hazard or to save the crew by immediate abor-
tion of the mission. In space missions the last 
possibility is, except for limited periods in the 
flight plan, quite remote. Detectable hazards 
within the cabin will probably lead to either 
automated mechanical action or human effort 
to eliminate the hazard. 
One should consider as detectable harbingers 
of impending fire hazard high temperatures, 
ignitible or toxic vapors, and the highly danger-
ous open flame. High temperatures, if recog-
nized in time, may be reduced by "throttling" 
the heat source. Ignitible and toxic vapors 
may be evacuated and the source closed. The 
open flame, however, requires immediate quench-
ing action on the ignition source, activation 
of fire-extinguishing apparatus, or abortion of 
mission. 
TABLE 21.-Fire-Oontrol Provisions jor Various Types oj Baggage and Oargo Oompartments 
[AFTER ASADOURIAN 7] 
Class* Characteristic 
A Fire is easily discernible and is 
accessible in flight. 
B Sufficient access to baggage and 
cargo compartment in flight 
to move contents and to ex-
tinguish. 
C Fire is not easily discernible and 
is not accessible in flight. 
D A fire occurring will be com-
pletely confined without en-
dangering the vehicle or the 
occupants. 
Means of fire protection 
Hand fire extinguisher for each baggage and cargo compartment. 
Separate system of smoke or fire detectors and hand fire extinguishers 
for each baggage and cargo compartment. 0 hazardous quantities 
of smoke, flames, or extinguishing agent should enter crew or passenger 
compartments when access to the baggage and cargo compartment 
is opened. The compartment should be lined with fire-resistant 
material. 
Separate systems of smoke or fire detectors for each baggage and cargo 
compartment with built-in fire extinguishing system. No hazardous 
quantities of smoke, flames, or extinguishing agent should enter crew 
or passenger compartments. Control of ventilation and draft V\>ithin 
each baggage and cargo compartment so agent can control fire. 
Baggage and cargo compartment should be lined with fire-resistant 
material. 
Neither flames nor smoke or other noxious gases should enter crew or 
passenger compartments in hazardous quantities. Ventilation and 
draft within compartments should be controlJed. ** Compartments 
should be lined with fire-resistant material. No critical effects should 
be caused by heat on adjacent P'l.rts. 
*The classification is adopted from paragraph 44.383 of the Civil Aeronautics Manual 4b. 
**For compartments in class D having a volume not in excess of 500 cu ft, an airflow of not more than 1,500 cu 
ft per hour is considered acceptable. For larger compartments lesser airflow may be applicable. For measur-
ing baggage compartment leakage rates, see CAA TDR No. 146. 
------ ---
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The following types of detectors have been 
used in flight vehicles or have been projected 
for future use: 
(a) Flame detectors-visual or automatic 
(b) Heat detectors-unit and continuous 
(c) Smoke detectors-photoelectric 
(d) Oarbon monoxide-infrared absorption 
(e) Vapor detectors-time-of-flight mass 
spectrometers, nondisperse infrared spectropho-
tometers, and column chromatographs 
(f) Pressure detectors 
The choice of detector system for any appli-
cation should be determined by the ability of a 
system to give a reliable indication of a real 
hazard condition and to give no false alarms 
under any environmental condition of applica-
tion. The indication should be such that it is 
easily observed and/or heard by the crew 
members responsible for action. The follow-
ing discussion is from the reviews of Oiccotti, 35 
Lockheed-Oalifornia, 136 and Oary et al. 33 
Flame Detectors 
Flame detectors are recommended where 
natural or forced heat convection is low, such 
as in some compartments of space vehicles, and 
only if the detector system complies with other 
requirements outlined below. 
Flame detectors which operate on the flicker 
characteristic of a flame should not be used 
when flicker triggering may be caused by cycling 
phenomena such as light shining through rotat-
ing or vibrating equipment or when exhaust 
gases may trigger the detector. Flame detec-
tors with low heat resistance or flame detectors 
that may lose their ability to indicate start of 
a fire, termination of a fire, or reignition of a 
fire, due to contamination of the sensor by soot, 
leaking oil, and so forth, should not be used. 
Visual-type radiation-sensitive detectors, if 
used, should be insensitive to the normally 
expected cosmic or solar radiation. 
Most flame detectors are of the infrared or 
ultraviolet type. A suitable infrared fire detec-
tor has lead sulfide photoconductive cells with 
omnidimensional viewing. It readily distin-
guishes between the pulsating infrared emission 
pattern characteristic of a flame and the 
smoother infrared emission pattern caused by 
other radiation sources. Detection and warn-
ing are almost instantaneous with the outbreak 
of an actual flame. The fact that flames may 
not flicker in convection-free zero gravity may 
confound this approach. 
There are several types of adequate ultra-
violet detectors. An ultraviolet-type fire detec-
tor recently developed for aircraft use has a 
phototube that operates on the Geiger-Muller 
principle.35 The tube uses a pulse-integrating 
network to distinguish between the ultraviolet 
radiation from a flame and random radiation 
such as that from the sun or cosmic rays. This 
system is reportedly sensitive to a match flame 
6 feet away or to burning oil in a 1-foo.t-square 
area at a distance of 100 feet, yet can discrimi-
nate against direct sunlight. It does not re-
spond to overheat conditions, nor is it affected 
by ambient temperature or residual radiation. 
It is insensitive to infrared and visible light, 
and relatively insensitive to X- and gamma-
radiation. 
In addition to having the same advantages 
as infrared fire detectors, namely, omnidimen-
sional viewing and nearly instantaneous, posi-
tive response to a flame, this particular ultra-
violet unit can be adapted to perform a number 
of associated functions. For example, it can 
be used to detect smoke if an ultraviolet source 
is mounted beside it with the beam directed 
into the monitored area; smoke will scatter the 
ultraviolet energy and reflect some of it back 
to the detector. Another possible use for this 
unit is as a combustible gas detector. If a 
"Davy screen" equipped with a hot-wire ele-
ment is added, air can be directed through the 
screen across the glowing wire. The wire will 
ignite any combustible vapors that may be 
present, and the phototube will detect the re-
sulting ultraviolet radiation. 
Optical fiber surveillance detectors, which 
transmit light from a fire 'to a remote viewing 
point through a bundle of thin glass fibers, 
may be used as a reliable means for checking 
the validity of fire warning-light signals, in 
cases where 100 percent reliability is desirable. 
Heat Detectors 
Heat detectors require contact with heat or 
flame. Unit-type heat detectors should, there-
L 
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fore, be used only in small compartments; or in 
large compartments with few confined hazard 
areas; or in large compartments with uniform, 
unidirectional airflow, without stagnant areas, 
and with few well-defined air exit areas. In 
all other applicatfons continuous-type detectors 
should be used. These are useful only in areas 
where hot spots are constantly present and 
detection of critical overheat limit is required. 
Fire and overheat alarm setting should 
generally be 100 0 F to 200 0 F above the 
maximum expected ambient temperatures at 
the location of the sensors. The setting should 
be high enough, however, to prevent harmless 
leakage of hot gases from causing an alarm. 
Smoke and Carbon Monoxide Detectors 
Smoke and carbon monoxide detectors should 
be used in ventilation outlets in compartments 
where low air supply permits only smoldering 
rather than an open flame. Smoke and carbon 
monoxide detectors should be used in inacces-
sible compartments with fire-extinguishing pro-
visions only if fire extinguishing is effective on 
the kind of smoldering fire which may be 
expected in these compartments. If the 
smoldering fire is confined, for instance, in a 
clothing case or paper box it may smoke for a 
long period of time without penetrating the 
surface. The extinguishing agent would be 
wasted if applied externally to the case before 
the fire broke through. 
In small potential fire zones and inhabited 
areas of spacecraft which have a continuous 
unidirectional flow of atmosphere, carbon 
monoxide detectors may be used advanta-
geously, since they tend to provide early 
warning of an incipient fire before open flames 
are in evidence. Smoke detectors pick up 
changes in optical density of the atmosphere 
produced by smoke particles. Oarbon mon-
oxide analyzers continuously sample the at-
mosphere, and activate warning signals when 
the carbon monoxide concentration exceeds a 
predetermined value. This value is usually 
many thousand times less than the concentra-
tion that results from combustion of materials 
in aircraft compartments. Such devices give 
rapid warning of even a smoldering fire in a 
space vehicle so that control measures can be 
taken in time to prevent a major conflagration. 
It should be pointed out that in space cabins 
with 100 percent oxygen environments, fires 
will probably involve complete oxidation of 
products. Smoldering with much telltale 
smoke or release of carbon monoxide due to 
incomplete oxidation should not be relied on as 
a trigger of fire warning systems. 
Vapor Detectors 
More sophisticated physicochemical devices 
known as vapor detectors may be set to detect 
one or more critical compounds in space cabins, 
including carbon monoxide. They have been 
used for years on submarines for similar 
purposes. Development of a comprehensive 
atmosphere-analyzer warning system would 
enable the crew to take corrective action against 
the buildup of an explosive or other undesirable 
condition in the internal air. These would have 
to be properly located in the ventilation system 
to be effective. 
Pressure Detectors 
Incipient explosions may be detected by 
pressure-sensitive devices. Failure of breath-
ing-gas control systems may also produca 
sudden pressure rises. 
Appropriate means must be devised to 
distinguish between the two types of pressure 
rise. Explosive pressure-rise rates are much 
greater than those for other contingencies 
except for possibly an explosive failure of the 
breathing-gas control systems. There are exist-
ing explosion detection and suppression systems 
that appear to be adaptable to operation in a 
space-vehicle environment, but each individual 
installation will require specific additional 
engineering design and development. 
Determination of the actual feasibility of 
detector systems requires complex risk-cost-
weight analysis. The study of Oary et al. 33 
outlines several possible computer procedures 
for analyzing feasibility data. In these analy-
ses, the presence of high oxygen, low pressure, 
and zero gravity environments of limited 
accessibility should be included. Adequate 
planning for overall fire detection and suppres-
sion requires a most sophisticated risk analysis. 
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The ultimate in the development sequence 
aimed at fire and explosion protection is a 
system that not only warns of a fire or explosive 
condition, but also marks its nature, location, 
and magnitude, determines the type and 
amount of agent that should be used to counter-
act it, and actually activates the appropriate 
action automatically. Such a system would, of 
course, have to be coupled with an extensive 
piping network and with a computer memory 
unit programed with complete data on the 
whole gamut of possibilities: the effectiveness 
of each agent carried against each possible 
hazardous condition, acceptable alternate 
agents, a running inventory of agents, maxi-
mum safe concentrations of agent from 
the standpoints of toxicity or anesthesia, 
vehicle area to be treated, and a number of 
other factors. The development of an auto-
matic fire and explosion protection system is 
technologically feasible; whether it is economi-
cally justifiable will have to be evaluated. 
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND STRUCTURES 
A final problem to be overcome is thermal 
hazard in meteorite flash oxidation. Whftt 
protective clothing and modification of interior 
structural materials are required? 
The high radiant energy of the flash presents 
a burning problem which must be faced by the 
designer of space suits. As was pointed out in 
Chapter 2, effectiveness of flameproofing tech-
niques for fabrics is radically altered by the 
oxygen content of the gaseous environment. 
The use of aluminized surfaces for reflection of 
the radiant energy has been required to cover 
the hazards of reentry heating. The same gen-
eral fabric and coating design will protect 
against flash fires and meteoroid flash radiation. 
A recent review of the means and materials for 
combating thermal-radiation flash burns has 
been presented by the Armour Research Foun-
dation. 6 Most of the principles are directed 
against nuclear-weapons effects but the same 
general rules should hold for meteoroid flash 
burns and other flash fires in the cabin. It is 
beyond the scope of the present report to dis-
cuss this problem in detail. It is suggested, 
however, that the principles outlined in the 
Armour study be modified to include the pres-
ence of high-oxygen, low-density gaseous envi-
ronments. The studies of Clarke et a1.38 and 
Berkley 12 on the protective qualities of fabrics 
and clothing against thermal radiation should 
also be reviewed for the effects of unusual at-
mospheric environments to be found in space 
cabins. Recent techniques of Chianta and 
Sto1l 34 contribute much to the evaluation of 
thermal transfer properties of fabric materials. 
It has been suggested that much weight can 
be saved by using plastic instead of metal for 
space-cabin interior structure. Because of the 
low probability of meteoroid penetration, it 
would appear that these materials are safe for 
most missions near the earth. High-oxygen 
environments, however, create a special hazard 
in zones of high meteoroid density and even 
where meteoroid penetration is not a danger. 
In Operation Teapot 232 the resistance of many 
plastic and fibrous materials to radiant thermal 
damage from nuclear weapons was studied. 
The outline of Kelble and Bernados 122 is also 
pertinent. These studies should be reviewed 
for selection of those materials which will be 
safest for use in space cabins with the entire 
anticipated atmosphere spectrum. 
FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT 
Fire extinguishment and" explosion" (detona-
tion) depression in space-cabin environments is 
a fascinating problem. High oxygen concen-
tration, low gas density, zero-gravity conditions, 
and limited removal of toxic products are the 
major factors compounding the task. 
The physical methods of flame control were 
outlined in Chapter 1. They will be reviewed 
in greater detail below. 
Isolation of Combustible from Oxidant (Dilution and 
Blanketin g) 
Presence of an infinite vacuum "sink" about 
a spacecraft lightens considerably the isolation 
approach to flame extinguishment. By dump-
ing the cabin atmosphere into this sink one 
can decrease the concentrations of both gas-
eous combustible and oxygen below the limits 
of flammability. This single step will probably 
be of greatest value in fighting space-cabin 
fires. Of course, the procedure must be delayed 
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until pressure suits are donned and the re-
placement of the environment must be delayed 
until all ignition sources and/or combustibles 
are removed. If the cabin is compartmen-
talized with adequate pressure seals, only the 
area involved in the fire need be decompressed. 
To reduce propagation of flames to a minimum 
within a sealed compartment, the air-condition-
ing system should be turned off as soon as 
possible. As was discussed in Chapter 1, in 
the absence or' gravity, forced convection and 
not natural convection is the prime source of 
oxidant-combustible mixing in heterogeneous 
systems. This elimination of forced convec-
tion may well be a critical factor during the 
time lost in donning pressure suits. 
There is one paradox in the decompression 
routine. The actual act of decompression will 
create a forced-convection condition which 
may tip the balance in a borderline conflagra-
tion. It would seem that a slow decompression 
would be more hazardous than an explosive 
decompression. The former approach retains 
10 I I 
Zone m: I 
oxygen for longer periods of time and may 
allow damage to critical structures. It must 
also be remembered that provision for cutting 
off the OAry-gen supply to the cabin must be 
included in the emergency procedure. Cal-
culations for adequate oxygen supply should 
include consideration of the loss of gas during 
fire procedures. 
The blanketing of a fire area with a gas 
denser than the ambient atmosphere is a stand-
ard extinguishment procedure. It is usually 
accomplished by the use of carbon dioxide or 
chemical foams and essentially prevents ade-
quate oxygen from reaching the flame zone. In 
the absence of gravity, however, the density 
factor no longer comes into play and blanketing 
agents will probably be quite ineffective. The 
a:;tual blast of gas or foam in the direction of 
the fire may set up a forced convection which 
will augment the transport of oxidant to a fire 
that might otherwise be kept in check by the 
effects of reduced gravity. Low nozzle-exit 
speeds, therefore, would improve the effi-
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ciency of the carbon dioxide approach. The 
blanketing of "overhead" fires by these agents 
would probably be more effective than in 
norma' gravity environments. It must also be 
remembered that venting a cabin to reduce 
oxygen will remove carbon dioxide or foams as 
well. It is apparent, however, that either 
venting or carbon dioxide alone will be used, 
but never both simultaneously. 
It should be kept in mind that carbon dioxide 
must be removed from the cabin before toxic 
levels are reached. There have been fatal acci-
dents from excessive concentrations of carbon 
dioxide in aircraft cabins after the use of carbon 
dioxide extinguishers in baggage compart-
ments.231 Figure 52 demonstrates the time-
concentration tolerance curves for carbon di-
oxide.1c4 The excess carbon dioxide may be 
removed by venting to the outside or by the 
chemical absorption system within the air-
conditioning system. Care must be taken not 
to overload the capacity of the carbon dioxide 
absorption system, 
The use of blankets, towels, or similar ma-
terials for "snuffing" out small fires is to be 
discouraged. As will be mentioned in Chap-
ter 7, a serious fire accident has occurred in a 
5-psi 100 percent oxygen environment as a 
result of this approach to the problem. The 
use of "fireproof" blanketing fabric materials 
i.n 100 percent oxygen environments should be 
discouraged unless the fireproofing has been 
tested in these atmospheres (see Chapter 2). 
Cooling 
The usual agent for extinguishing fires by 
cooling is water. Other chemical agents also 
involve cooling as part of their mechanism. 
High heat capacity, large heat vaporization, 
and ability to undergo endothermic decompo-
sition reactions contribute to the cooling proc-
ess. It must be remembered that in zero-
gravity environments liquid will not settle on 
a flame area. A stream released from a nozzle 
will break up into globules and ricochet off the 
surface until the energy of motion is dissipated. 
Blockage of Radiant Heat Transfer 
Many . agents can interpose between the 
flame zone and unburned liquid of a hetero-
724-454 0-64-8 
geneous unmixed system and decrease the 
radiant heat transfer to the fuel source. This 
decreases vaporization and reduces the con-
centration of vapor at the flame zone to a 
level below the lower (lean) limit. 
Chemical Inhibition 
Recent reviews of the voluminous literature 
on chemical extinguishing agents have been 
quite thorough.81.203 It appears worthwhile to 
review only the general mode of action of these 
agents in extinguishing flames and suppressing 
detonations. The mode of action very often 
determines the optimum use of each agent 
under any specific condition. 
Hydrocarbons. Additions of hydrocarbons 
such as methane, ethane, and propane can 
inhibit hydrogen-oxygen flames and detonation. 
The use of these compounds is of only theoreti-
cal interest. The inhibition is probably brought 
about by the absorption of H' . As was men-
tioned in Chapter 1, H' is the active free radical 
in propagating the oxidation of hydrogen. The 
hydrocarbons apparently react with the H' and 
substitute a less reactive R in its place. 8 
H' +CHc---->H2 +CH3' 
H' +C2H6---+H2+C2Hs' 
H' +C2H 4-02H 6' 
The C2Hs' may react with oxygen to give the 
more stable (unreactive) radical H02' which 
diffuses to the wall and is converted into stable 
compounds. 
Methyl radicals react with oxygen to give 
The OH' is active but formaldehyde (HCHO) 
ties up more H' to give 
The formyl radical diffuses to the wall. Thus, 
the hydrogen-o},.'ygen reaction is inhibited by 
free-radical conversion and trapping. 
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TABLE 22.-Advantages and Disadvantages oj Various Extinguishing Methods [AFTER LOCKHEED-
CALIFORNIA CO. 136] 
Method Advantages D isadvantages 
Manual extinguishing 
system. 
Allows assessment of hazard by flight 
crew and may prevent waste of extin-
guishing agent. Avoids shock and 
hazard of unexpected shutdown. 
May delay action beyond safe limits. 
Fires may run out of control 30 sec or 
less after ignition. 
Automatic extinguishing 
system. 
Superior to man ual system only when 
fast action is vital. 
Inadvertent operation can cause disastrous 
shutdown of vital systems. 
Explosion suppression ___ _ Limits explosion peak pressures to le vels 
safe for structure and equipment . 
Gi ves good explosion protection in 
small spaces. 
Limited volume coverage of suppression 
units requires complex system for large 
volumes and odd compartment or tank 
shapes. Complex wiring system intro-
duces ignition hazards. 
Evacuation ___ __________ _ Effective in space-vehicle compartments Requires donning of space suit when used 
in inhabited areas. Not effective for 
bipropellant and non propellant fires. 
with oxygen atmosphere. 
Alkyl Halides. Carbon tetrachloride (CC14) 
and the other alkyl halides extinguish flames by 
blanketing, cooling, and chemically inhibiting 
combustion. Bromochloromethane (CH2ClBr) 
is widely used . Recently other alkyl halides 
have been found to be superior in effectiveness 
against many different fire sources and are less 
toxic. These compounds studied by Engibous 
and Torkelson61 are: dibromodifluoromethan:e 
(CF2Br2); bromochlorodifluoromethane 
(CBrClF2); bromotrifluoromethane (CBrFa); 
1-2 dibromotetrafluoroethane (BrF2C-CF2Br). 
.All these agents appear most effective in a 1 g 
environment when ejected forcefully so that 
they penetrate the flame.110 Friedrich 82.83.84 has 
studied the mode of action of these compounds 
against a variety of vaporizing liquids . He 
concludes that these halides decompose ip. the 
flame to yield halogen atoms which are the 
active extinguishing agents. The more efficient 
alkyl halides are the ones which can penetrate 
the flames to the flame front without breaking 
down. At the flame front they become unstable, 
and they release the greatest number of 
halogen atoms at the front itself. 
The chemical mechanism of action has been 
reviewed at the Seventh Combustion Sym-
posium. In brief, Rosser et al. 186.18"1. 188. consider 
that hydrocarbon combustion proceeds by the 
diffusion and action of active species H', OH', 
and 0". They hypothesize that the halogen 
atoms released at the flame front tie up these 
compounds. An example of the action IS as 
follows: 
Br'+RH-~R'+HBr 
and 
The Br' is free to continue the chain-terminating 
steps until only the less reactive R radicals are 
left. It has been generalized that all oxygen 
oxidations should be blocked by the halides 
except for O2 or 0 3 - oxidations which can 
tie up the HBr formed and prevent chain 
termination. There are still several fuels with 
unexplained anomalous responses to the alkyl 
halides. 
It must be remembered that none of these 
agents are effective against burning alkyl 
borane fuels. 247 They are effective to some 
degree against hydrogen-oxygen flames. 204. 221. 222 
Also, some alkyl halides intensify the com-
bustion of some fuels such as hydrazine.lss.ls6 
A completely different theory from that of 
Rosser et al. has been suggested by Creitz.54 • 55 
He proposed that as one of the key steps in 
combustion, O2- - ions are formed by capture 
of electrons produced from the ionization of the 
hydrocarbons. He suggests that halogens cap-
ture electrons rather than oxygen and thereby 
r-- ----------- , .-- ~- ---- -,-- --- --
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inhibit the step. This hypothesis has never 
been ruled out in laboratory studies of reaction 
mechanisms and must still be considered as 
possible. 
Halide Salts. A number of volatile inorganic 
halides have been found to be several times 
more effective than HBr, on an atom-for-atom 
basis, against hydrocarbon-air flames. 187 The 
molecules themselves appear to be the active 
inhibitors in a mechanism that differs from that 
of alkyl halides. Such compounds as BBra, 
POOla, PSOla, PBra, SbOla, SnOI4, and Ti04 
were most effective but were, unfortunately, 
corrosive and toxic. 
Finely Divided Salts. Suppression of hydro-
carbon,'30. lal. 187 hydrogen,211 and even hydra-
zine 155. 156 fires and detonations by finely divided 
alkali metal salts has been well studied in the 
past. Particles about 5}J. in diameter can 
evaporate on passage through the flame front. 
Those that evaporate most readily appear to 
be the most effective. The metal atoms of 
such salts as potassium bitartrate, sodium and 
potassium bicarbonate, and potassium oxalate 
have been used. The hydrated potassium and 
rubidium oxalates appear most effective. Pres-
ence of organic chlorides such as OHaCI appear 
to inhibit action of these salts, probably by 
tying up the metal ions with halogen ions. 
How do these salts suppress combustion? 
The metal atom may act (a) as a third body 
in free-radical recombinations, (b) as an 
intermediate in recombinations, or (c) as a 
deactivating agent for excited species (see 
Ohapter 1). The great advantage of these salt 
dusts is in the suppression of hydrogen-oxygen 
explosion. It must be remembered, however, 
that these salt dusts will not settle on a fire in 
zero gravity and will probably require forced 
propulsion through the flame front . 
Choice of Extinguishing Methods 
The choice of one extinguishing method over 
another in space vehicles is most difficult. In 
general, the whole hazard risk-detector-extin-
guishing sequence must be considered. Since 
the probabilities involved are still beyond the 
quantitative stage of assessment, it would seem 
best to review the basic principles on which the 
choice of agent may be based. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the 
four basic approaches to the extinguishment 
problem are listed in table 22. It would seem 
that for each station in a vehicle, an optimum 
approach may be outlined. Evacuation, when-
ever possible, is the method of choice, but is 
hindered by the suit-donning time or time to flee 
from sealed compartments. The ineffective-
ness of dilution against many propellant fires 
must also be kept in mind. The other suppres-
sion systems have their time and place as 
determined by vehicle and mission. 
The choice of an extinguishing agent to back 
up the evacuation method is determined by the 
following factors: 
(1) Specific gravity 
(2) Corrosive tendency against vehicle 
structure 
(3) Physiological toxicity 
(4) Electrical conductivity 
(5) Swelling of elastomers 
(6) Effectiveness against unusual fires. 
Specific Gravity and Corrosive Tendency. 
Table 23 presents the physical parameters of 
the most effective agents. It would appear 
that CO2, CF2Br2, OFaBr, CF2BrCF2Br, and 
CCl4 are the most favorable (in decreasing 
order) as far as specific gravity and corrosive 
potential are concerned. In the absence of 
gravity, of course, the specific gravity is not 
much of a factor, but when the craft is at rest 
on earth or on a planet the specific gravity 
promptly resumes its importance. 
Physiological Toxicity. The physiological 
toxicity of the cool and heated vapor against 
rats may be seen in table 24. It is clear that 
CO2 is best, followed by CFaBr. The group 
CH3Br, OH2BrOI, and OF2ClBr is less favorable. 
Finally, OCI4, CF2BrOF2Br, and CF2Br2 are 
the worst of all. The report of Engineer Re-
search and Development Laboratories 150 has 
been backed up by numerous studies of many 
other groups. (See refs. 50, 66, 111, 126, and 
160.) The time-concentration tolerance curves 
for 002 have recently been reviewed by 
Nevison 164 and are seen in figure 52. 
It must be remembered that pressure suits, 
if donned, will protect against toxic vapors. 
Even when the crew is in a "shirtsleeve" en-
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vironment, it may be possible to avoid toxicity 
by slowly venting the atmosphere and replacing 
it with fresh gas. The venting process itself, 
however, may create a gas current which can 
aggravate combustion under zero-gravity 
conditions. 
Electrical Oonductivity. The use of metal 
salts creates a hazard as far as electrical con-
duct ivity is concerned. Their use should 
probably be restricted to areas where hydro-
gen-oxygen explosions are a hazard. The 
alkyl halides and carbon dioxide are 
noncond ucting. 
Swelling oj Elastomers. The swelling of 
elastomers by the halogenated alkyl compounds 
is not a serious problem, but should be con-
sidered in the design of extinguishing-system 
components. Table 25 is an outline of the 
swelling characteristics for the most favorable 
agents. Bromotrifiuoromethane (CF3Br) ap-
pears to be the most satisfactory in this respect. 
Effectiveness Against Unusual Fires. Re-
search studies of extinguishing agents for exotic 
propellants are still underway.l6l· 182 . 189 . 219 
Laboratory tests have, in many cases, not 
proven satisfactory in predicting flame and 
combustion problems in the field. Table 26 
from Welch et al. 227 outlines the effective 
percentage concentration for propellant-air fires 
in small-scale laboratory tests. The best 
agent against hydrocarbons, CF3Br, was not 
studied. Full-scale fire tests showed these 
concentrations for ammonia fires to be inade-
quate. Combustion of materials like hydra-
zine is augmented by these agents. 155 . 156 
The meteoroid flash oxidation creates the 
problem of burning metals. As was discussed 
in Chapter 5, the use of magnesium inside 
cabins with high oxygen concentration is not 
recommended. If, however, other design cri-
teria make magnesium imperative, it will 
probably be wise to think of the special problem 
of extinguishing magnesium fires . Greenstein 
and Richman 91 have demonstrated that solu-
tions of 50 percent diisodecyl phthalate in 
bromochloromethane are effective against mag-
nesium fires. The phthalate solution acts as a 
coolant and bromo chloromethane forms a 
protective coating (MgCb) upon reaction with 
the magnesium surface. 
TABLE 23.-Physical Properties oj Extinguishing Agents [AFTER LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO. 136] 
Sp. gr. of Liq. den- Corrosion resistance ' of-
Extinguishing agent Mol. liquid at Boiling Freezing sity at 
wt. 70° F point, OF point, OF 70° F, 
I 
IAluminum lb/gal Steel Brass 
Carbon dioxide, CO2 ____________ 44 O. 76 -109.0 -110.0 6. 3 Corrosion re istance is high 
Methyl bromide, CH3BL ________ 94. 94 1. 67 40. 0 -135.4 14.0 { 42. 0 310 > 1,500 650. 0 250 >1,500 
Bromochioromethane, CH2BrCL_ 129. 4 1. 93 156.0 -123.7 16. 1 { 27 200 >1,500 280 1, 620 >1,500 
Dibromodifluoromethane, CF2Br2_ 209. 8 2. 27 76. 1 -222.9 19.0 { O. 8 O. 7 O. 7 62 375 55 
Bromotrifluoromethane, CF3Br ___ 148. 9 1. 57 -57.9 -270.4 13. 1 { 0.9 .1. 5 O. 7 b-91 b-35 59 
1 ,2-di bromotetrafluoroethane, { 1.5 5. 7 O. 4 CF2BrCF2Br _______________ -- 259. 8 2.15 117.5 -166.8 18.0 140 385 50 
Carbon tetrachloride, CCI4 _______ 153.8 1. 59 170. 1 -9.4 13. 3 { 1.5 8. 7 >1,500 93 213 54 
• Average penetration, (Inch/Month) X 10-6, upper figures dry, lower figures wet. These data are from tests 
by Jackson Lab., E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. 
b The minus sign indicates tightly bound scale forming in layers on a metal test strip rather than corrosion or 
penetration. 
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Application Engineering of Extinguishing Agents 
Current military practice has determined 
bromo chloromethane, CH2BrCI (Mil B-4394), 
and bromotrifluoromethane, CF3Br (Mil B-
12218), to be the most suitable agents as far as 
maximum effectiveness and minimal detri-
mental side effects are concerned. The quan-
tity of agent to be used in any situation is 
rather difficult to determine. The minimum quan-
t ity required depends on airflow and volume of 
compartment. Table 27 outlines the recom-
mended values for aircraft. 
It has been recommended for aircraft that 
in automatic systems the halogenated com-
pounds should be discharged within a maxi-
mum duration of 1 second and carbon dioxide 
within 1.25 to 1.35 seconds from 400 to 600 psi 
cylinders to attain the concentrations in table 28. 
It has also been recommended that these 
concentrations be maintained for at least 0.5 
second simultaneously throughout the cabin.136 
How well do these application recommenda-
tions apply to fires in spacecraft cabins? It 
appears that, in the past, fire-extinguishing 
systems have been specified on the basis of 
reaching or exceeding a given agent concentra-
tion for a given period of time. Presumably, 
these specifications are related to the fire-
extinguishing ability of a known concentration 
of agents against known fuel concentrations, as 
well as to the engineer's knowledge of past per-
formance of detector-extinguishment systems. 
To justify the use of a given space cabin fire-
extinguishing system through a risk study, it 
will be necessary to obtain performance data of 
a more quantitative nature than has been 
available in the past. The three necessary 
pieces of information are: The probability that 
in a given fire the system will be activated; the 
probability that a given extinguishing system 
will operate when activated; and the probability 
that its operation will successfully extinguish 
TABLE 24.-Physiological Properties oj Extinguishing Agents [AFTER LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO. 136] 
Approx. lethal con-
centration for 15 Warning of presence of toxic vapors by smell, irritation, cough-
min exposure of rats ing, and lachrymation 
Extinguishing agent 
(from ref. 150) 
Natural Vapor 
vapor, heated to Natural vapor Heated vapor 
ppm vol. 1,4700 F, 
ppm vol. 
Carbon dioxide, CO2 _____ 658, 000 658, 000 Odorless at low concentration; Odorless at low concentration ; 
acrid at high concentration. acrid at high concentration . 
Methyl bromide, CHa Br_ 5, 900 9, 600 Odorless, poisoning not immedi- Decomposition products are 
ately apparent, odorant added moderately irritating. 
by U.S.A. mfr. * 
Bromochloromethane, 29, 000 4, 000 Sweet odor ___________________ Decomposition products are 
CH2BrCI. exceedingly irritating. 
Dibromodifluoro- 54,000 1, 850 Heavy, ethereaL ______________ Decomposition products are 
methane, CF2Br2. extremely painful to inhale. 
Bromotrifluoro- 800, 000 14, 000 Slight, ethereaL ___ ____________ Acrid, irritating. 
methane, CFaBr. 
1,2-dibromotetrafluoro- 126, 000 1, 600 Slight, ethereaL _______ _____ ___ Acrid, irritating. 
ethane, CF2BrCF2Br. 
Carbon tetrachloride, 28, 000 300 Solventlike ______ 
------------
Decomposition products are 
CCl •. extremely painful to inhale. 
Bromochlorodifluoro- 324, 000 7, 650 Slight, ethereaL _______________ Acrid, irritating. 
methane, CF2ClBr. 
*Addition of odorant required by Government specification. 
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TABLE 25.-Swelling oj Elastomers in Fi1'e-
Extinguishing Agents (Maximum Percent In-
crease in Length at Room Temperature) [AFTER 
LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO.136] 
Extinguishing agent 
Carbon dioxide, CO2 _____ 
Bromochloromethane, 
CH2BrCI. 
D ibromodifiuoromethane, 
CF,Br. 
Bromotrifiuoromethane, 
CFaBr. 
1,2-dibromotetra-
fiuoroethane, 
CF,BrCF2Br. 
Carbon tetrachloride, 
CC4. 
Bromochlorodifiuoro-
methane, CF,ClBr. 
E lastomer* 
Per-
cent 
swell 
No swelling caused by CO2 
{Viton A __________ 4 
Silicone 23 ________ 10 
ButyL ___________ 15 
rOlY,"lfid. ------- 8 Thiokol FA _______ 8 
Hycar OR-15 _____ 11 
Buna N ____ ___ ___ 11 
Perbunan 26 ______ 23 
Perbunan 26 __ ____ 0 
Neoprene T ype 0 
GN-A. 
Hycar OR-15 _____ 1 
GR-S ____________ 1 
Thiokol F A ______ 1 
rhiOkOl FA ______ 4 
Neoprene Type 6 
GN-A. 
Hycar OR-15 ___ __ 7 
{Viton A __________ 1 
Polysulfide __ _____ 12 
Hycar OR-15 _____ 13 rutYL --- - -- - -- - - 2 Thiokol FA ____ __ 4 
Hycar OR-15 _____ 5 
*Materials for each extinguishing agent which ex-
hibited the lowest linear swelling in tests with a num-
ber of materials. Tests were conducted by E. 1. du 
Pont de 'emours & Co. by storing test strips in sealed 
glass tubes with the liquid agent for 2 weeks. 
the fire or, at least, increase the salvage value 
of the spacecraft system. Justification will be 
further influenced by the probability of detect-
ing the fire in time for the extingulshing system 
to have value. 
One type of study which is of value in 
assessing the overall problem is outlined in 
figure 53 . For those agents which are applied 
in, or are primarily effective in, gaseous form, 
TABLE 26 .-Extinguishing-Agent Concentrations 
jor Some Propellant-Air Fires (Laboratory 
Testing) [AFTER LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO. 136 
FROM THE DATA OF WELCH ET AL.227] 
Propellant Agent 
lcF2BrcF'BL-- - --- -CF2Br 2 __ __ _______ --Ammonia_ _ _ ___ __ __ _ CH2BrCL _________ _ CHaBr _____ ____ __ _ _ CO, _____________ _ _ 
lcH2BrcL- - - -- - - - --CHaBr ____ -- _ -- _ - --Aniline_ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ CO2 _________ - - ___ _ CF2BrCF2BL ____ ---CF 2Br, ____ ________ _ 
lcF2BrcF2BL- -- ----CF2Br 2 ___ __ ____ -- --EthanoL _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ CH,BrCL ___ ______ _ CHaBr ____ -- ____ ---co2 __ ________ -___ _ 
lcHaBr -- ---- - -- - - --CF2BrCF,BL _____ --Hydrogen___ _ _ __ __ _ _ CH2BrCL _________ _ CF2Br 2 ___ __ _ --- ----CO 2 _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
{
CF2Br CF2Br --- _ -- --
CH2BrCL __ ___ ___ --
MethanoL _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CF 2Br2 ___ _________ _ 
CHaBr _____ __ ___ __ _ 
CO 2 _ - - - ----- ------
Concen-
tration, 
% vol. 
<0.25 
<0.25 
<0.25 
O. 3 
4.7 
1.8 
1.9 
2.1 
2. 2 
3. 2 
5. 3 
5. 8 
8. 7 
11. 4 
14. 1 
15. 5 
17. 3 
31. 0 
34. 4 
52. 5 
16.8 
17.9 
20. 6 
21. 0 
27. 5 
lcF,BrcF2Br----- - -- 4.2 CF2Br2_____________ 8.6 Nitromethane _______ CH2BrCL__________ 12.4 CHaBL____________ 18.9 CO2 ________ _ ___ _ _ _ 21. 7 
F luorine_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ All agents except CO2 reacted 
with fluorine. 
extinguishment effectiveness can be represented 
by such a graph. Here the concentration of 
agent necessary to extinguish a hypothetical 
fire is plotted as a function of various conditions 
such as fuel concentration, initial (Tl ) and final 
(T2) reactant temperatures, and partial pres-
sures of oxygen and inert diluent gases in the 
atmosphere. As has been discussed, the OJo..'"Ygen 
and diluent gas pressures in the space cabin 
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TABLE 27.-Quantity oj Extinguishing Agents [AFTER LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO. 136] 
Agent Flow 
{
High _____ --
High ______ _ 
Bromotrifluoromethane, CFaBL _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ High ______ _ 
Low ______ _ 
No ___ __ __ _ 
j
High ______ _ 
High ______ _ 
Bromochloromethane, CH.BrCL _ _ _ ___ _ _ __ High ______ _ 
Low ______ _ 
{~~;h---~~~~~ High ______ _ Carbon dioxide, CO2 _____________________ High ______ _ Low ______ _ 
No _______ _ 
Compartment 
configuration 
Smooth _______________ _ 
Rough ________________ _ 
Very rough ____________ _ 
Smooth or rough ______ _ _ 
Smooth or rough _______ _ 
smooth _______________ _ 
Rough ________________ _ 
Very rough __ ___ _______ _ 
Smooth or rough _______ _ 
Smooth or rough _______ _ 
Smooth ___________ __ __ _ 
Rough ________________ _ 
Very rough ____________ _ 
Smooth or rough _______ _ 
Smooth or rough _______ _ 
Agent quantity, lb* 
0.25 W.+ 0.02V 
0.75 W.+0.02V 
1.25 W.+0.02V 
0.05V 
0.02V 
OAW.+0.025V 
1.2W.+ 0.025V 
2.0W.+O.025V 
0.06V 
O.025V 
O.5W.+ O.03V 
1.5W.+0.03V 
2.5 W.+ O.03V 
O.07V 
O.03V 
*W.=Pounds of air per sec passing through zone at cruising speed. V=Net volume of zone in cubic feet . 
are very critical in determining burning rates 
and temperatures. The effects of zero gravity, 
as they are more clearly defined, should be 
added to the other variables contributing to 
the design envelope. 
The weight-volume tradeoffs of extinguishing 
agents are of great importance in space opera-
tions. Agents are often rated by the minimum 
volume or weight percentage of agent that 
completely suppresses the flammability under 
the worst possible conditions. For example, 
in air at room temperature about 29 volume 
percentage of carbon dioxide is required under 
the most unfavorable conditions, while only 11 
to 15 percent of the alkyl halides is required.33 
On a total weight basis, however, the advantage 
of the halides is much less apparent. 
It is also possible to save weight and space 
by programing the application rate of extin-
guishing agents so as to account for the stage 
of development of the fire. To extinguish the 
flame with a minimum quantity of agent in a 
ventilated compartment or exposed location, 
the application rate should be high, so that the 
agent concentration is high. However, to pre-
vent reignition the agent must be supplied 
continuously for a period of time sufficient to 
allow possible ignition sources to cool or other-
wise be deactivated. It seems likely that the 
minimum agent concentration to prevent re-
ignition may be lower than that required for 
extinguishment. If this is true, it has not been 
recognized in the literature, and no known fire 
extinguishment system has employed a staged 
discharge flow to take advantage of such a 
situation .. 
It must be remembered that in the final 
full-scale fire protection tests, the space condi-
tion should be most closely simulated. Zero-
gravity conditions, of course, can be studied 
only in model systems set up in operational 
spacecraft or in an aircraft in zero-gravity 
TABLE 28.-Extinguishing-Agent Ooncentration 
[AFTER LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA CO .136] 
Agent 
CF3Br _________________ _ 
CH2BrCL ___ -- ____ - - - --
CO2 _ --- - -- - ----- - --- ---
Minimum concentration 
Percent 
wt. 
22 
36 
49 
Percent 
vol. 
6 
11 
37 
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FIGURE 53.-Flamrnability limits of a fuel as af-
fected by an extinguishing agent. ( AFTER C ARY 
ET AL.33) 
parabolas. It may be possible to obtain enough 
gravitational coefficients from experimental data 
to simulate this factor in full-scale ground tests 
by modifying the appropriate combustion para-
meters. It must also be remembered that 
because of the probable scattering effect at 
zero gravity, optimum nozzle velocity should 
be used to obtain the maximu::n blanketing 
effect for each agent. The appropriate nozzle 
velocity, ejection duration, and final concentra-
tion parameters for each agent needs to be 
simulated in mock cabins with complete interior 
configuration. The "fire pockets" between in-
struments and structures are a major factor in 
determining the design envelopes of the fire-
extinguishing system. 
For oxygen-supported fires of hydrocarbon-
type fuels, a substantial background of experi-
ence is available which may be applied, at least 
empirically, to the fire-extinguishment problem. 
However, for fires supported by other types of 
oxidants or involving radically different types 
of fuels, there is little experience. Experimen-
tal studies of the extinguishment of such fires 
should be started as soon as such oxidants or 
fuels are incorporated into planned future ve-
hicles; otherwise, logical evaluation of extin-
guishment systems will be impossible. 
----- '- - ._._ - --, 
CHAPTER 7 
Role of Fire and Blast Hazard 
in Selection of 
Space-Cabin Atmosphere 
REVIEW OF FIRE ACCIDENTS IN SPACE-CABIN 
EXPERIMENTS 
Those interested in the design of space cabins 
have been concerned recently by the occurrence of 
several fire accidents in high-oxygen environ-
ments. The first occurred in the space-cabin 
simulator at the USAF School of Aerospace 
Medicine, Brooks Air Force Base, TexasY' 226 
The data were obtained by oral communication 
with Drs. H. G. Olamann and B. Welch. Any 
errors of fact are the fault of the author. 
Several years ago during a space-cabin ex-
periment performed at an altitude of 33,000 
feet with 100 percent oxygen, a power tube in 
the TV cabin monitor overheated. The "resin" 
base of the tube ignited and hot plastic dripped 
out of the chassis onto coolant lines passing 
beneath. These coolant lines were covered with 
a Ruberoid insulation of an as yet undeter-
mined composition. The lines did not catch on 
fire. Fumes from the hot resin alerted the cabin 
crew. The mission was aborted without further 
damage to cabin or crew. Instead of focusing 
attention on the hazards of fire, the accident 
gave a "false sense of security." The fact that 
the molten resins or the Ruberoid insulation 
did not flame violently in 100 percent oxygen 
gave the investigators more confidence in the 
safety of this potentially hazardous environ-
ment than they had prior to the experience. 
In 1962, the two-man space-cabin simulator 
was being used to study temperature control 
factors in pressure suits and cabins. Two sub-
--- - --'--- ~~~-
jects were dressed in pressure suits with closed 
helmet visors. One subject had both inlet and 
outlet of his suit connected to the heat ex-
changer. The other subject had only the inlet 
side of the suit connected to the heat exchanger 
and was actually asleep when the fire broke 
out. The fire was not detected by the sight or 
smell of smoke. This is a very important point. 
The crewman saw a glow behind the instrument 
panel. Within several seconds the rear of the 
panel was ablaze. The crewman who was 
asleep awoke when the fire alarm went off and 
for some reason opened the visor of his helmet. 
He inhaled the fumes issuing from the blazing 
panel. The other crewman, who had his visor 
closed and both inlet and outlet air hoses 
attached to the heat exchanger, inhaled none 
of the cabin fumes directly. Both subjects 
reportedly "passed out." The one with the 
open visor suffered "respiratory tract damage," 
probably from the direct inhalation of fumes. 
His laboratory pulmonary-function tests have 
returned to normal. The subject with closed 
visor suffered no apparent respiratory tract 
damage even though he remained in the cham-
ber longer (2 to 3 minutes after he discovered 
the glow) than the other man with the open 
visor. Neither subject experienced clothing or 
body burns. The fire was extinguished with 
difficulty by means of a carbon dioxide device. 
The exact cause of the fire was not deter-
mined. The glow appeared at the back of the 
instrument panel where the wiring passed be-
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hind an access panel. The panel was not 
hinged (as first reported by rumor) but was 
opened by a "Dzus fastener." The flexion of 
wires "at a hinged edge of the panel" was 
evidently not, as previously reported to the 
author, responsible for the fire. The wires 
were in a 24 to 26 volt circuit. The circuit 
breaker or fuse system was operative when 
checked after the fire. There were apparently 
no obvious sites of defective circuitry. Damage 
by the fire, however, probably obscured any 
subtle defect that may have been responsible. 
The wire insulation was of polyvinyl plastic 
and was probably the major source of fuel. 
The Ruberoid insulation covering the coolant 
pipes also caught fire. The electrical insulation 
behind the instrument panel was totally burned. 
During the experiment the vapors in the 
cabin were being sampled in a cryogenic trap. 
The vapors and fumes generated during the fire 
were thus studied by both gas chromatography 
and infrared spectrophotography. The follow-
ing compounds were new or had levels above 
those ordinarily present in the cabin: benzene, 
diazomethane, ethyl ether, formaldehyde, in-
organic isocyanates, acetylene, methyl chloride, 
and ethyl chloride. The isocyanates were 
thought to come from the Ruberoid insulation 
on the coolant pipes. No polyurethane diiso-
cyanate foams were reported to have been on 
fire, though the Ruberoid may well have con-
tained this plastic as a component. It is of 
interest that no hydrogen chloride or phosgene 
was reported, since pyrolysis of polyvinyl chlo-
ride has been shown to produce these ma-
terials.4s It is possible, of course, that the 
screening tests were not able to detect these 
materials. It is not known how sophisticated 
a fire safety analysis was performed on the 
materials which were used in the cabin. 
The other fire occurred in 1962 at the Aircrew 
Equipment Laboratory of the Naval Air Center, 
Philadelphia, Pa. 152 The accident occurred in 
a chamber with an internal atmosphere of 100 
percent oxygen at 5 psi. Four men in the 
rhamber were taking part in experiments under 
the acceleration-atelectasis-oxygen toxici ty 
study reviewed in Part I of this report. 
A light bulb in the ceiling fix ture burned out. 
One man climbed up to replace the bulb. After 
the bulb was replaced, he heard a "sound like 
the arcing of a short circuit." A small flame 
(about Yz inch long) was seen coming from an 
insulated wire in the fixture. The composition 
of this insulation is still not known. The sub-
ject requested water but was told to snuff the 
fire out with a towel. The towel caught on fire 
and blazed so vigorously that it set the man's 
clothing afire. An "asbestos fire blanket" was 
used to snuff out the clothing fire, but it too 
burst into flames. The asbestos blanket re-
portedly had an organic filler or coating which 
"kept the asbestos from flaking off." The 
clothing of the other subjects who were using 
the blanket also caught on fire. Altogether 
four men received second-degree burns. It was 
not reported by what means the fire was finally 
brought under control. It was felt that the 
blanket and towel had been "saturated with 
oxygen for 17 days and burned much more 
vigorously than would be expected under sea 
level conditions." 
An interesting aspect of this case is the fact 
that burning insulation dripped from the light 
fixture onto a bunk. One crewman tried to 
snuff out the resulting fire, and "his skin caught 
on fire." The burns on his hands were "severe" 
and necessitated tre~tment for 11 or 12 days in 
the hospital. The cabin was being continuously 
vented and no analysis of the vapors was being 
performed at the time of the accident. No 
"unusual chemical extinguishers" were used on 
the fire. No symptoms of lung damage were 
reported. No formal report of this accident 
has as yet been published. 
Future experiments in this chamber are being 
planned . More thought has been given to 
details of the fire hazard. Showers or sprinklers 
will be installed in the cabin in case another fire 
accident occurs. 
These accidents illustrate in concrete fashion 
the potential dangers of 100 percent oxygen 
atmospheres. It can be argued that the lack 
of professional fire-safety engineering may have 
been a major factor in these accidents. The 
cabin fire at the USAF School of Aerospace 
Medicine does not appear to be a result of 
obvious human error. The prime factor in 
initiating the fire is still unknown. From the 
previous discussion of burning of electrical 
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insulation, it would appear that the choice of 
polyvinyl chloride was probably not optimum. 
One might also question the positioning of a 
Ruberoid insulated coolant pipe beneath or 
close to the electrical system. The design 
tradeoffs which determined these factors are 
not known. In an operational space vehicle 
such factors could possibly be avoided. 
In the Aircrew Equipment Laboratory fire, 
the basic defect of flaming insulation might 
not have been a serious event if the human errors 
in fighting the fire had not complicated the 
situation. Had asbestos or possibly silicone-
glass fiber insulation been used, the original 
flame might never have been initiated. Use of 
a flammable fabric to snuff out a fire in 100 
percent oxygen was certainly not the optimum 
approach, but in an acute emergency situation, 
such action is not entirely unexpected. Testing 
of the effectiveness of the asbestos fire blanket 
in 100 percent oxygen environments prior to 
the experiment would probably have averted 
some of the difficulties. 
ROLE OF OXYGEN AND INERT GASES IN THE 
FIRE HAZARD 
In both situations, either safety design or 
fire discipline might have prevented entirely the 
accidental fires. Nevertheless, it must be 
admitted that a 100 percent oxygen environ-
ment does present an unusual hazard in space 
cabins. How serious is the fire hazard pro-
duced by this environment? Will the addi-
tion of inert gases at rather low concentrations 
decrease the hazard to any degree? Let us 
review the theoretical and empirical data pre-
sented in Chapters 1 to 6 and pick out those 
combustion parameters in which the atmos-
pheric constituents playa major role. 
Ignition parameters will be discussed first. 
The electrostatic spark ignition of flammable 
gases is markedly affected by the presence of 
an inert diluent. As seen in figure 4, the 
addition of nitrogen to a mixture of propane 
and oxygen will increase minimum ignition 
energies by almost 2 orders of magnitude on 
going from 100 percent oxygen to 21 percent 
oxygen. At any given percentage of inert gas 
in the propane-oxygen mixture, halving the 
total pressure in the system will increase the 
minimum ignition temperature by a factor of 
5. A change from 21 percent oxygen at sea 
level to 100 percent oxygen at 5 psi should 
decrease the minimum ignition energy by a 
factor of 10. 
The relative effects of other inert gases were 
seen in tables 2 and 8. As will be discussed in 
Part III of this report, only helium, neon, and 
nitrogen will be contenders for the inert gas in 
sealed cabins. In table 2, it is seen that for 
increasing the minimum spark-ignition pressure, 
helium was more effective than nitrogen. This 
was also true for increasing the minimum spark-
ignition energy and increasing the quenching 
distance for both hydrogen-oxygen and meth-
ane-oxygen systems. Table 8 showed how 
helium is more effective by a factor of 2 to 3 
for both of these parameters in both combustion 
systems. It was pointed out that the electro-
static charge which can build up on a human 
body, if discharged, is capable of igniting a great 
many hydrocarbon-air mixtures. Most mix-
tures of hydrocarbon and pure oxygen within 
the limits of flammability would certainly be 
ignited by such a discharge. 
The ignition of gases or liquids by hot sur-
faces is dependent on the percentage of oxygen 
in the gaseous mixture as well as on the total 
pressure of oxygen in the system. The mini-
mum spontaneous-ignition temperatures of some 
hydraulic fluids can be reduced by almost a 
factor of 2 when the volume percentage of oxy-
gen in an air mixture is increased from 20 to 
100 (fig. 26). Some fluids are hardly affected 
by this change. The plate-ignition tempera-
tures of many fluids and fuels are reduced by 
the decrease in percentage of inert diluent or 
the increase of oxygen tension in air mixtures. 
Table 9 and figures 29 to 33 indicate the magni-
tude of change expected from these variations 
in atmospheric constituents. Figure 31, for 
instance, demonstrates that as the partial pres-
sure of pure oxygen is increased from 4 in. Hg 
(2 psi) to 10 in. Hg (5 psi) the plate-ignition 
temperature of the hydraulic fluid MLO-8200 
decreases from 1,100 0 F to 560 0 F. The rate 
and temperature of burning of these fluids is 
markedly increased . by increases in oxygen 
partial pressure or by decreases in percentage 
of diluent gas. The explosion potential in-
102 FIRE AND BLAST HAZARD S 
creases accordingly. It should be remembered 
that the physical parameters of the test vessel 
are subtly critical in modifying the specific de-
termination of ignition temperature for any 
gaseous system. 
The ignition temperature or minimum burn-
ing current of insulated electrical wire is 
markedly affected by the partial pressure of 
oxygen and percentage of inert diluent. Fig-
ure 34 and tables 10 to 12 indicate the magni-
tude of this effect with different insulating 
materials. The variation in response to these 
atmospheric parameters by different plastic 
insulations is marked. Optimum selection of 
insulation in space cabins requires review of 
such data. 
Ignition of flammable materials by heated 
gases such as those produced by pilot flames, 
adiabatic compression, shock waves, and mete-
oroid penetration is also dependent on oxygen 
concentration. It would appear that only in 
the case of hypergolic ignition is the atmos-
pheric oxygen or diluent not a major factor. 
The limits of fiammability of almost all com-
bustible gases or vapors are determined by the 
partial pressure of oxygen and by the percentage 
concentration of diluent gas. In general, the 
upper (rich) limit is greatly elevated by in-
creasing the oxygen pressure or decreasing the 
percentage of diluent gas. This is seen in 
figure 4 for the propane-oxygen-nitrogen sys-
tem. The range of limits of flammability is 
changed from 2-10 percent to 2-40 percent 
propane by increasing the percentage of oxygen 
from a sea-level environment to a 100 percent 
oxygen environment. The range of explosion 
limits is also widened by increasing the partial 
pressure of oxygen and decreasing the percent-
age concentration of diluent. 
Inert gases affect the range of flammability 
limits in a way which is greatly modified by the 
physical environment other than the atmos-
phere itself. In table 2 it can be seen that for 
wide tubes, nitrogen is more effective in de-
creasing the flammability range of hydrocarbon-
oxygen systems than is helium, while in narrow 
tube3 helium is more effective. The direction 
of propagation is also critical. Table 7 indi-
cates that the relative effects of nitrogen, 
helium, and argon vary from fuel to fuel and 
with direction of propagation. The complexi-
ties generated by the experimental variables 
make a clear-cut evaluation of the relative 
"safety" of the inert diluents most difficult for 
these gaseous combustion systems. 
Once ignition occurs in a system that lies 
within the limits of flammability, both the rate 
and the temperature of burning are markedly 
affected by the oxygen and inert-gas parameters. 
Figures 14 to 18 indicate the magnitude of these 
effects for burning fabrics. A very important 
quantitative point is brought out in figure 18 . 
The rate of burning of cotton fabric in a 5 psi, 
100 percent oxygen environment is 3.7 times the 
rate in the 8,000-foot-altitude air cabin main-
tained in current pressurized high-altitude 
aircraft. Comparative rates for other oxygen-
nitrogen mixtures may be determined from this 
graph. 
Tables 3 to 5 and figures 20 to 23 indicate how 
slight increases in the percentage of oxygen in 
air markedly affect the burning rates of many 
differen t fabrics. These tables and figures also 
indicate that fireproofing techniques which are 
adequate for sea-level air conditions fall quite 
short of adequately protecting fabrics in atmos-
pheres with elevated percentages of oxygen. 
The modification of fireproofing capacity by re-
duction in total pressure along with elevation in 
partial pressure of oxygen has not yet been 
adequately studied. This area deserves further 
work. 
The effect of inert gases on the rate of burning 
of premixed gaseous hydrocarbons and hydrogen 
flames has received much study. These com-
bustion systems have much less relevance to 
space-cabin environments than do nonhomo-
geneous solid, liquid, and vapor systems. The 
magnitude of inert-gas effects cannot be directly 
extrapolated from the well-mixed gaseous sys-
tems to the nonhomogeneous vapor, solid, and 
liquid systems. 
In figures 13 and 24, it can be seen that for 
the gaseous hydrocarbon or hydrogen combus-
tion systems, nitrogen is far more effective 
than argon or helium in retarding the fiame 
speed in burner experiments. From figures 
17 and 19 it can be seen that nitrogen is only 
slightly more effective than helium in retarding 
the rate of burning of fabrics. In both the 
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gaseous and fabric combustion systems, however, 
the percentage of diluent does have a marked 
effect on flame speed or burning rate regard-
less of what diluent is used. For example, in 
figure 24 (b) , increasing the percentage of 
helium, argon, and nitrogen gas from 0 to 80 
percent will decrease the flame speed of a 
propane-oxygen burner system from 11 It/sec 
to about 1 to 3 ft/sec. 
It is important to realize that the tempera-
ture of the combustion system is also reduced 
by addition of inert diluent gases. Figure 25 
indicates that for several hydrocarbon and 
hydrogen systems, increasing the diluent gas 
from 50 volume percent to 80 volume percent 
will decrease burning temperature from about 
2,600° K to 1,600° K. This is also true in 
the burning of liquids and solids . Reduction 
of rate and temperature of burning by inert 
gases has a great effect on the fire and detona-
tion hazard. As the time scale of combustion 
phenomena is reduced, deflagration or flame 
phenomena are, in specific systems, converted 
to detonation phenomena. As the rate and 
temperature of combustion are reduced, the 
chlLDces of secondary detonation are reduced, 
as are the chances of secondary fires in materials 
with higher ignition temperatures. 
In the overall deflagration hazard it is, 
therefore, difficult to assess the exact safety 
factor which an inert gas contributes. This 
is also true in the case of the meteoroid blast 
and flash hazard. In the studies of simulated 
meteoroid penetration it was clear that the 
intensity of the light flash and subsequent 
burning of animals was markedly affected by 
the presence of nitrogen in the environment . 
In the Ling-Temco-Vought studies, penetration 
into a 5 psi, 100 percent oxygen environment 
resulted in a light flash 7 times as intense as in 
a sea-level environment. Interestingly enough, 
the light flftsh appeared more intense in a 
5 psi 100 percent oxygen environment than 
in a 14.7 psi 100 percent oxygen environment. 
The blast overpressures, however, appeared 
little affected by the oxygen concentration in 
the cabin. The revised penetration-probability 
figures suggest a minimal weighting of the 
meteoroid blast factor in a choice of cabin 
atmospheres for current cislunar missions. 
FIRE RISK OF HIGH-OXYGEN LOW-INERT-GAS 
ENVIRONMENTS 
After reviewing these data, is there actual 
justification for eliminating 100 percent oxygen 
environments in space cabins as an excessive 
risk? The argument against this step may be 
mustered as follows. 
All the data presented in this report are of 
an idealized nature. The probability of having 
fires of the well-mixed homogeneous gaseous 
variety is extremely low. Hydraulic systems, 
machinery requiring lubricants, propellants, 
and all of the hazardous equipment and con-
ditions outlined in Chapter 6 can be eliminated 
from the cabin. Only electrical insulation, 
clothing and other fabrics, mattress or padding 
materials, and paper are the fuels which can-
not be eliminated. Proper fireproofing and 
choice of these materials and adequate fire 
discipline in the crew as outlined in Ohapter 6 
will reduce the hazard in even these combustion 
systems to a negligible minimum. 
The problem of meteoroid penetration and 
resultant flash and blast hazard is significant 
only for missions in the asteroid belt. About 
the earth and in cislunar space the probability 
of being penetrated by a meteoroid is ex-
tremely small. The latest calculations pre-
sented in Ohapter 5 of this report indicate 
that for spacecraft with 28 square meters of 
surface area, an aluminum skin 0.03cm thick, and 
no meteoroid shield system, the chances of 
being penetrated by meteoroids in the vicinity 
of the earth is once every 2.3 years . Addition 
of a bumper and absorption core, with possibly 
little addition in overall weight, will reduce 
this probability by a factor of 10. These 
probabilities are for minimal penetrating 
masses. What if the craft is penetrated by 
such a small particle? From the studies of 
the Ling-Temco-Vought group, it would appear 
that the flash and blast from minimftl pene-
trating particles would not excessively en-
danger a creWlnan at the center of a typical 
space cabin. It would take an extremely 
rare particle of large mass to be a significant 
factor as a space-cabin hazard. As justifica-
tion for the addition of inert gases to space-
cabin systems, the meteoroid hazard should be 
relegated to the bottom of the list. 
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What about protective systems? If auto-
matic fire detection and extinguishing devices 
are considered for large space-cabin systems 
where remoteness of crew from trouble spots 
becomes a factor, the fire risk is further reduced. 
The vacuum of space and the potential for 
rapidly eliminating oxygen from the cabin 
environment by venting the atmosphere is a 
tremendous safety factor. It is true that in 
the "shirtsleeve" environment projected for 
long-range space missions, this safety factor 
will be limited by the time required for donning 
suits or exiting to an emergency compartment. 
However, in "cWTent missions" where lack of 
experience weighs heavily in the fire risk, 
crews will probably be in pressure suits through-
out the entire flight profile. The venting 
mechanism will, therefore, be available when 
it is needed the most. 
What about gravity? From the discussion 
in Chapter 1, zero gravity will most probably 
reduce the fire hazard rather than increase it. 
Therefore, should not elimination of forced 
convection allow zero gravity to "put out fires"? 
As was pointed out, the degree of hazard re-
duction is open to question and cannot be 
determined from theoretical considerations. 
Empirical data are obviously required to an-
swer this question. The only zero-gravity 
factors that augment combustion are the 
creation of ignition hot spots and the reduction 
of heat transfer from the flame front due to 
lack of convection. Since potential hot spots 
can be predetermined, this unfavorable zero-
gravity interaction can be eliminated by good 
safety design. It appears, therefore, that one 
may rely, but not too heavily, on zero gravity 
to reduce the fire risk. 
After considering all the above arguments, 
is not the concern about fire and blast risk 
re ulting from 100 percent oxygen environments 
only academic? At first sight, the arguments 
presented do seemingly reduce the concern . 
It is easy to say that sophisticated safety design 
will eliminate ignition sow'ces and fuels and 
that training will eliminate human errors. 
It is also easy to rely on the dumping of cabin 
pressure, zero-gravity fire attenuation, and 
detector-extinguisher systems as backup for 
potential design failmes. It is difficult, how-
ever, to assign to many of these factors a 
probability of success or failure. The ultimate 
question, of comse, is this: Is the increase in 
overall probability of mission failme brought 
about by the fire risk of 100 percent oxygen 
environments greater than the overall proba-
bility of failme brought about by the added 
weight and complexity of a multigas cabin sys-
tern? The fire risk of 100 percen t oxygen is 
one aspect of the problem. The risk of oxygen 
toxicity discussed in Part I of this report is 
another. The two must be added together to 
assess the overall risk of 100 percent o>"'y-gen 
environments. Can the risk attributable to 
a 100 percent oxygen environment as opposed 
to inert-gas systems be determined in a more 
quantitative fashion with regard to fire hazard 
than it could be with regard to physiological 
oxygen toxicity? The answer is probably 
"not at this stage of the game." There are 
not enough quantitative data on the non-
Effects of 
pressure, 
gravity f orces , 
dilution, etc. 
Further 
malfunctions 
• Quantity, density, and configuration 
of materials 
• Heat-release rate 
FIGURE 54.-The fire situation. (AFTER CARY ET 
AL.33) 
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homogeneous, multifactored fuel-oxidant in-
teractions that represent the space-cabin fire 
hazards to assign valid probabilities. How 
does one approach the problem of estimating 
these probabilities? 
ESTIMATION OF OVER ALL FIR E HAZARD IN 
ENGINEERING DESIGN 
In their recent review of the reliability of 
flight-vehicle fire protective equipment, Cary 
et al.33 have presented a framework for a pos-
sible approach to the quantitative evaluation 
of fire risk. Let us briefly review some of these 
basic concepts, with emphasis on the gaseous 
atmosphere. 
The probability of fire is only one component 
of the overall mission hazard. Thus, the proba-
bilityof the overall mission hazard PH may be 
represented by the relation 
where the probability of fire PI is one compo-
nent. The event of fire depends on the coin-
cidence of a combustible fuel, an oxidizer (not 
necessarily in stoichiometric quantities), and an 
ignition source. An expression for the proba-
bility of fire may be written as follows: 
PI=PjPcPO 
where 
P, probability of fire associated with each 
class of materials in cabin 
Pi probability of malfunction causing a suit-
able ignition source (equal to 1.0 if fuel 
and oxidant spontaneously inflame) in 
the normal environment 
Pc probability of available combustible fuel 
(taken as 1.0 if fuel material is present, 
or some value from 0 to 1.0 if fuel 
availability depends on malfunction or 
other circumstance) 
Po probability of available oxidizer (taken as 
1.0 if oxidizer is presf'nt, or some ntlue 
from 0 to 1.0 if oxidizer ayailability 
depends on malfunction or other 
rircumstance) 
Fiaure 54 is a schematic representation of 
the c probability relationships. The growth 
and propagation of a fire will depend on the 
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type and amount of fuel and oxidizer available 
and the geometry or arrangement. Obviously, 
when an excess of fuel is present, the burning 
rate is proportional to the rate of introduction 
of the oxidizer. When an excess of oxidizer is 
present, the burning rate is proportional to the 
rate of supply of the fuel. Reduced pressure 
and addition of inert diluents tend to slow down 
the reaction. As the fire grows in intensity, 
areater amounts of fuel may become available, b 
and further malfunctions caused by the fire may 
lead to fire situations in other areas. 
For each compartment it seems possible, in 
concept at least, to determine a hazard index. 
An index would express the total heat energy 
that would be present as a function of tempera-
ture (with time implicit) when the fuel mate-
rials available were burned. The total high-
energy index for a hypothetical compartment 
might take the form shown in figure 55. The 
calculation of the index itself will be discussed 
below. The sequence illustrated assumes that 
the most easily ignited material has been ignited 
by a minimum ignition source. As the total 
thermal energy within the compartment in-
creases and the average compartment tempera-
ture increases, more fuels or oxidants become 
available to the fire, and the heat released 
increases in discon tinuous steps corresponding 
to the ignition temperature or flash point. of 
these secondary fuel sources. At some POlllt, 
106 FIRE AND BLAST HAZARDS 
the detonation hazard appears to complicate 
the picture. 
It is quite clear that the actual degree of 
hazard depends upon a large number of specific 
characteristics which have already been re-
viewed: 
(1) Flammability limits (variation with tem-
perature, pressure, and fuel-oxidant combina-
tions) 
(2) Chemical reactivity 
(3) Heat of combustion 
(4) Ignition temperature and minimum igni-
tion energy and quenching distance 
(5) Character of products (toxic, corrosive, 
noxious) 
(6) Rate of pressure rise and pressure ratio 
(7) Flame speeds 
(8) Vapor pressures 
(9) Range of hypergolicity of fuel-oxidant 
com bina tions 
(10) Heats of vaporization 
(11) Detonation characteristics 
It is obvious from our review that the role of 
inert gases in each of these characteristics is 
quite complex in itself and dependent on the 
physical parameters of the specific combustion 
hazard in question. It would require an extra-
ordinary amount of full-scale in situ experi-
mentation to define these parameters ade-
quately. 
In view of the obvious difficulties of attempt-
ing a rigorous definition and calculation of a 
hazard index, the simplified concept in figure 
55 may be used as a very rough approx"imation. 
The index could be determined as follows: 
where 
H hazard index 
he maximum total heat-energy release from all 
possible combustion reactions within the 
compartment 
Cp average heat capacity of all materials 
within the compartment 
M total mass of all materials within the 
compartment 
Given sufficient information, values of the 
hazard index coulc;l be determined for each 
increment of time after initiation of combustion 
as indicated in figure 55. It would be necessary 
to determine what kind of fire is most likely to 
initiate the fire sequence. For a given com-
partment configuration, different. ignition 
sources can initiate the fire sequence as the 
temperature rises. This is illustrated concep-
tually in figure 56. At the lowest temperature, 
powerful ignition sources would be required. 
As the temperature rises, weaker ignition 
sources may become effective, until finally 
spontaneous ignition occurs . 
It has been assumed in this discussion that 
the design configuration would make use of 
compartmentation. The importance of effec-
tive thermal barriers between compartments is 
evident. The full scale of compartmentation 
can be achieved only if the barriers can shield 
adj acent units from the heat released by burn-
ing fuels inside the compartment. Such ar-
rangements could serve to isolate the high-fire-
hazard units that could not otherwise be elimi-
nated. Further reduction in the probahility of 
fire may be gained if the compartments or 
packages can be positioned so that high-fire-
hazard compartments are surrounded by low-
fire-hazard compartments. As the size and 
content of each compartment is reduced, per-
haps to the level of individual compartments 
(i .e., packages), probability of fire would be 
likelv to decrease also. 
The probabilities of reducing the overall fire 
risk by inclusion of semi- or fully-automatic 
fire detecting and extinguishing systems can be 
determined. As outlined in Chapter 6, these 
probabilities must be calculated in the light of 
the unusual gaseous components of the atmos-
p.here and zero-gravit.y conditions. The re-
view of Cary et a1.33 outlines in detail the 
research work which is still required to allow 
complete reliability analysis of detection-ex-
tinguishment systems. 
How helpful is the historical approach? Can 
the experience with fires in operational aircraft. 
be used to obtain empirical probability factors 
for sueh an overall fire-hazard analysis? The 
answer is probably no. In operational aircraft 
cabins one is dealing with air atmospheres at 
reduced pressures. Experience with aircraft 
fires is, therefore, limited to only OI"le possible 
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parameter in the space-cabin atmosphere. It 
should also be remembered that the necessity 
for fire risk analysis in aircraft is based on a 
different requirement than is the risk analysis 
in space cabins. In aircraft, cabins, the design 
of the cabin and the atmospheric constituents 
are basically fixed. The risk-regret, analysis of ' 
the fire hazard-detection-extinguishment profile 
is required for a decision relative to the necessity 
for and design of a supplementary fire protec-
tion system. In the space cabin, such an 
analysis is required for the actual cabin design 
and choice of atmosphere. This actually puts 
the cart before the horse and thereby compli-
cates the whole picture. 
AN INTUITIVE APPROACH TO THE CHOICE 
OF ATMOSPHERE 
It appears that t,he ultimate decision relative 
to the weigbting of the fire hazard in the total 
800 
600 
Spontaneous 
ignition 
selection of a space-cabin atmosphere will be 
made on a semiquantitative level with intuition 
playing a major role. The time needed for 
more quantitative appraisal of the fire problem 
appears to run well beyond the maximum time 
available for engineering decisions regarding 
single- versus multi-gas systems. 
This general appraisal of the situation may 
be started by recognizing that the safest cabin 
atmosphere is air at reduced pressure. The 
8,OOO-foot atmosphere used in current high-
altitude aircraft cabins is about as safe as can 
be in the tradeoff between fire hazard and 
physiological hazard. Lower air pressure would 
decrease the cabin fire hazard. If an 11 psi 
cabin pressure were beyond engineering capa-
bilities, or if a lower pressure were deemed 
desirable to reduce the decompression hazard 
(Part III of this report), a decrease in pressure 
and concomitant increase in partial pressure of 
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FIGURE 56.-Concept of probability of initiatio n of fire f o r hypothetical compartment. (AFTER CARY 
ET AL.33) 
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oxygen would be required. There appears to 
be no clear-cu t threshold in the fire hazard as 
the percentage of oxygen is increased. In-
creasing the oxygen generally affects all the 
com bustion parameters in the direction of in-
creasing the hazard. However, as Wolfhard ~43 
points out, it is probably the first moderate 
increase of oxygen index that changes the fire 
hazard most severely. 
'The sensitivity of response of each combustion 
parameter to elevation in percentage of oxygen 
is different. Minimum ignition energy for 
~lectrostatic sparks is probably the most 
sensitive. Other parameters follow behind at 
varying degrees of sensitivity. It is difficult 
to a:rbitrarily set a given limit for tolerable 
hazard even in such clear-cut factors as mini-
inum spark-ignition energies or rates of burning 
of fabrics. 
As far as the choice of inert gas is concerned, 
the decision is again too complex for an ap-
proach other than the intuitive. Helium 
appears to be safer than nitrogen as far as 
spark-ignition parameters are concerned, but 
is a much poorer choice in the case of the 
rate of burning of premixed gaseous systems. 
Nitrogen is also very slightly safer in terms 
of the rate of burning of fabric materials. 
Wolfhard 243 feels that, overall, nitrogen is the 
safer of the two gases. 
eon lies between helium and nitrogen in 
narrowing the limits of flammability in 
hydrogen-oxygen systems. 0 other data were 
obtained for neon. This gas may well be a 
good compromise in the overall reduction of 
fire hazards. The choice of inert gas will 
probably be determined by factors other than 
combustion parameters (to be discussed in 
Parts III and IV of this report). 
In conclusion, it cannot be stated with 
certainty on the basis of present data that, 
as regards fire hazard alone, 100 percent oxygen 
should be eliminated as an atmospheric 
environment in space cabins. The closer to 
the 8,000-foot air atmosphere one can get, 
the safer the choice. Any compromise of this 
"ideal" should be in favor of more inert diluent 
and lower total preSSUl'e. The more closely 
the ideal fire-prevention design and the ideal 
detection and extinguishing systems outlined 
in Chapter 6 are approximated, the less 
significant becomes the choice of atmosphere. 
l 
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